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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is motivated by the significance of natural shocks for agricultural households 
in Thailand, which form the majority of the country’s poor. It contributes to the existing 
literature by providing recent evidence from Thailand, where current research in this field 
is limited. Three empirical studies were carried out to examine the relationships between 
shocks, household welfare, and behaviour, using variations in the measures of shocks and 
across different contexts.    
The first study estimates the reduced-form effects of rainfall shocks on household income 
and consumption expenditure, and examines how farming households respond to such 
shocks. Two explicit measures of extreme rainfall events are constructed from a primary 
rainfall time series in order to track the incidence of excessive and deficit rainfall on the 
basis of the rainfall variability. The analysis is based on a pseudo-panel of repeated 
cross-sectional household surveys conducted between 2006 and 2010, combined with 
provincial-based measures of rainfall shocks. The results show evidence of consumption 
smoothing but not of income smoothing in which crop income is highly sensitive to 
rainfall shocks. Farming households can earn income from off-farm employment and 
asset sales in compensation for crop income loss. Landless households are more affected 
by rainfall shocks than better-off households. Dissaving and asset sales are prevalent 
options in response to extreme rainfall events.  
The second study considers a particular catastrophic event of the mega flood in 2011 and 
examines its impacts on household preferences, subjective expectations, and behaviour. 
This study draws on a survey that was conducted in 2014 in four key rice-growing 
vi 
provinces in Thailand’s central, lower north, and north-east regions, which were severely 
affected by the flood. Experiencing the mega flood made non-flood-prone households 
more risk averse, more impatient, and more altruistic. They also adjusted upward their 
subjective expectations of future severe floods and public insurance, while reducing the 
dependability of social networks and self-reliance. The flood influenced households’ 
behaviour, in that flooded households were less likely to have savings and to engage in 
self-insurance mechanisms, as well as to make productive investments, but more likely to 
take out crop insurance.  
The third study provides a comparative analysis of multiple types of shocks by analysing 
the distribution of shocks, their consequences, and how affected households cope with 
different shocks. Based on a panel survey of rural and urban households from 2010 and 
2012, the results show that natural and health shocks are the most common shocks and 
that shocks are not uniformly distributed across households but vary according to 
demographics, livelihoods, and economic status. Imperfect consumption smoothing is 
evident in that households cannot fully insure their consumption against illnesses and 
economic shocks. The effects of shocks on household consumption and risk-coping 
responses also vary by wealth level. Shocks reduce consumption expenditure among 
poorer households but lead to overspending among richer households. Asset-abundant 
households are more likely to resort to their own savings or to deplete assets, while asset-
poor and resource-constrained households prefer to cut their consumption expenditure or 
rely on external credit and assistance from relatives.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
Agricultural households in Thailand are the majority of the country’s poor. Not only are 
they poor, but their lives are constantly subject to sources of risk, mostly from the natural 
environment.1 Tropical storms, floods, droughts, and crop pests are common threats to 
farmers in many parts of Thailand. In addition to the natural occurrence of shocks, 
farmers are also exposed to idiosyncratic shocks such as economic and health shocks, 
often at the same time, thus making their lives even more difficult. Experiencing shocks 
can result in income volatility and consumption shortfall. When financial resources and 
access to formal safety nets are limited, such shocks potentially induce poverty traps.  
The livelihood of agricultural households has been a focal point of government policy as 
agriculture has long been the mainstay of the Thai economy as the primary employer, 
covering roughly 40 percent of the total labour supply over the past decade. 
The main focus of this thesis is the effect of natural shocks on the welfare of Thai 
agricultural households, as well as their behaviour in response to natural shocks.  
It provides recent evidence from Thailand where current research in this field has been 
limited by using variations in the measures of shocks and across different contexts. 
Understanding the effects of shocks and how affected households respond to shocks can 
                                                          
1  There are many definitions of risk in different points of view. In general, risk implies future 
uncertainty about deviation from expected earnings (or outcomes) or the possibility that something 
unpleasant or unwelcome will happen. For the term ‘shock’ used in this thesis, it is the manifestation 
of risk reflecting the occurrence of an unexpected and usually upsetting event or experience that could 
lead to undesired welfare outcomes.  
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provide valuable insights into the problems with existing informal coping mechanisms 
and how to develop and improve safety net programs that could help prevent vulnerable 
households from falling into poverty. This chapter provides an introduction to the 
incidence of adverse natural events in the past, the role of government as an insurer, as 
well as a brief theoretical overview of the main studies in this thesis.  
The overview of natural hazards in Thailand and other countries in Southeast Asia over 
the past 35 years is given in Table 1.1. Hydro-meteorological events such as floods and 
tropical storms were the most common shocks in the region, accounting for more than  
75 percent of the registered shocks. Thailand experienced about three events per year 
during this period, with two of these being floods. Few earthquakes and landslides 
occurred in Thailand and most of these have had moderate impacts, except for the 2004 
Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami which was the deadliest natural disaster ever 
recorded in Thailand with more than 8,300 lives lost. There were substantial numbers of 
earthquakes and volcanic events in the region, mostly scattered across Indonesia and the 
Philippines. Thailand has suffered relatively more from droughts compared to other 
countries in the region, with over 30 million people affected. These drought events can 
be explained by the country’s poor irrigation system − only 20 percent of farmland is 
irrigated areas, concentrated mostly in the central region.  
Local evidence of droughts and floods in Thailand during 1989-2013 is presented in 
Table 1.2 and Table 1.3, respectively. Droughts usually occur in the dry season starting 
from November to May the following year. The natural cause of droughts can be lower 
than average rainfall, long delays in the onset of rain, or an uneven distribution of rain. 
The problem has been worsened by excess water usage for agriculture and industrial 
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production as well as deforestation. Severe droughts typically occurred every three to 
five years, such as in 1999, 2005, 2010, and 2013, with some of these being exacerbated 
by the El Niño phenomenon. Given the country’s poor irrigation system, the occurrence 
of droughts impose a greater burden to agricultural households. Floods are the most 
frequent occurring natural hazards in Thailand with the average of nine events per year. 
The usual period for flooding is during the monsoon season, between June and 
November. The flood in 2011 was recorded as the largest flood to have hit Thailand over 
half a century. It was also the most destructive natural disaster in Thailand’s modern 
history and the second deadliest disaster, only ranked behind the 2004 Indian Ocean 
earthquake and tsunami.  
The Thai government plays an important role in providing natural disaster relief, either in 
cash or in kind. The largest share of the government budget is devoted to the case of 
floods, followed by droughts. The statistics indicate that floods affect households in 
general, not just farming households, and cause relatively more damage to household 
income and capital as compared to droughts, which results in higher compensation 
payments. Agricultural households are eligible for compensation when their property or 
production activity is affected (totally or partially) and if they are located in officially 
declared disaster areas. However, there have been discussions about the efficiency of 
local authorities who are responsible for assessing the actual loss and damage since the 
compensation scheme depends heavily on self-reported claims by the victims.  
This thesis fits into two broad sets of literature regarding the relationships between 
shocks, household welfare, and behavioural responses. The first set of literature considers 
the adverse impacts of income risk on household consumption that is caused by a variety 
4 
of shocks. Shocks are differentiated by several characteristics, including their frequency 
and intensity, the persistence of their impacts, and whether shocks are covariate or 
idiosyncratic. Income risk could also translate into consumption fluctuation (Morduch, 
1995; Dercon, 1996). Households may undertake actions to mitigate negative impacts of 
shocks and to insulate their consumption. Alderman and Paxson (1992) present two 
broad classifications of possible strategies for dealing with the consequences of shocks. 
Risk-management strategies attempt to reduce risk and the variability of income ex-ante 
(income smoothing). Income diversification and income skewing are examples of this 
kind.2 Risk-coping strategies help mitigate the subsequent effects of income risk on 
consumption ex-post (consumption smoothing). Such strategies include self-insurance, 
formal market mechanisms, and informal risk-sharing arrangements within a particular 
network. However, there are limitations to managing and coping with risk such that not 
everyone can fully benefit from these strategies. These limitations are due to incomplete 
credit and insurance markets and the fact that some strategies are asset-based, thus 
preventing asset-poor households from using them. Finally, dealing with shocks may also 
come at an additional cost, especially from diversifying sources of income, incurring debt, 
and depleting productive assets.  
Another set of literature considers the consequences of natural disasters on individuals’ 
preferences, beliefs, and behaviour. Natural disasters can be traumatic events that occur 
infrequently, but cause great damage. Cavallo and Noy (2010) point out the difference 
between direct and indirect damages caused by natural disasters. Direct damages include 
                                                          
2 Dercon (2004) refers to two types of strategies for income smoothing. Income diversification can be 
achieved by diversifying income sources that are not perfectly covariate or having low positive 
covariance. Income skewing can be achieved by allocating resources to take up low-risk activities in 
order to lower risk, but often at the cost of low returns. 
5 
mortality and morbidity, and damages to assets and capital. Indirect effects refer to 
damages to the production of goods and services that will not take place directly 
following the disaster and because of it. These indirect costs include income loss and 
consumption shortfall at the household level, as well as the macroeconomic impacts on 
the economy’s performance. In addition, largely unexpected and severe disasters may  
in turn affect individual behaviour by altering preferences and subjective expectations  
of risk frequency and intensity (Cameron and Shah, 2012). These behavioural changes 
could have implications for individual’s long-term economic development and resilience 
to future disaster risks.          
This thesis is comprised of three empirical studies presented in Chapters 2 to 4, which 
focus on the consequences of shocks on household welfare, coping responses, and 
behaviour. Each study differs from one another, mainly in the application of shocks, 
datasets, and outcome variables. Chapter 5 summarises key findings of the three studies 
and provides an overall discussion of the research. 
The study in Chapter 2, entitled ‘The Economic Impacts of Extreme Rainfall Events on 
Farming Households: Evidence from Thailand’, estimates the reduced-form effects of 
rainfall shocks on various measures of household income and consumption expenditure. 
The main objective is to examine how farming households smooth their income and 
consumption when hit by rainfall shocks and whether or not they engage in any coping 
mechanisms in response to such shocks. The empirical analysis is based on a pseudo-
panel of repeated cross-sectional farm household surveys during 2006-2010, combined 
with the provincial-based measures of rainfall shocks in each year. Using a primary 
rainfall time series, two explicit measures of rainfall shocks are constructed to track the 
6 
prospect of having too much and too little rain, both of which are particularly important 
for farming activities. These constructed variables define the incidence of excessive and 
deficit rainfall based on the variability of rainfall conditions that is far beyond the normal 
trend such that the events can be considered as extreme. The use of objective measures of 
rainfall shocks helps assess the direct impacts of shocks on household welfare, regardless 
of personal attitude or past experience. This study sheds light on the implications of 
weather-based index insurance which is accurate and independent of on-farm inspection 
and loss assessment, especially for managing drought risk. 
The study presented in Chapter 3, entitled ‘The Effects of Natural Disasters on 
Households’ Preferences and Behaviour: Evidence from Thai Rice Farmers after the 
Mega Flood in 2011’, considers the largest flood experienced in Thailand over the past 
50 years. Given its rarity and severity, the mega flood in 2011 serves as an ideal natural 
experiment for a study of how households cope with a largely unexpected natural disaster 
and how the disaster affects their behaviour. Using variation in severe flood experience at 
both the village and household level, we examine what are the effects of the mega flood 
on preferences, subjective expectations of future flood events and the dependability of 
various safety net institutions, and behavioural choices of rice-farming households.  
The original survey was conducted in 2014 in key rice-growing areas severely affected 
by the mega flood, particularly in the central-lower north and the north-east of Thailand. 
Four provinces were selected to provide the variation in the nature of the mega flood 
exposure as well as the capacity and strategies of households and communities in dealing 
with floods in general. Our findings emphasise the credibility of public safety nets in the 
aftermath of widespread natural disasters and the role of government, market, and 
community in natural disaster risk-management and risk-coping strategies. 
7 
The study in Chapter 4, entitled ‘Shocks, Economic Consequences, and Coping 
Responses: Evidence from Thai Households’, slightly deviates from the first two studies 
by providing a comparative analysis of multiple types of shocks. This study helps deliver 
compelling evidence on the occurrence of shocks and how the affected households cope 
with different types of shocks when they are hit by more than one shock at the same time 
and are resource constrained. The empirical analysis is based on a panel survey of Thai 
rural and urban households between 2010 and 2012. The main objective is to provide  
a better understanding of shocks in several aspects by first examining the distribution of 
shocks by demographic composition of households, their economic status, and location 
of residence. Next, the impacts of shocks on household consumption expenditure, 
borrowings, and savings are estimated. This provides some insight into the channels 
through which shocks affect households and their ability to smooth consumption. Finally, 
this study investigates which shocks trigger which coping strategies and what determines 
the choice of coping strategy. The conclusion calls for the government to adopt policies 
that promote and strengthen the safety net programs that help support the vulnerable 
households and prevent them from falling into poverty. 
  
8 
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CHAPTER 2 
The Economic Impacts of Extreme Rainfall Events on 
Farming Households: Evidence from Thailand 
2.1 Introduction 
Economic risk from the natural environment and its effects on livelihoods of households 
in developing countries, especially for the resource-constrained poor, has been well 
documented in the economic literature. With the expectation of increasing frequency  
and intensity of adverse natural events as a result of global warming, the reinforcement 
of protection systems − strategies to mitigate risk at household level − and the provision 
of safety nets for the vulnerable population has gained in importance in economic 
development and public policy. Due to the country’s tropical monsoon climate in 
conjunction with the lack of irrigation system, the prominent source of risk facing 
farming households in Thailand comes from variation in rainfall patterns. 3  There is 
overwhelming evidence of adverse rainfall events occurring in many parts of Thailand.  
A recent well-known example is the mega flood in 2011, which was recorded as the 
largest flood to have hit Thailand in over the past 50 years in terms of the damage caused 
and the number of affected people (Poapongsakorn and Meethom, 2012).4 
                                                          
3 The Office of Agricultural Economics of Thailand reports that in 2011, 80 percent of farmland was 
non-irrigated, with 20 percent of irrigated farm areas, concentrated in the central region. 
4 The 2011 flood began in late July 2011 and receded in mid-December 2011, inundating 9.1 percent 
of total land area, affecting approximately 13 million people, with 800 deaths, and causing loss and 
damage of US$ 46.5 billion or 14 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). Damaged areas were 
13 
In addition to major catastrophic events, farming households in Thailand have also been 
experiencing adverse rainfall conditions (in other words, when there is too much or too 
little rain), resulting in either local floods or droughts. These types of adverse rainfall 
events cause less severe damage but do occur more frequently than the national disasters. 
Specifically, the incidence of excessive and deficit rainfall events potentially involves 
agricultural production loss, resulting in a reduction of household income and 
consumption expenditure. Moreover, extreme rainfall events like floods and droughts are 
expected to become more frequent and forceful with the changing climate (Parry, 2007). 
The Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) recently revealed that the incidence of 
hydrological disasters has been increasing over time, especially in Asia and the Pacific 
region (Cavallo and Noy, 2010).  
Agriculture has long been the backbone of the Thai economy, employing roughly  
40 percent of the total labour supply. The variability of rainfall conditions potentially 
affects the income and livelihoods of a substantial part of the population. Excessive and 
deficit rainfall events are bound to have negative implications for farming households, 
especially if households are unable to insure their income and consumption against those 
shocks. This chapter evaluates the welfare impacts of extreme rainfall events on farming 
households and investigates their risk-coping responses. Two main research questions are 
addressed: How does the incidence of extreme rainfall affect household income and 
consumption expenditure? Which coping mechanisms do households adopt in response 
to rainfall shocks? The analysis not only examines the consequences of shocks for the 
full sample but also across population subgroups.  
                                                                                                                                                                            
dispersed across 69 provinces in every region, with the 19 provinces most severely inundated located 
in the Chao Phraya and Tha Chin River basins, including industrial and residential areas in Bangkok 
and the adjacent provinces to the north and west of Bangkok. 
14 
The relationship between household welfare and rainfall shocks has been explored 
extensively in development economics literature, addressing the variations in adverse 
natural events and measures of shocks. A number of studies have examined the welfare 
impacts of major disasters, for example Hurricane Mitch in Central America (see Morris 
et al., 2002; Carter et al., 2007; Van den Berg and Burger, 2008; Jakobsen, 2012), while 
another strand of literature considers the variability of rainfall conditions. An extensive 
range of rainfall shock variables has been applied in the literature, for example the use of 
subjective measures of rainfall shocks (Dercon et al., 2005; Kurosaki, 2013) or simple 
rainfall deviations from the long-term trend (Asiimwe and Mpuga, 2007). Recent studies 
tend to apply more explicit measures of rainfall shocks by using information from the 
distribution of rainfall time series to capture the incidence of specific adverse rainfall 
events (Thomas et al., 2010; Skoufias et al., 2011; Porter, 2012). There are only a few 
studies for the case of Thailand (Felkner et al., 2009; Poapongsakorn and Meethom, 
2012), but these are limited in the scope of study by considering the effects of shocks in  
a north-eastern province of Thailand and a particular event of the 2011 flood. This calls 
for further analysis of the impacts of extreme rainfall events on the Thai farming 
households’ welfare that requires the application of specific and accurate measures of 
rainfall shocks among heterogeneous households. 
This chapter is the first rigorous study for Thailand that evaluates the potential welfare 
impacts of adverse rainfall events on farming households and investigates their coping 
behaviour in response to rainfall shocks. The analysis applies explicit measures of shocks 
in order to capture the occurrence of extreme rainfall events. Inspired by the examples 
from Skoufias et al. (2011) and Porter (2012), this study defines the incidence of 
excessive and deficit rainfall, based on the variability of local rainfall conditions, using 
15 
solely information on rainfall distribution – rather than the personal perceptions and 
recollection of survey respondents. The measures of rainfall shocks are objectlvely 
constructed from high frequency rainfall time series at the province level, obtained from 
the Meteorological Department of Thailand. This empirical analysis relies on a farm 
household socio-economic survey conducted by the Office of Agricultural Economics of 
Thailand. The advantage of this nationwide survey is that it is representative of farming 
households at the province level (defined as households that commit to allocating some 
resources to agricultural production activities) and that it is of sufficient size to capture 
heterogeneity by key farm characteristics and wealth status. 
The repeated cross-sectional farm household surveys are used to construct a pseudo-
panel for provinces covering the period of 2006-2010, combined with provincial-based 
measures of rainfall shocks in each year. This study then investigates how the incidence 
of excessive and deficit rainfall affects various measures of household income, 
consumption expenditure, and coping responses as well as how these effects differ by 
initial household endowment. The estimation results show that crop income is highly 
sensitive to the incidence of rainfall shocks compared to other sources of income. 
Farming households are likely to smooth income earned from off-farm employment and 
asset transactions when affected by excessive rainfall shocks. Deficit rainfall shocks, on 
the other hand, affect both farm and non-farm earnings. The incidence of deficit rainfall 
causes a significant reduction in household spending on luxury goods, gambling, 
entertainment, recreation, and special occasions. However, there is no significant effect 
of rainfall shocks on total household consumption expenditure, thus providing some 
evidence of consumption smoothing. Landless households are more affected by rainfall 
shocks as they have less opportunity or fewer channels to smooth income compared to 
16 
better-off households. An exploration of several risk-coping options shows that dissaving 
and asset sales are the main mechanisms in response to rainfall shocks.   
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 provides a selective 
review of the related literature. Section 2.3 describes the socio-economic dataset and how 
to construct the objective measures of rainfall shocks. Section 2.4 outlines the empirical 
strategies used in identifying the welfare impacts of extreme rainfall events. Section 2.5 
presents the estimation results. Finally, conclusions and policy implications are drawn in 
section 2.6.  
2.2 Review of Related Literature 
A large body of literature has been investigating the economic impacts of rainfall shocks 
on household socio-economic outcomes and how the affected households manage to deal 
with those shocks.5 This section provides a selective review of the existing literature in 
two strands. The first evaluates the direct effects of adverse rainfall events on different 
measures of household welfare. The second investigates the relationship between rainfall 
shocks and household responses.  
                                                          
5 Another set of literature examines macroeconomic effects of natural disasters. Using cross-country 
data, macroeconomic research has been analysing the consequent impacts of natural disasters on the 
economy in terms of various outcomes such as national income, employment, and inflation in the 
short or long run (see Skidmore and Toya, 2002; Raddatz, 2007; Loayza et al., 2009; Noy, 2009; 
Cavallo et al., 2010; Sawada et al., 2011). A general conclusion is that natural disasters have negative 
impacts on the economy’s short-term economic growth. These negative effects are more dramatic for 
developing and smaller economies. However, there remains inconclusive evidence for the long-run 
effects of natural disasters on the economy’s long-term growth, which is partly due to the difficulty of 
constructing an appropriate counterfactual.  
17 
Studies that consider specific natural catastrophic events generally find evidence of asset 
loss as well as an important role of assets in smoothing consumption. Morris et al. (2002) 
find that Hurricane Mitch in Honduras caused a significant reduction in the current 
income of the rural poor, mainly due to crop loss and a depletion of assets. Negative 
effects on asset loss were more critical for the poorest households since they were likely 
to have fewer assets to start with. Van den Berg and Burger (2008) take a step further by 
examining the consumption reactions to Hurricane Mitch of rural Nicaraguan households 
and show that asset-poor households reduced consumption in response to transitory 
income loss in order to maintain their limited asset holdings. Carter et al. (2007) and 
Jakobsen (2012) conclude that natural disasters have significant impacts on household 
asset portfolios through the presence of poverty traps. Asset loss due to destruction or 
transaction could hamper a household’s long-term livelihood through a slow pace of 
asset recovery. It may also result in a temporary or permanent income shortage and 
reduced consumption. Asset-poor households seem to forego their consumption in 
response to income shocks, while the wealthier households may resort to using their 
assets to stabilise consumption.  
Apart from major natural disasters, the variability of rainfall conditions can also have 
negative implications on production outcomes, and hence household income, which  
in turn can translate into consumption fluctuation (Morduch, 1995; Dercon, 1996).  
Using self-reported measures of shocks, Dercon et al. (2005) find negative and persistent 
effects of droughts on household consumption in Ethiopia. Negative effects of droughts 
were higher among female-headed households, households with an uneducated head, and 
households with small land holdings. Asiimwe and Mpuga (2007) show that higher than 
average rainfall in the main planting and harvesting seasons in Uganda significantly 
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lowered household income and consumption. Kurosaki (2013) relies on self-reported 
information on floods and droughts of rural households in Pakistan and finds that 
household consumption was not sensitive to droughts. However, the negative effects of 
floods were especially large and these impacts were even larger among those households 
with relatively few asset holdings. 
Recent studies tend to apply explicit measures of rainfall shocks in order to capture the 
incidence of adverse rainfall events, rather than using subjective measures of rainfall 
shocks or simply deviations from rainfall average. Thomas et al. (2010) create natural 
disaster maps for droughts, excessive rainfall, riverine floods, and cyclones in Vietnam 
using meteorological data and find substantial loss of household consumption with both 
of riverine floods and Hurricanes. Skoufias et al. (2011) conclude that rural rice-farming 
households in Indonesia were affected by a shortfall of rain during the monsoon season, 
but not by a delay of rain in the onset of monsoon. There was significant evidence that 
the affected households insulated their food consumption by spending less on non-food 
items. Porter (2012) also finds that deficit rainfall (taken from the bottom quintile of the 
rainfall distribution) resulted in a significant reduction of crop income and consumption 
expenditure of households in rural Ethiopia. 
When facing shocks, households can choose to engage in ex-ante risk-management or  
ex-post risk-coping strategies to insulate their consumption. Alderman and Paxson (1992) 
point out that risk management is related to actions undertaken to reduce the variability 
of income prior to the occurrence of shocks. This may involve a variety of diversification 
strategies regarding crop portfolio choices, off-farm activities, or migration decisions.  
In contrast, risk-coping mechanisms do not target the exposure to shocks but rather  
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aim to mitigate the subsequent effects of income shocks on household consumption.  
In the absence of complete insurance, affected households may rely on informal risk-
sharing arrangements or resort to self-insurance in order to maintain consumption. Risk-
sharing networks can be formed through family ties, livelihood groups, or communities. 
If full risk-sharing exists, then households should be able to completely smooth their 
consumption against idiosyncratic shocks. An extensive body of literature has tested the 
full risk-sharing hypothesis and finds that group-based risk-sharing arrangements are 
partly effective in insuring against idiosyncratic shocks, although complete consumption 
insurance tends to be rejected (see, for example Townsend, 1994, 1995; Deaton, 1997; 
Grimard, 1997; Goldstein, 1999; Morduch, 2004; Chiappori et al., 2006).   
The role of self-insurance as risk-coping mechanisms can be achieved by drawing on 
savings, selling assets, or seeking non-farm income. Deaton (1991) highlights the benefit 
of savings as self-insurance in the absence of a complete credit market. Paxson (1992) 
gives supporting evidence for the role of savings by examining the saving behaviour of 
the Thai farming households and finds that savings were used to buffer consumption 
from transitory income shocks. When considering the timing of shocks and saving 
behaviour of households in Zimbabwe, Ersado et al. (2003) conclude that the use of 
savings was partly limited in the post-drought period. It turned out that precautionary 
savings could not be maintained afterwards. As for the role of assets, Udry (1994) shows 
that after being hit by shocks, agrarian households in Nigeria reduced savings through  
a disaccumulation of assets. Dercon (1996) explores the relationship between crop 
portfolio decisions and asset holdings in Tanzania and finds that liquid assets helped 
provide consumption security. Constrained households who own small liquid assets 
ended up growing low-risk crops, with the cost of low returns. Fafchamps et al. (1998) 
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and Kazianga and Udry (2006) find the marginal role of livestock as buffer stocks to 
insulate consumption from income shocks when facing droughts in West Africa and 
Burkina Faso, respectively. Hoddinott (2006) shows that the incidence of droughts in 
Zimbabwe was associated with a rise in the sale of livestock and that asset-poor 
households were less likely to sell assets as they had low assets at the pre-shock stage. 
Other sources of income can be another possible risk-coping option when compensating 
for income loss. Porter (2012) finds that crop shocks stimulated non-farm earnings by  
an equivalent amount as they negatively affected farm income.  
Despite a growing body of literature on the direct effects of rainfall shocks on household 
welfare, there are few examples for the case of Thailand. Using household panel surveys 
from the Townsend Thai Project, Felkner et al. (2009) examine the potential impacts of 
climate change on rice yields of farmers in four villages in Sisaket, a province in the rural 
north-eastern part of Thailand. Under two climate change scenarios, the results suggest 
that rice-farming households were less able to prevent yield loss in an extreme scenario, 
while most of them gained some benefits from a moderate increase of rain in a milder 
scenario. Poapongsakorn and Meethom (2012) compare the effects of the large flood in 
Thailand in 2011 on household income and expenditure by using satellite radar images to 
specify flooded and non-flooded subdistricts and find that the mega flood had significant 
negative impacts on the money income and wage income of households in flooded 
provinces. In addition, the flood caused a significant reduction of expenditure not only 
for households in flooded areas but also for those in non-flooded areas, thus indicating 
the inter-dependence between families in urban and rural areas.   
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2.3 Data  
The economic impacts of extreme rainfall events on household welfare are examined 
using information from the farm household socio-economic surveys, together with 
primary rainfall statistics. The combined dataset contains household-level information on 
income, expenditure, financial status, asset holdings, demographic characteristics, and 
province-level constructed measures of rainfall shocks. A brief description of key socio-
economic variables is provided in Table 2.1, while Table 2.2 reports the mean and 
standard deviation of all variables included in the analysis.  
2.3.1 Socio-economic data 
Household-level information is drawn from five rounds of the Thai Agricultural 
Household Socio-Economic Survey between 2006 and 2010, collected by the Office of 
Agricultural Economics under the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives of Thailand. 
This dataset contains nationwide representative farming households, who allocate their 
resources to agricultural production activities. It is canvassed annually in accordance 
with the agricultural year, running from the beginning of May until the end of April in 
the following year. The survey period takes place near the end of agricultural year, 
starting from February to March. By applying a stratified two-stage systematic sampling 
method, in each round the total of 6,000-12,000 farming households are randomly 
selected from 1,500-3,000 sampled villages in 76 provinces throughout Thailand. 6  
After pooling the samples from five repeated cross-sectional surveys and dropping some 
observations with incomplete rainfall data, there remain 40,684 farming households in  
                                                          
6 More information about the sampling strategy can be found in Appendix 2-A. 
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68 provinces.7 The key strength of this survey lies in its comprehensive sets of data on 
agricultural production including in-depth information on land use and characteristics, 
production outcomes, product distribution, and production cost. The survey also has 
extensive modules of household earnings from various sources, consumption expenditure 
on a range of goods and services, asset holdings, financial status, and household 
demographics.  
Various measures of household income and consumption expenditure are extracted in 
order to account for the sensitivity of income sources and types of spending to exogenous 
rainfall shocks. Crop income is measured by the total value of crop production minus 
production cost. Likewise, livestock income is the aggregate value of livestock and 
fishery products minus their input cost. Apart from crop and livestock income, farm 
income also includes earnings from other farm activities and returns from providing farm 
labour and services. Non-farm income is mainly comprised of profits from trading goods 
and services, wage and salary from non-farm employment, earnings from renting or 
selling non-farm land and assets, and remittances. Total household income combines 
total farm and non-farm income, plus any transfers from the government given as natural 
disaster relief. Total consumption expenditure is the sum of household spending on food 
and non-food items. Food expenditure is the cost of buying food supplies or cooked food, 
plus the total value of own-produced agricultural products and food received as gifts 
consumed by the household itself. Non-food expenditure captures spending on housing 
                                                          
7 Although this survey is conducted in all 76 provinces throughout Thailand, only farming households 
from 68 provinces are compiled into the sample, while 6 percent are taken out of the original sample. 
This exclusion is due to the unavailability of daily rainfall data in eight provinces used in constructing 
the objective measures of excessive rainfall events.  
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and utilities, education, medical care, durable goods, and miscellaneous items such as 
luxury goods, gambling, entertainment, recreation, and special occasions.  
This study looks at several types of risk-coping strategies that the farming households 
may engage to mitigate the negative effects of rainfall shocks. Coping options of interest 
are dissaving, borrowing, selling assets, and selling last-year stocks of crop and livestock 
products. Unfortunately, the farm household survey does not contain explicit information 
on shocks and coping responses that link to certain shocks. The changes of a farming 
household’s financial status in terms of savings and borrowings, asset, and stock holdings 
observed within a year are extracted from the survey in order to examine their coping 
behaviour. The observed risk-coping responses are expressed in terms of binary variables 
indicating the propensity to engage in each of the coping strategies, irrespective of 
shocks. Dissaving is defined as a reduction in a household’s financial savings during  
a year. Borrowing involves loans from both formal and informal lenders in the last year 
to finance farm and non-farm transactions. A reduction of asset and stock holdings of at 
least 20 percent of the initial value measured at the beginning of the year is applied to 
indicate the sale of farm and non-farm assets and farm stocks.8  
There are four sets of control variables used in the empirical analysis, which are farm 
characteristics, asset holdings, household characteristics, and market prices. The first 
three sets control for any observed heterogeneity across the sampled households in which 
                                                          
8 It is not straightforward to identify the sale of assets and farm stocks. Farming households were 
asked to report the total value of assets and farm stocks they held at the beginning and at the end of 
agricultural year in this one-shot survey. Unfortunately, one cannot identify the cause of a reduction in 
the total value of asset and stock holdings – as it could be due to depreciation or the instance of selling. 
To solve this asset valuation problem, the threshold is arbitrarily set at 20 percent, for which the 
reduction can be treated as selling.  
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households are differentiated by their production practices, endowments, and livelihoods.  
Farm characteristics include farm size and an irrigation dummy. Asset holdings are 
measured by the total value of household financial and physical assets, evaluated at the 
beginning of each year. Demographic characteristics contain information on gender, age, 
and the highest education level of the household head and members. Furthermore, the 
indicators for social capital benefits and non-farm earnings are included to control for 
households’ heterogeneous livelihood factors. Finally, village-level average prices of  
12 major crops are also included in the regressions in order to control for market 
conditions at the village level.9 These price controls help explain the change of household 
income conditioning on the supply side of the market environment. The control of crop 
prices in expenditure equations captures indirect effects of rainfall shocks on household 
consumption choices, especially on food items, on the demand side.  
2.3.2 Constructed rainfall shock variables  
This study makes use of primary rainfall time series and applies a standard definition of 
flood and drought events to identify the incidents of extreme rainfall, rather than relying 
on the official statistics of floods and droughts. The use of objective measures of rainfall 
shocks also avoids any influence of the personal perceptions or past experience with 
regard to shocks. The main objective is to define rainfall shock variables that best track 
the prospect of extreme rainfall events, in particular excessive and deficit rainfall events. 
These measures are constructed from daily and monthly rainfall data available at the 
                                                          
9 These 12 crops are rice, maize, cassava, sugarcane, rubber, and selected fruit trees of which the 
sampled households produce the most.  
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province level obtained from the Thai Meteorological Department.10 However, there are 
several limitations in relation to this construction matter. First, sampled households that 
are in the same province are assigned to be in proximity of the same rainfall station, and 
therefore assumed to be similarly affected by rainfall shocks. Second, only rainfall data is 
used in defining the incidence of excessive and deficit rainfall, disregarding physical 
factors such as river water levels and flows, soil types, and moisture content. Finally, the 
production cycles of crops are not taken into account.  
In defining the incidents of extreme rainfall as having too much and too little rain, some 
admittedly arbitrary decisions need to be made regarding the formation process in order 
to get the most relevant measures of rainfall shocks. Crucially, the triggers of floods and 
droughts differ in critical rainfall thresholds and the duration for which these thresholds 
need to be exceeded. The thresholds are here defined as rainfall patterns that are beyond 
normal conditions such that these events can be considered as extreme, with the threshold 
values set at two standard deviations above and below the mean of rainfall distribution 
for excessive and deficit rainfall, respectively. To justify these choices, the cut-off points 
are compared with standard meteorological measures of extreme excessive and deficit 
rainfall. In addition, the results are robust to changes to the cut-off points. The rainfall 
shock variables are constructed using daily and monthly rainfall data, and then expressed 
as annual cumulative measures of excessive and deficit rainfall spells at the province 
level. Figure 2.1 shows the spatial and temporal differences of the incidence of excessive 
and deficit rainfall in 68 provinces during 2006-2010.   
                                                          
10 General information about rainfall patterns in Thailand is given in Appendix 2-B. 
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The objective measure of excessive rainfall events is constructed from daily rainfall data 
available in 68 provinces between 2006 and 2010.11 The rationale behind the use of high 
frequency daily statistics is the fact that flooding is a fast-onset type of event, which can 
be formed when there is an excessive amount of rain over a short period of consecutive 
rainy days. The incidence of excessive rainfall spells is counted when the rainfall total in 
each day exceeds a given threshold for any three days in a row. The use of a three-day 
period in identifying excessive rainfall events can be linked to the actual occurrence of 
flash floods caused by tropical storms in the early monsoon season as summarised in 
Poapongsakorn and Meethom (2012). 12  The excessive rainfall threshold values are 
computed for each province separately by taking the 95th percentile of the daily rainfall 
time series over five years. The amount of rain at the 95th percentile recorded across 
provinces and time periods in this study is approximately 48 millimetres on average,  
with a minimum of 34 millimetres. This corresponds closely to the definition for the 
amount of daily rainfall applied by the Thai Meteorological Department that classify 
rainfall of more than 35 millimetres per day as ‘heavy rain’.13  
                                                          
11 Daily rainfall data is not available in eight provinces, including seven provinces in the central area 
(Uthai Thani, Samut Sakhon, Samut Songkhram, Nonthaburi, Ang Thong, Nakhon Sawan, and Sing 
Buri) and one in the west (Prachuap Khiri Khan).  
12 Examples are Haima depression in June 2011 (rainfall in five days greater than 150 millimetres); 
Nok Ten depression in July 2011 (rainfall in three days greater than 150 millimetres); Hai Tang storm 
in September 2011 (rainfall in three days greater than 180 millimetres); Nesard storm in October 2011 
(rainfall in two days greater than 120 millimetres); and Nalkae storm in October 2011 (rainfall in 
three days greater than 180 millimetres).  
13 The Meteorological Department of Thailand applies the criteria for measuring the amount of rain in 
a 24-hour period based on typical rainfall conditions of the tropical monsoon climate as follows: 
‘unnoticeable’ when the amount of rain is less than 0.1 millimetres; ‘light rain’ when the amount of 
rain is between 0.1 and 10 millimetres; ‘moderate rain’ when the amount of rain is between 10.1 and 
35 millimetres; ‘heavy rain’ when the amount of rain is between 35.1 and 90 millimetres; and ‘very 
heavy rain’ when the amount of rain is beyond 90.1 millimetres.  
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The excessive rainfall shock variable is constructed by counting the number of excessive 
rainfall spells in each province on a daily basis over a year, with a spell defined as three 
consecutive days of heavy rain:  
                 ܨ௣௧ ൌ σ ௝݂ǡ௣௧௃௝ୀଵ  ௝݂ǡ௣௧ ൌ ͳݎ௝ି௜ǡ௣௧ ൐  ߬௣Ǣ ׊݅ ൌ  ሼͲǡͳǡʹሽ   [2.1] 
                 ܨ௣௧ ൌ σ ௝݂௣௧௃௝ୀଵ  ௝݂ǡ௣௧ ൌ Ͳ߬௣Ǣ ׊݅ ൌ  ሼͲǡͳǡʹሽ  [2.1] 
where the indicator ௝݂ǡ௣௧  reports the incidence of excessive rainfall spells occurring in 
province p on day j in year t, by taking value 1 for any j if the third consecutive day  
on which the amount of daily rainfall, ݎ௝ǡ௣௧ , exceeds the provincial-specific threshold,߬௣, 
and taking value 0 otherwise. The excessive rainfall shock variable, ܨ௣௧, then sums ௝݂ǡ௣௧  
over the total number of days in a year, J. 
Unlike flooding, the occurrence of drought is a slow-onset event and unlikely to occur 
within a short period of time. This analysis therefore determines the occurrence of deficit 
rainfall based on the notion of meteorological drought, which is measured by rainfall 
deficiencies over an extended period – a three-month period is of interest in this study.14 
The incidence of deficit rainfall is defined as a shortfall of three-month cumulative 
rainfall that is below a given threshold. A sequence of a three-month moving rainfall 
total is generated by adding up the amount of rain for each of every three consecutive 
months throughout the year. The application of a moving three-month period helps 
                                                          
14 According to Wilhite and Glantz (1985), there are four main types of drought phenomenon which 
are meteorological, hydrological, agricultural, and socio-economic. The first three deal with the 
physical occurrence, while the last one defines drought in terms of supply and demand in tracking the 
effects of a water shortfall as it ripples through socio-economic systems. Meteorological drought is 
usually defined as the degree of abnormal dryness with respect to normal conditions or the long-term 
average amount of precipitation for a specific period of time.  
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capture the actuality of having deficit rain in every three months, which can be within  
a season or across seasons. The objective measure of deficit rainfall events is constructed 
from monthly rainfall time series over the 30-year period running from 1981 to 2010.  
The threshold values are set for each province separately at the 5th percentile of the 
monthly rainfall records for each of every three consecutive months in comparison with 
the same three-month period over 30 years. This approach is in line with the meaning of 
Standardised Precipitation Index (SPI) − a widely used index in defining meteorological 
droughts.15 To confirm this, the provincial rainfall data for the months where the three-
month moving total is below the 5th percentile threshold yields an average value of the 
three-month SPI of -2.10.16 This suggests that the measure of deficit rainfall spells indeed 
reflects periods of extremely dry conditions.  
The deficit rainfall shock variable is constructed by counting the number of deficit 
rainfall spells on a monthly basis over a year:  
                     ܦ௣௧ ൌ σ ݀௞ǡ௣௧௄௞ୀଵ ݀௞ǡ௣௧ ൌ ͳ σ ݉௛ǡ௣௧௞௛ୀ௞ିଶ ൏ ߱௣    [2.2] 
                      ܦ௣௧ ൌ σ ݀௞ǡ௣௧௄௞ଵ ݀௞ǡ௣௧ ൌ Ͳ σ ݉௛ǡ௣௧௞௛ୀ௞ିଶ   [2.2] 
                                                          
15 Pioneered by McKee et al. (1993), SPI is a widely used index used to characterise the occurrence of 
meteorological drought on a range of timescales varying from the shortest one month to the longer 
three months, six months, 12 months, and up to 24 months. The calculation of SPI requires only 
precipitation data, but using long-term records (30 to 50 years recommended). SPI is expressed as the 
number of standard deviations that the observed amount of rain deviates from the long-term mean of  
a standard normal distribution. Considering the negative value of SPI, the degree of dryness implied 
by each label corresponds to the degree of removal from mean conditions, with the classification as 
follows: ‘near normal condition’ when SPI is between -0.99 and 0.99; ‘moderately dry’ when SPI is 
between -1.49 and -1.00; ‘severely dry’ when SPI is between -1.99 and -1.50; and ‘extremely dry’ 
when SPI is less than -2.00.  
16 The standard three-month SPI is often used to capture seasonal variations of rainfall conditions 
which could happen within or between the seasons. The idea behind the three-month SPI is similar to 
comparing monthly rainfall total from any specific three-month period with the rainfall total from the 
same three-month period over years included in the historical records. The scale of three months 
reflects short- and medium-term moisture conditions.  
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where the indicator ݀௞ǡ௣௧  reports the incidence of deficit rainfall spells occurring in 
province p in month k of year t, by taking value 1 for any k if the cumulative amount  
of rain over three consecutive months, σ ݉௛ǡ௣௧௞௛ୀ௞ିଶ , is less than the provincial-specific 
threshold, ߱௣, and taking value 0 otherwise. The deficit rainfall shock variable, ܦ௣௧ , then 
sums ݀௞ǡ௣௧  over the total number of months in a year, K.  
2.4 Empirical Strategy 
To examine how the incidence of extreme rainfall events affects household income and 
consumption and how farming households respond to shocks, the empirical analysis 
relies on reduced-form regressions applied to pooled repeated cross-sectional household 
datasets that form a pseudo-panel at the province level. The strategy uses provincial 
variation of rainfall shock variables to explain the variation of outcome variables of the 
average household in those provinces:  
         ܳ௜ௗ௣௧ ൌ ܅௣௧ᇱ ઺ ൅ ۶௜ௗ௣௧ᇱ ી ൅ߛௗ ൅ߜ௧ ൅ߝ௜ௗ௣௧    [2.3] 
where ܳ௜ௗ௣௧  represents the outcome variables of household i that live in district d of 
province p in year t. The outcome variables of interest are various measures of household 
income and consumption expenditure per adult equivalent expressed in log forms and 
binary variables for risk-coping responses. Next,܅௣௧  is a vector of provincial-based 
measures for the incidence of excessive and deficit rainfall spells, ۶௜ௗ௣௧is a vector of 
control variables including weather and farm characteristics, asset holdings, average 
market prices of 12 major crops at the village level, and household characteristics 
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regarding their demographics and livelihood. The model includes district dummies, ߛௗ, 
and time fixed effects, ߜ௧, to control for unobserved heterogeneity across locations and 
over time. The random error ߝ௜ௗ௣௧ is assumed to follow a standard normal distribution. 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the province level.  
The use of index-based measures of rainfall shocks helps avoid potential endogeneity 
bias, which could arise when applying subjective or self-reported information on shocks 
in the absence of household panel data. However, the effects of rainfall shocks on 
household welfare in each location cannot be assumed to be random as the occurrence of 
extreme rainfall events in a locality is likely correlated with household behaviour, which 
could in turn affect their earnings and spending habits. For example, households who are 
more exposed to floods would be more accustomed to dealing with floods, compared to 
those who rarely experience floods. To resolve this problem, district dummies and time 
fixed effects are included in the estimation equation to control for unobserved location-
specific factors in each district and heterogeneity across time periods, respectively.17  
In addition to the explicit measures of rainfall shocks, the estimation equation includes 
long-term average rainfall over 30 years to control for normal rainfall patterns in each 
province. These constructed objective measures of rainfall shocks, therefore, capture the 
incidence of adverse rainfall events with the intensity beyond the province’s typical 
rainfall conditions and farmer expectations. Finally, the comprehensive set of control 
variables is incorporated in the model to control for heterogeneous factors observed 
across all cross-sectional units and at the village level.   
                                                          
17 District is an administrative unit in Thailand which is smaller than a province but larger than  
a county (or subdistrict). Sampled households are from 821 districts over five years.   
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The estimate of β yields the average effects of extreme rainfall events on the outcome 
variables by assuming that households living in the same province are similarly affected 
by rainfall shocks. It is important to note that when controlling for long-term average 
rainfall, the estimate of β picks up the variation of rainfall conditions off the normal trend. 
The coefficient can be interpreted as a percentage change of household income and 
consumption expenditure or a percentage point change in the probability of engaging in 
coping mechanisms when the number of excessive or deficit rainfall spells changes by 
one. Summary statistics show that the average number of excessive and deficit rainfall 
spells is less than one, indicating that the events of excessive and deficit rainfall are not 
an annual occurrence, but once in 10 years and once in five years, respectively. The use 
of provincial-based rainfall shock variables on household-level information may reduce 
the precision of the effects, but the estimation results can also be interpreted as the lower 
bound of the true effects.  
Since the incidence of excessive and deficit rainfall is most likely to have negative 
consequences for agricultural production, and hence on farm outcomes, the estimate of β 
on crop income is expected to be negative and statistically different from zero. Farming 
households that earn a living from non-farm activities may also rely on their non-farm 
earnings in compensation for crop income loss since non-farm income is less likely to be 
severely affected by rainfall shocks. In this regard, the estimate of β on non-farm income 
is expected to be positive, thus providing evidence of income smoothing through 
different sources of earnings. In case of risk aversion, households may prefer a smoothed 
consumption path, even when their income fluctuates as a result of unexpected events. 
Therefore, if farming households are able to smooth their consumption against negative 
income shocks, the effect of rainfall shocks on consumption expenditure should be lower 
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than that on income. The estimate of β in consumption equations can be either positive or 
negative, but less than that in income equations. When hit by shocks, households may 
respond to shocks in different ways in order to protect their consumption which can be 
by drawing on their own assets or savings, or by borrowing from others. As a result, one 
would expect positive signs on the estimate of β in risk-coping equations, indicating the 
propensity to engage in that particular option.   
2.5 Estimation Results 
2.5.1 Rainfall shocks and income smoothing 
Table 2.3 summarises the estimation results from OLS regressions on the average effects 
of rainfall shocks on the household income portfolio. The top panel shows results for the 
full sample. As expected, there is imperfect smoothing of crop income, signifying the 
importance of rainwater in agriculture and the implications of having too much or too 
little rain. Crop income falls by 33.77 percent and 20.49 percent on average in response 
to excessive and deficit rainfall shocks, respectively. 18  However, there is a positive 
correlation between livestock income and the incidence of extreme rainfall, even though 
the estimates are not precise. An explanation for this could be the fact that livestock is 
usually kept as asset, which can be sold and turned into cash when needed. The incidence 
of excessive rainfall events causes a substantial decline in other farm income, but 
increases household income from farm labour and services. This suggests that farming 
                                                          
18 In defining rainfall shock variables, an arbitrary decision on the threshold values has to be made 
based on the distribution of rainfall. In this regard, Appendix 2-C provides the sensitivity analysis of 
excessive and deficit rainfall shocks on the key measures of household income when alternating the 
threshold values around the proposed values.   
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households can supply their labour or provide services to other farms in compensation 
when their own farm is affected by excessive rainfall shocks. On the other hand, there is 
no such evidence for the case of deficit rainfall events, suggesting that when affected by 
deficit rainfall shocks, it is more difficult for farming households to find another source 
of income from off-farm activities since other farms nearby might also be affected. 
Droughts typically have a larger geographic coverage and last longer than excessive rain 
or flash floods. The estimates of rainfall shocks on various measures of non-farm income 
are varied and not statistically different from zero. Earnings from renting or selling non-
farm land and assets are also used to smooth household income in case of excessive 
rainfall shocks, but not deficit rainfall shocks.  
Total household income is reduced by roughly 17 percent on average in response to the 
incidence of extreme rainfall events. Negative effects of excessive rainfall shocks on 
aggregate income are slightly smaller than that of deficit rainfall shocks. This finding is 
in contrast to the results for crop income, which is more affected by excessive rainfall 
spells. A possible explanation could be that farming households are more able to smooth 
their income earned from off-farm employment and asset transactions when affected by 
excessive rainfall shocks. Deficit rainfall shocks seem to have negative implications on  
a wider range of income sources, thereby reducing the ability to smooth not only farm 
but also non-farm income. Perhaps surprisingly, there is no positive correlation between 
receipt of government assistance through natural disaster relief and constructed rainfall 
shock variables.19 This can be explained by the difference between index-based measures 
                                                          
19 The estimation results when using a dummy variable (=1 if the household received disaster relief 
from the government) are qualitatively similar to the current results using the amount of disaster relief 
received (baht), indicating that the findings are robust with respect to the specification of the model 
and choice of variables on disaster relief. 
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of rainfall shocks and the actual compensation provided by the government. Specifically, 
the size of Thailand’s compensation scheme for natural disasters tends to be exaggerated 
as it is mainly based on self-reported claims of the victims in the absence of effective loss 
and damage assessment of local authorities.   
The lower panels of Table 2.3 show the estimates of rainfall shocks on household income 
when dividing the farming households by land ownership. Landholding households 
constitute the majority of the sample, while those who do not own land but rent land for 
agricultural production are classified as landless households. The overall results indicate 
that the negative effects of extreme rainfall events are significantly larger for landless 
farming households. Since land holdings are positively correlated with asset holdings and 
household income, these findings emphasise the wealth-differentiated effects of rainfall 
shocks. In addition, only landholding households can smooth their income in response to 
excessive rainfall shocks by increasing earnings from livestock, labour supply, renting or 
selling non-farm land and assets.  
2.5.2 Rainfall shocks and consumption smoothing 
The reduced-form effects of rainfall shocks on household consumption expenditure are 
presented in Table 2.4. The estimation results provide no statistically significant evidence 
of any impact of extreme rainfall events on average food and non-food consumption 
expenditure. In response to the incidence of deficit rainfall, there is a significant 
reduction of miscellaneous expenses or money spent on luxury goods, gambling, 
entertainment, recreation, charity, and social occasions. This suggests that the farming 
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households are more likely to spend less on unnecessary items when affected by deficit 
rainfall shocks in order to maintain their necessary consumption. 
Overall, there is no statistically significant effect of rainfall shocks on total household 
consumption, suggesting that, on average, farming households are able to smooth their 
consumption. Even though farm income, especially from crop production, is negatively 
affected by rainfall shocks, farming households can still manage to keep their overall 
consumption path smooth through either reducing unnecessary expenses or engaging in 
the range of risk-coping options.  
The estimation results for household subgroups show some heterogeneity in the ability  
to smooth consumption, as landless farming households are more vulnerable to the 
incidence of rainfall shocks when compared to the wealthier landholding households. 
The results show negative and significant effects of deficit rainfall shocks on food  
and non-food consumption expenditure, with larger effects among landless households.  
This is similar to the key findings for household income, where the negative effects of 
deficit rainfall shocks on crop income and total farm income are larger among 
households who do not own land.   
2.5.3 Rainfall shocks and coping responses 
Table 2.5 presents the estimation results obtained from linear probability regressions of 
four risk-coping strategies: dissaving, borrowing, selling assets, and selling farm stocks. 
The estimated coefficients reflect the percentage point increase in the propensity of 
engaging in a particular option in coping with the incidence of excessive and deficit 
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rainfall. Dissaving is found to be the most common strategy in coping with rainfall 
shocks in both situations. Farming households may resort to their own savings when their 
income is negatively affected by shocks in order to maintain consumption. In contrast 
with dissaving, households in general seem not to incur more debt by taking out new 
loans when they are affected by rainfall shocks. This could reflect farming households 
having low investments in farming activities when the negative effects of rainfall shocks 
are substantial. As for the role of physical assets, there is statistically significant evidence 
that farming households are likely to sell their non-farm assets to buffer the negative 
effects of deficit rainfall spells. While affected by excessive rainfall events, they would 
rather resort to selling their stocks of crop and livestock.  
2.6 Conclusions  
The combination of a tropical monsoon climate and the country’s poor irrigation system 
leaves Thai farming households being exposed to rainfall variability and the associated 
risk to agricultural production and earnings. Yet the evidence regarding welfare impacts 
of extreme rainfall events for Thai farming households is scant. The existing literature in 
Thailand has so far been limited in the scope of study, either by focusing on a particular 
event or on specific areas.  
This chapter aims to fill the gap in the existing literature for Thailand by evaluating the 
potential welfare impacts of extreme rainfall events on farming households, as well as the 
actions that affected households may adopt in response to rainfall shocks. The empirical 
analysis draws on a province pseudo-panel, combining household-level information from 
annually repeated cross-sectional farm household surveys over the period of 2006-2010 
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and provincial-based measures of annual rainfall shocks. The rainfall shock variables are 
constructed from primary high frequency rainfall time series, identifying the incidence of 
excessive and deficient rainfall events.  
The estimation results are consistent with the existing literature as they show evidence of 
imperfect income smoothing. Crop income falls significantly, with the negative effects of 
excessive rainfall shocks being slightly larger than that of deficit rainfall shocks.  
While crop income is highly sensitive to rainfall shocks, livestock income on average 
seems not to be affected. The reason could be that livestock is usually kept as asset, 
which in itself can provide coping options. There is significant evidence that farming 
households supply labour or provide services to other farms to compensate for own farm 
income reduction due to excessive rainfall shocks. However, there is no such evidence of 
income smoothing against deficit rainfall shocks, as droughts seem to have negative 
implications for a wider range of income sources, affecting the ability to smooth not only 
farm but non-farm income as well.  
There is no clear evidence that rainfall shocks affect food and non-food consumption 
expenditure. However, farming households when affected by deficit rainfall shocks are 
likely to spend less on miscellaneous and luxury expenses in order to maintain their 
necessary consumption. Overall, this finding supports the notion that farming households 
can manage to smooth their consumption and insure it against temporary income loss 
from floods and droughts. However, the results do show heterogeneity by initial wealth 
level, expressed in terms of land ownership. Landholding households are able to smooth 
both income and consumption by renting or selling non-farm land and assets in response 
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to excessive rainfall shocks, while income and consumption smoothing is rejected for 
households who do not own any land.  
As for the relationship between shocks and coping responses, the results show that 
dissaving is the most common strategy that households use to cope with rainfall shocks. 
Farming households may resort to their own savings when their income is negatively 
affected in order to maintain consumption. In general, households do not seem to incur 
more debt by taking out new loans when exposed to rainfall shocks, which could point to 
reduced farm investments with potentially longer term implications for future farming 
activities. There is also evidence that farming households are likely to sell non-farm 
assets and last-year stocks of crop and livestock products in order to buffer negative 
effects of deficit and excessive rainfall shocks. 
The overall findings point towards policy implications regarding the allocation of public 
natural disaster relief. Given that there is no correlation between the measures of rainfall 
shocks and actual disaster compensation, the provision of public assistance for dealing 
with extreme rainfall events seems to be mistargeted and households are therefore not 
fully insured against flood and drought loss. In comparison to excessive rainfall events, 
the incidence of deficit rainfall shocks has greater impacts on farming households by 
affecting both farm and non-farm income, as well as consumption, especially for the least 
wealthy group. However, the public safety net program through disaster compensation 
scheme is predominantly focussed on flooding, which sometimes tends to be exaggerated 
in the absence of an effective local loss and damage assessment. Only a small fraction of 
funds is allocated to compensate farmers for drought loss. An underlying reason could be 
the fact that the occurrence of drought and its consequences are harder to inspect as it is 
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nearly invisible on the ground unlike flooding. Even though the occurrence of drought is 
not apparent for the compensation, farming households do suffer from negative effects of 
drought and they are also less able to cope with. The Thai government should therefore 
develop a more accurate system for assessing drought loss and provide support to the 
farmers through an effective assessment procedure. 
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Table 2.1: Definition of key socio-economic variables 
  
Variable Description 
Measures of household income: 
Farm income   
−  Crop income (baht) Value of total crop production minus total production cost of 320 
types of crop within a year    
−  Livestock income (baht) Value of current livestock holding and fishery products minus total 
input cost of 51 product items within a year  
−  Other farm income (baht) Return from other farm-related activities, e.g. selling plant seeds, 
animal breeds, and processed agricultural products, renting or selling 
farmland and farm assets, etc.  
−  Farm labour and services (baht) Return from offering farm labour and providing farm services  
Non-farm income  
−  Trade and business (baht) Profit from trading goods and services from own business e.g. retail 
shop, handicraft, car repair, etc.  
−  Wage and salary (baht) Cash income earned from non-farm jobs either full-time or part-time 
−  Renting or selling assets (baht) Revenue from renting or selling non-farm land and assets 
−  Remittances (baht) Money transferred from family members either onshore or offshore 
−  Other non-farm income (baht) Money received from miscellaneous sources, e.g. interest, gambling, 
special occasions such as funerals, weddings, charity, etc. 
Disaster relief (baht) Money transferred from the government as natural disaster relief  
Total income (baht) Sum of total farm and non-farm income plus the government’s 
transfers in case of natural disaster relief   
Measures of household consumption expenditure: 
Food consumption expenditure (baht) Cost of buying food supplies and cooked food, plus value of own-
produced crop and livestock products and food received as gifts 
consumed by the household  
Non-food consumption expenditure   
−  Household items (baht) Cash spending on housing (e.g. rent, property tax, repair cost, etc.), 
utilities, fuel, clothing and footwear, frequently purchased household 
and personal items (e.g. light bulbs, soap, shampoo, detergents, 
toothpaste, etc.), communication, and transportation  
−  Education and health care (baht) Money spent on education and medical care   
−  Durable goods (baht) Money spent on furniture and household equipment, transport 
equipment, and non-farm land including maintenance costs 
−  Miscellaneous expense (baht) Money spent on luxury goods, gambling, entertainment, recreation, 
special occasions such as funerals, weddings, charity, etc. 
Total consumption expenditure (baht) Sum of food and non-food consumption expenditure  
Farm characteristics: 
Farm size (rai) Total area of farmland in rai (1 rai = 0.16 hectare) 
Irrigation dummy (=1) Dummy variable which equals one if the household has at least one 
plot of farmland located in irrigated areas  
Asset holdings: 
Own land (baht) Value of farm and non-farm land owned by the household  
Productive assets (baht) Value of productive assets owned by the household, e.g. storehouse, 
water tank, water pump, livestock and fishery facilities, tractor, truck, 
farm machines and equipment, etc.  
Durable assets (baht) Value of durable assets owned by the household, e.g. house excluding 
land, furniture, household electrical appliances, etc.  
Farm stocks (baht) Value of stocks of crop and livestock products carried from last year  
Savings (baht)  Value of cash savings in financial institutions  
Other household characteristics: 
Social capital dummies  
−  BAAC (=1) 
−  Farmer and cooperative group (=1) 
−  Saving group (=1) 
Dummy variables for social capital benefits which equal one if the 
household has at least one member aged 18 years and over who is  
a member of the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives 
(BAAC), farmer or cooperative group, or informal saving group 
Non-farm participation dummies  
−  Retail and business owner (=1) 
−  Full-time employment (=1) 
Dummy variables for household’s engagement in non-farm activities 
which equal one if the household has at least one member aged 18 
years and over running own business or employed full-time  
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics 
  
Variable N Mean SD 
Measures of household income per adult equivalent:     
Farm income (baht) 40,684 58,120.59 107,305.90 
−  Crop income (baht) 40,684 38,993.39 85,734.11 
−  Livestock income (baht) 40,684 11,057.73 40,014.83 
−  Other farm income (baht) 40,684 2,652.01 30,937.41 
−  Farm labour and services (baht) 40,684 6,065.57 30,212.13 
Non-farm income (baht) 40,684 32,200.89 59,898.08 
−  Trade and business (baht) 40,684 5,340.55 26,585.31 
−  Wage and salary (baht) 40,684 18,401.46 41,145.50 
−  Renting or selling assets (baht) 40,684 407.11 11,472.17 
−  Remittances (baht) 40,684 5,162.36 20,773.02 
−  Other non-farm income (baht) 40,684 2,889.42 22,896.83 
Disaster relief (baht) 40,684 1,851.46 4,703.75 
Total income (baht) 40,684 91,600.64 124,105.00 
 Measures of household consumption expenditure per adult equivalent:   
Food consumption expenditure (baht) 40,684 16,216.40 10,037.80 
Non-food consumption expenditure (baht) 40,684 27,680.99 38,725.36 
−  Household items (baht) 40,684 15,274.56 25,068.46 
−  Education and health care (baht) 40,684 4,644.57 10,360.13 
−  Durable goods (baht) 40,684 2,178.17 13,649.77 
−  Miscellaneous expense (baht) 40,684 5,583.68 14,396.54 
Total consumption expenditure (baht) 40,684 43,897.38 42,816.75 
Risk-coping options:    
Reduction of savings (=1) 40,684                     0.24                      0.42  
Borrowing in total (=1) 40,684                     0.60                      0.49  
Borrowing for farming purposes (=1) 40,684                     0.42                      0.49  
Borrowing for non-farming purposes (=1) 40,684                     0.30                      0.45  
Reduction of assets in total (=1) 40,684                     0.23                      0.41  
Reduction of farm assets (=1) 40,684                     0.14                      0.35  
Reduction of non-farm assets (=1) 40,684                     0.13                      0.33  
Reduction of farm stocks (=1) 40,684                     0.15                      0.35  
Weather characteristic and constructed measures of rainfall shocks:     
Mean annual rainfall (millimetres)  40,684            1,412.13                 513.03  
Excessive rainfall − Fpt (the number of spells per year) 40,684 0.10  0.36  
Deficit rainfall − Dpt (the number of spells per year) 40,684 0.22  0.52  
Farm characteristics:   
Farm size (rai) 40,684                  24.81                   26.70  
Irrigation dummy (=1) 40,684                     0.28                      0.45  
Asset holdings per household:    
Own land (baht) 40,684    1,145,584.00     4,685,331.00  
Productive assets (baht) 40,684        144,293.50         857,419.30  
Durable assets (baht) 40,684        367,905.80         454,570.80  
Farm stocks (baht) 40,684          28,496.63           93,522.69  
Savings (baht)  40,684          37,074.45         160,584.50  
Household characteristics:   
Head’s age (years) 40,684 54.56  11.67  
Male head (=1) 40,684 0.83  0.37  
Highest education of household head:    
−  Under primary school or self-learning (=1) 40,684 0.06  0.24  
−  Primary school (=1) 40,684 0.77  0.42  
−  Secondary school (=1) 40,684 0.13  0.34  
Number of males aged < 18 years 40,684 0.56  0.75  
Number of males aged > 65 years  40,684 0.18  0.39  
Number of females aged < 18 years  40,684 0.53  0.73  
Number of females aged > 65 years  40,684 0.18  0.39  
Number of males aged 18-65 years classified by highest education level:    
−  Under primary school or self-learning 40,684 0.05  0.23  
−  Primary school 40,684 0.87  0.76  
−  Secondary school 40,684 0.47  0.67  
−  Postsecondary or higher education 40,684 0.23  0.50  
Number of females aged 18-65 years classified by highest education level:    
−  Under primary school or self-learning 40,684 0.07  0.27  
−  Primary school 40,684 0.94  0.67  
−  Secondary school 40,684 0.37  0.60  
−  Postsecondary or higher education 40,684 0.25  0.53  
Social capital dummies:    
−  [SC]-BAAC (=1) 40,684 0.50  0.50  
−  [SC]-Farmer and cooperative group (=1) 40,684 0.16  0.37  
−  [SC]-Saving group (=1) 40,684 0.08  0.26  
Non-farm participation dummies:    
−  [NF]-Retail and business owner (=1) 40,684 0.12  0.33  
−  [NF]-Full-time employment (=1)  40,684 0.13  0.34  
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Appendix 2-A: Thai Farm Household Socio-Economic Survey 
 
This appendix provides supplementary information on the sampling strategy applied in 
the Thai farm household socio-economic survey. This survey uses a stratified two-stage 
systematic sampling method to select the sample of farming villages and farming 
households. Specifically, this two-stage sampling approach involves two sampling units 
to be selected in order. In the first stage, farming villages are selected as primary 
sampling units (PSU). A sampling frame is drawn from the nationwide Agricultural 
Census in 2003 and the Farmer Registration Database in 2006, collected by the National 
Statistical Office and the Office of Agricultural Economics of Thailand, respectively.  
The total of roughly 70,000 villages is then classified into seven strata based on the 
characteristics of agricultural production commonly found in each village: livestock; 
fishery; vegetables, ornamental plants, and herbs; paddy; upland field crops; fruit trees 
and perennial crops; and unclassified. Appendix Table 2.1 gives a description for each of 
these seven stratified villages. This initial stage is implemented prior to the start of the 
field survey, with the number of intended sampled villages to be surveyed in each round 
exogenously determined by the allocated budget each year. The selection of farming 
villages in each province is determined based on the number of villages in each stratum 
relative to the nature of agricultural production found in that province. Overall, the 
sampled farming villages are representative at the province level.  
 
Given the number of sampled villages from the first step, the second stage is to randomly 
select four farming households from each of the sampled villages as secondary sampling 
units (SSU). This procedure is carried out on-site at the village by first counting the 
number of all farming households in that village whose agricultural production activity is 
matched with the village’s stratification by asking the village heads or key informants, 
and then picking four households from the list using a table of random digits. As a result, 
the sampled households are also representative at the province level. The sampled 
households are mainly small and medium farming households, excluding big corporate 
farms, companies, and institutions. In each year, the total of 6,000-12,000 farming 
households were chosen from 1,500-3,000 sampled farming villages in 76 provinces 
between 2006 and 2010. It should be noted that the sample size in 2006 and 2008 is 
almost double of that in other rounds.  
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After pooling all five cross-sectional surveys and dropping observations with incomplete 
rainfall information, there remain 40,684 farming households in 68 provinces covering 
five consecutive years from 2006 to 2010. The two pie charts in Appendix Figure 2.1 
show the percentage of sampled households, categorised by seven village strata and six 
geographical regions during 2006-2010. Almost a half of the sample is drawn from rice-
growing villages. The north-east, where the irrigation system is typically underdeveloped 
and most agricultural production is rainfed, has the largest representation in the sample. 
Farming households from paddy villages are the majority in all regions, except in the east 
and in the south, while the majority of households in eastern and southern Thailand 
engage in the production of fruit trees and perennial crops. 
 
Appendix Table 2.1: Definition of village strata 
Stratum Village Description 
1 Livestock village  
 
A village that has more than 15 households who  
raise livestock for commercial purposes 
2 Fishery village A village that has more than 15 households who run  
a fishery for commercial purposes  
3 Vegetables, ornamental plants, and 
herbs village 
A village that has more than 15% of total land area  
for growing vegetables, ornamental plants, and herbs 
4 Paddy village 
 
A village that has more than 60% of total land area  
for growing rice 
5 Upland field crops village A village that has more than 60% of total land area  
for growing upland field crops 
6 Fruit trees and perennial crops village A village that has more than 60% of total land area  
for growing fruit trees and perennial crops 
7 Unclassified village  A village that does not match with any stratum.    
 
Appendix Figure 2.1: The sample size classified by village strata and regions  
Stratum 1, 
18.7% 
Stratum 2, 
6.5% 
Stratum 3, 
3.3% 
Stratum 4, 
46.0% 
Stratum 5, 
9.1% 
Stratum 6, 
15.4% 
Stratum 7, 
0.8% 
North, 
11.6% 
North-east, 
45.9% 
Central, 
18.6% 
East, 
6.4% 
West, 
4.8% 
South, 
12.8% 
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Appendix 2-B: Rainfall Patterns in Thailand 
 
Located on the Indochinese Peninsula, Thailand is influenced by the south-west and the 
north-east monsoons over a year cycle. Under the influence of the south-west monsoon, 
the rainy season in Thailand usually begins in mid-May and lasts through October in 
most regions, except for the southern part where it lasts until December. During the rainy 
season, a significant amount of rain can be found in two non-consecutive periods in May-
June and August-September. There is a slight decline in the amount of rain in the middle 
of the rainy season, starting from late June and possibly lasting from two to four weeks. 
The discontinuity of rainfall between June and July is driven by a temporary movement 
of the monsoon trough from northern Thailand towards southern China. This low 
pressure trough comes back to Thailand in late July, causing moderate to heavy rain until 
the end of the rainy season. Appendix Figure 2.2 shows the spatial variation of rainfall 
conditions across 76 provinces in Thailand, represented by the long-term average and 
standard deviation of annual rainfall between 1981 and 2010. The amount of rain is 
moderate and differs slightly between the north and the north-east. Maximum average 
rainfall is found in the southern and eastern regions which are under the strong influence 
of the two monsoons throughout the year. The central flat plain and the western region 
have the lowest average rainfall compared with the other regions. 
 
Appendix Figure 2.2: Mean and standard deviation of annual rainfall 
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Appendix 2-C: Sensitivity Analysis of Rainfall Shock Variables 
 
As discussed in section 2.3.2, the construction of rainfall shock variables involves an 
arbitrary decision on the threshold values. This appendix provides the sensitivity analysis 
of shock variables on key measures of household income. Appendix Table 2.2 shows the 
estimation results in three different scenarios by alternating the threshold values around 
the proposed values. The estimates in the second scenario are from baseline estimations 
in Table 2.3 using the 95th and the 5th percentile in defining the incidence of excessive 
and deficit rainfall, respectively. The first scenario can be considered as the less extreme 
case compared to the baseline, with threshold values of P90 and P10 for excessive and 
deficit rainfall, respectively. The negative effects of rainfall shocks on crop income are 
much lower, and total income is positively correlated with excessive rainfall events in 
this scenario. The reason could be the fact that P90 and P10 are too low to capture the 
occurrence of adverse rainfall events. The amount of daily rain at P90 is 34 millimetres 
on average, classified as ‘moderate rain’ using the Thai Meteorological Department’s 
definition, while the cut-off at P10 corresponds to the average value of 3-month SPI  
at -1.70, indicating ‘moderately dry condition’. With the more severe case in the third 
scenario, the use of P2 gives no variation in the incidence of deficit rainfall. Although 
negative effects of excessive rainfall shocks are larger when applying P98 as the 
threshold, they are not statistically different from zero.  
 
Appendix Table 2.2: Sensitively analysis of rainfall shocks on income  
 Threshold Crop income 
Livestock 
income 
Total farm 
income 
Total non- 
farm income 
Total 
income 
Scenario 1       
Excessive rainfall (Fpt) P90 -0.0609 0.2212 0.0057 0.1848 0.0184 
  (0.0778) (0.1507) (0.0658) (0.1931) (0.0434) 
Deficit rainfall (Dpt) P10 -0.1181* 0.0599 -0.0820* -0.2722 -0.0794 
  (0.0633) (0.0967) (0.0436) (0.2946) (0.0489) 
Scenario 2        
Excessive rainfall (Fpt) P95 -0.3377* 0.3454 -0.1536 0.0407 -0.1691* 
  (0.1806) (0.2918) (0.1236) (0.2415) (0.0874) 
Deficit rainfall (Dpt) P5 -0.2049* 0.2093 -0.1705* -0.8511 -0.1731 
  (0.1220) (0.1754) (0.0970) (0.8842) (0.1412) 
Scenario 3       
Excessive rainfall (Fpt) P98 -0.7010 0.4807 -0.2720 0.4681 -0.3328 
  (0.6851) (0.4367) (0.3296) (0.4975) (0.2230) 
Deficit rainfall (Dpt) P2 omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted 
  - - - - - 
Notes: The table shows OLS estimates of shocks on household income using multiple thresholds. *, **, *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively; robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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CHAPTER 3 
The Effects of Natural Disasters on Households’  
Preferences and Behaviour: Evidence from Thai Rice  
Farmers after the Mega Flood in 2011  
3.1 Introduction 
Natural disasters can have serious implications for economic development. Not only do 
they generally cause damage to an economy’s physical and human capital as well as its 
institutions; they can also lead to changes in people’s behaviour. Experiencing or 
observing largely unexpected and severe disasters may alter people’s risk, time, and 
social preferences. Such disasters could also induce a revision of subjective expectations 
of future risk exposure of affected households. Together, the changed preferences and 
subjective expectations induced by natural disasters could in turn result in a change in 
household behaviour that could further affect long-term economic development and 
resilience to future disaster risks. Understanding these consequences is important for the 
design of safety nets and development programs that could facilitate effective risk 
management and crowd in economic growth, especially among vulnerable rural 
agricultural households. 
This study contributes to the growing literature on the impacts of major catastrophic 
events on households’ preferences and behaviour. Given its rarity and severity, the 2011 
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mega flood serves as an ideal natural experiment to identify the casual impact of a largely 
unexpected natural disaster on affected households. In particular, we identify the effects 
of the 2011 flood on the risk, time, and social preferences; the subjective expectations of 
future floods and of the dependability of various safety net institutions; and the behaviour 
of rice-farming households in Thailand. We do so by utilising the discontinuity generated 
by the mega flood, on the basis of a remote sensing flood map, to construct a variation in 
severe flood experience across sampled villages and households. This discontinuity 
allows us to compare villages and households that were directly hit by the mega flood 
with those that were not. A field survey and a number of experimental games conducted 
among 426 households in 44 villages in four key rice-growing provinces in 2014 were 
used to elicit households’ preferences, subjective expectations, and behaviour, together 
with other household characteristics.  
Even though the 2011 flood also affected industrial and residential areas, this study 
focuses only on the effects of flood on rice-farming households. Most of the areas 
directly affected by the flood were farmland, especially for rice cultivation, and these 
farms were operated by relatively poor households whose access to risk-management and 
risk-coping mechanisms was limited. The flood impacted the livelihoods of farming 
households in a substantial way and shed light on policy implications regarding safety 
nets for poor and vulnerable households.20 Using a cross-sectional survey of Thai rice-
farming households collected in 2014, we first explore how experiencing the mega flood 
affected the risk, time, and social preferences of flooded and non-flooded households 
                                                          
20 In a recent study, Poaponsakorn and Meethom (2014) compare information from Thailand’s socio-
economic surveys in 2009 and 2011 and map them with the flooded areas by using satellite images. 
They show that the 2011 mega flood in Thailand had a large negative impact on farm profits of some 
middle income households in the flooded provinces.  
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within the flood-prone and non-flood-prone areas. Next, we explore how the mega flood 
affected these households’ subjective expectations of future flood events and of the 
dependability of various safety net institutions. Finally, we examine whether the mega 
flood affected household behaviour and how the changes in preferences and subjective 
expectations induced by the mega flood affected such behaviour.  
Recent studies have shown evidence that natural disasters can change risk, time, and 
social preferences of affected households. For risk preferences, Eckel et al. (2009) find 
that experiencing Hurricane Katrina in 2005 affected the risk preferences of Hurricane 
evacuees in the United States. Cameron and Shah (2012) find that individuals who had 
recently suffered a flood or earthquake in Indonesia exhibited higher risk aversion than 
those living in similar but unaffected villages. Cassar et al. (2011) and Ingwersen (2014) 
show that the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami in Thailand and Indonesia resulted in higher 
and lower risk aversion, respectively. Page et al. (2012) find that after large negative 
wealth shocks from the 2011 flood in Brisbane, Australia, individuals became more 
willing to adopt riskier options in their decision-making process. For time preferences, 
Callen (2015) shows that exposure to the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami 
increased the patience of Sri Lankan wage workers. For social preferences, Castillo and 
Carter (2011) find that a large negative shock caused by Hurricane Mitch in 1998 
increased altruism, trust, and reciprocity in small Honduran communities. Cassar et al. 
(2011) show that the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami in Thailand also 
resulted in higher altruism.21 
                                                          
21 There is also literature on the effects of traumatic and catastrophic civil conflicts on preferences – 
for example, Voors et al. (2012), Cassar et al. (2013), and Callen et al. (2014).  
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As summarised in Delavande et al. (2011), people form and adjust their subjective 
expectations to reflect some risk factors, which could be socio-economic characteristics, 
preferences, perceptions, or past experiences. In addition, expectations have been found 
to be associated with agricultural decisions. Giné et al. (2009) find that the timing of the 
planting decisions of Indian rainfed farmers was strongly influenced by their belief in the 
monsoon onset. Vargas Hill (2009) shows that coffee producers in Uganda allocated less 
labour when the expectations of coffee yield and price corresponded with negative 
returns. Several studies also show that individual expectations are key determinants of 
insurance demand. Shaik et al. (2008) find that farm producers in the United States who 
perceived higher crop yield or price were less likely to purchase both yield and revenue 
insurance, while those who expected higher yield variance were more at risk and hence 
demanded more revenue insurance. In the Netherlands, Van Asseldonk et al. (2002) find 
that a producer’s belief in the availability of public disaster relief in the future was 
negatively correlated with the willingness to pay for crop insurance. By studying public 
insurance schemes in Austria and Germany, Raschky et al. (2013) conclude that the 
lower the level of disaster relief and the more uncertain it was, the lesser was the degree 
of crowding out of private flood insurance. 
Changes in preferences and subjective expectations could affect household behaviour in 
various ways, which could in turn affect households’ economic development and their 
resilience to future disaster risks. On one hand, increasing risk aversion may lead 
households to reduce risk-taking behaviour, which might include a reduction in 
productive investment – necessary for economic growth. An increase in risk aversion 
could also lead households to invest in more insurance measures, including self-
insurance, social insurance, and market-based insurance. A change in time preference 
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could affect households’ intertemporal decisions, with increasing patience resulting in  
an increase in savings. Increasing altruism may enhance public goods contribution and 
investment in social capital. Increasing subjective expectations of future risk exposure 
could also dampen investment incentives but, on the other hand, increase various uses of 
insurance mechanisms. Increasing subjective expectations or the dependability of disaster 
safety nets could, however, create a problem. For example, increasing expectations of 
public disaster relief could lead to excessive risk-taking behaviour and could potentially 
crowd out households’ incentive to insure themselves and to invest in social and market-
based insurance. 
The results show that experiencing the mega flood made non-flood-prone households 
more risk averse, more impatient, and more altruistic, and that asset-poor households 
were more likely to be affected by the flood than better-off households. The flood also 
made these low-risk households adjust upward their subjective expectations of future 
severe floods. After being hit by the mega flood, non-flood-prone households lost their 
confidence in social safety nets, signifying the limitations of risk-sharing in the presence 
of covariate shocks. Middle-income households who were not prone to floods had higher 
expectations of public insurance following the flood. Mediating through the changes of 
preferences and subjective expectations, the flooded households were less likely to have 
savings and to engage in self-insurance mechanisms, as well as to invest in productive 
investments, but more likely to take out commercial crop insurance, especially those in 
the bottom and middle wealth groups. 
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The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 provides key information on 
the incidence of the 2011 mega flood in Thailand. Section 3.3 describes our survey and 
sampling strategy, outcome variables, and summary statistics of the sampled households. 
Section 3.4 discusses the empirical strategy we use to identify the causal effects of the 
mega flood. Section 3.5 shows the estimation results. Finally, section 3.6 concludes and 
provides policy implications. 
3.2 The 2011 Mega Flood in Thailand  
As in other East Asian countries, natural disasters are common in Thailand. Due to the 
country’s tropical monsoon climate, the most common natural disasters in Thailand are 
floods. According to the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT), Thailand experienced 
68 floods during 1980-2014, averaging about two events per year.22 Although floods 
occurred frequently during this period, they did not generally result in high numbers of 
people killed, with the cumulative death toll from all flood events less than one death per 
flood event on average. In most cases, the damage was geographically limited, with the 
exception of severe floods. The most recent was the mega flood in 2011, one of the 
country’s deadliest and most destructive natural disasters. 
The mega flood in 2011 was recorded as the largest flood to have hit Thailand in over the 
past 50 years. It claimed over 800 lives, making it the second deadliest natural disaster in 
Thailand’s modern history (behind only the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami). 
The flood was initially caused by a series of early heavy rains in the north and the north-
                                                          
22 For a more detailed discussion on the impact of the 2011 mega flood on the Thai economy, see 
Samphantharak (2014). 
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east, together with a number of tropical storms occurring consecutively from late June to 
October 2011.23 As a result, there was excessive rainwater in the north and the upper 
north-east that eventually exceeded the capacity of the country’s key dams and drainage 
systems, thus causing rapid downstream flood flows towards the south through  
a few rivers in the major river basins – the Chao Phraya and Tha Chin River basins in the 
central plain and the Chi and Mun River basins in the north-east. The 2011 flood covered 
approximately one-third of the country, affecting 66 of 77 provinces in all regions,  
with 4.14 million hectares of land being inundated. Among the flooded areas, the 
variations in the extent of the inundation period largely depended on the variations in the 
availability of good drainage systems and blockages, especially with respect to 
ineffective urban planning. 
In total, the mega flood affected 12.8 million people and damaged 1.67 million hectares 
of agricultural land as well as 9,859 factories. It affected the agricultural sector in at least 
26 provinces in the northern, central, and north-eastern regions (World Bank, 2012).  
In particular, the 2011 flood inundated key rice-growing areas in the Chao Phraya and 
Tha Chin River basins. The Thai government spent more than US$3 billion on disaster 
relief, of which approximately 8 percent went to rice farmers. The total loss and damage 
was approximated at US$46.5 billion, or 14 percent of the country’s gross domestic 
product (GDP). 
 
                                                          
23 The average cumulative rainfall of 1,781 millimetres between January and October 2011 was the 
highest on record and was about 35 percent higher than its 50-year average (Poaponsakorn and 
Meethom, 2014). The statistics provided by the World Bank show that the total rainfall during July-
September was the highest recorded since record-keeping began in 1901. The probability of such rain 
event has been estimated at once in 250 years.   
  62 
3.3 Data 
The data used in this study are from a recent survey of Thai rice-farming households.  
The fieldwork was conducted between January and April 2014 in the country’s key rice-
growing areas affected by the 2011 mega flood.  
3.3.1 Sampling strategy 
Four rice-growing provinces affected by the 2011 mega flood include Suphan Buri, 
Phitsanulok, Khon Kaen, and Nakhon Ratchasima. These provinces were purposefully 
selected to provide representative variations in rice cultivation systems, the nature of the 
mega flood exposure, and the capacity and strategies of households and communities to 
cope with floods in general.24 Suphan Buri and Phitsanulok are the country’s main rice-
growing provinces, covering about 15 percent of rice-farming areas in the central and the 
lower northern plains, where rice farming is mostly irrigated. Khon Kaen and Nakhon 
Ratchasima cover almost 20 percent of rice-farming areas in the north-eastern region, 
where rice farming is mainly rainfed. Shown in Figure 3.1, Suphan Buri and Phitsanulok 
are located in the Chao Phraya and Tha Chin River Basin Group, while Khon Kaen and 
Nakhon Ratchasima are located in the Mekong Tributary Basin Group.25 Within the Chao 
Phraya and Tha Chin River basins, Phitsanulok is upstream of the Nan River, while 
Suphan Buri is downstream of the Tha Chin River. In the north-east, Khon Kaen is 
                                                          
24 A selection effect must be acknowledged since we were not able to capture households that were 
severely affected by the mega flood and had already moved out of our selected areas. 
25 According to the classification of the National Committee on Hydrology of Thailand, there are 25 
distinct hydrological units, or basins. The basins are regrouped into nine basin groups. The Chao 
Phraya and Tha Chin River Basin Group consists of the basins of the rivers Ping, Wang, Yom, Nan, 
Chao Phraya, Sakae Krung, Pasak, and Tha Chin. The Mekong Tributary Basin Group consists of the 
basins of the rivers Mekong, Kok, Chi, Mun, and the Tonle Sap. 
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upstream of the Chi River, while Nakhon Ratchasima is downstream of the Mun River, 
where both rivers flow into the Mekong River. 
The first step in our sampling strategy was to confine the study areas in each of the  
four chosen provinces to only those neighbouring flood-prone rice-growing villages,  
on the basis of GIS remote sensing maps provided by the Geo-Informatics and Space 
Technology Development Agency (GISTDA) at the Ministry of Science and Technology 
of Thailand. We first identified rice-farming villages in each of the four provinces based 
on GIS-based rice-growing maps (a village is rice-farming village if more than 50 
percent of its areas grow rice). We then identified and confined our study areas to flood-
prone rice-farming villages by overlaying rice cultivation maps with flood frequency 
maps. The flood frequency maps were constructed using 5-year high-resolution historical 
flood inundation maps, which allowed us to identify in each year if (and therefore the  
5-year frequency at which) the area was heavily flooded (the area was considered heavily 
flooded if the observed inundation was longer than 15 days, which is long enough to 
create a total loss in rice fields).26 We then selected only neighbouring flood-prone rice-
growing villages (villages with more than 50 percent of areas heavily flooded for at least 
two of the past five years) for this study.  
The second step was to select heavily flooded and not so heavily flooded villages among 
the flood-prone rice-growing villages. We used the 2011 flood inundation maps to 
distinguish heavily flooded villages (villages with more than 50 percent of areas 
observed inundated for longer than 15 days) from the nearby not so heavily flooded 
                                                          
26 The flood inundation maps were constructed from satellite imagery on board RADARSAT-2, with 
a cloud-penetrating SAR sensor with a 25-metre resolution. 
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villages, so that we could then randomly choose five to six villages from each group in 
each province. Because these sampled villages are already confined among neighbouring 
flood-prone rice-growing villages, they largely share similar characteristics in terms of 
geography, rice cultivation systems, socio-economic conditions, and exposure to other 
shocks and policies, and differ only in the exposure to the mega flood.  
There were still large variations in flood-proneness and exposure to the mega flood 
within each selected village, so the third step was to select heavily flooded and not so 
heavily flooded households for comparison within the homogenous flood-prone or non-
flood-prone groups in each chosen village. In each village, we obtained GIS-based 
livelihood village maps, available at each village office, and used it to distinguish flood-
prone rice fields (in lowland areas outside the flood protection zone) from the non-flood-
prone rice fields (in relatively higher areas or in lowland areas, but located inside the 
flood protection zone). Combining the 2011 flood inundation maps with information 
from local authorities, we divided rice-growing households in each village (sampling 
frame) into four groups: [1] heavily flooded and prone to floods; [2] not heavily flooded, 
but prone to floods; [3] heavily flooded, but not prone to floods; and [4] not flooded and 
not prone to floods.  
Next, we randomly selected an equal amount of households from each of the four groups 
in each chosen village. A household was considered heavily flooded if its rice fields were 
located in areas with observed inundation of longer than 15 days. A household was 
considered being prone to floods if its rice fields were located in flood-prone areas.  
We captured 8-18 households altogether in each village, depending on village size. 
Within the flood-prone (non-flood-prone) group, the selected households should thus 
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largely share similar characteristics in terms of geography, rice cultivation systems, 
socio-economic conditions, and exposure to other shocks and policies, and differ only in 
the exposure to the mega flood.  
Table 3.1 shows descriptive statistics of the 2011 flood by studied province. The sample 
size is given in the top panel; there were 44 sampled villages, 22 of which were heavily 
flooded villages. There were 426 sampled households in total, 248 of which were in the 
non-flood-prone group. A total of 175 households were flooded households, 85 of which 
were in the non-flood-prone group. Although we intended to collect a balanced sample of 
flooded and non-flooded households, our sample size was largely unbalanced − roughly 
30-40 percent of households in Suphan Buri, Khon Kaen, and Nakhon Ratchasima were 
flooded. The share of flooded households in Phitsanulok (55 percent) slightly exceeded 
that of non-flooded households. These proportions reflect variations of flood incidence 
across sampled villages and, therefore, provinces. 
3.3.2 Survey and outcome variables  
Our questionnaire included standard household surveys, with a special module on 
households’ experiences with the 2011 flood and other adverse natural events in the past. 
This module contained detailed information on the occurrence and consequences of 
shocks, together with how the affected households prepared themselves prior to shocks 
and how they coped with shocks afterwards.  
Panel B of Table 3.1 shows the variation in characteristics of the mega flood. The flood 
hit Phitsanulok during July-August 2011 and lasted for 85 days, while Suphan Buri 
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experienced the flood more than a month later, in September, with longer flood days of  
94 days. Anticipating the floodwaters, farmers in Suphan Buri in principle had more time 
to prepare for and cope with the flood than those in Phitsanulok. The nature of the mega 
flood in the north-east was different from that in the central plain. Khon Kaen and 
Nakhon Ratchasima were hit by the mega flood later in October, but had only 48-58 
flood days. The flood damaged 89 percent of household’s rice fields and resulted in 86 
percent of total rice income loss on average.27 Rice-farming households in downstream 
Supan Buri suffered the largest loss of 220,000 baht, followed by those in Phitsanulok of 
210,000 baht. Rice income loss was much lower among households in the north-east, 
with an average of 82,000 baht in Khon Kaen and 127,000 baht in Nakhon Ratchasima.28 
Only a small fraction of flooded households reported house damage and asset loss. 
Approximately 20 percent of flooded households reported that they had to cut back their 
consumption following the mega flood and 67 percent of these households reported that 
they were unable to pay off their debt. 
Panel C of Table 3.1 shows the adoption of coping strategies among flooded households 
in response to the mega flood. Borrowing from financial institutions and receiving cash 
assistance from the government were the most salient responses. Social mechanisms 
were rather limited in the severe flood event − only 14 percent of flooded households 
reported getting support from friends or relatives. There was a low take-up rate of crop 
insurance among sampled households; insurance did not exist in Suphan Buri and 
Phitsanulok, and only 16 percent of flooded households in Khon Kaen and Nakhon 
                                                          
27 We calculated the percentage of total rice income lost from what the sampled households obtained 
following the mega flood, in comparison with what they could have obtained in the best scenario or in 
normal years when there is no flood.  
28 The exchange rate during the time of the survey was approximately 32 baht per US dollar. 
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Ratchasima received insurance indemnity following the mega flood. Reliance on self-
insurance mechanisms was not common practice; only 5 percent of flooded households 
relied on their own savings and assets, while 11 percent of flooded households, especially 
those in Khon Kaen (25 percent), relied on additional labour work. Though not common 
in general, about 20 percent of flooded households in Suphan Buri benefited from natural 
resources as safety nets during the mega flood.  
Table 3.2 reports summary statistics of household characteristics by the 2011 flood 
exposure at village and household levels for flood-prone and non-flood-prone groups. 
Panels A and B show that most characteristics were similar between flooded and non-
flooded villages, and especially between flooded and non-flooded or households. As for 
flooded households, the average household size was four people and 30 percent of which 
had migrant members. The majority of the respondents of 71 percent were the household 
head and about a half of those were female. The average age of respondents was 52-53 
years old, with 74 percent and 21 percent of respondents having completed at least 
primary and secondary education, respectively. The average land owned per capita by 
flooded households was 5 rai, while the average income per capita was about 81,500 baht 
per year.29 Flooded households earned 57 percent of their income from rice farming  
each year. Asset holdings were significantly larger among households living in flooded 
villages and flooded households compared to the non-flooded counterparts within the 
non-flood-prone group.30  
                                                          
29 Thailand uses ‘rai’ as unit of measurement for land (1 rai = 0.16 hectare). 
30 Statistics show that some household characteristics like occupational choice, wealth, and past shock 
experiences were significantly different across studied provinces. Farming households in Suphan Buri 
and Phitsanulok relied heavily on rice farming, earning more than 80 percent of total income from rice 
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The exposure to the 2011 flood of flood-prone and non-flood-prone households could  
be different by the number of characteristics, especially in flood anticipation, farm 
elevation, and production practices. If these characteristics correlate with the outcome 
variables, there will be biases in our estimation results. To deal with this issue, we thus 
stratified households by the degree to which they were prone to floods, mainly by their 
plot characteristics discussed earlier. Panels C and D of Table 3.2 show that production 
and plot characteristics and shock experiences were not significantly different between 
flooded and non-flooded villages or households within each stratified flood-prone group. 
In other words, given flood-proneness, exposure to the mega flood no longer depends on 
these factors. Therefore, in each flood-prone group, flooded and non-flooded villages or 
households are relatively similar, but only differ in exposure to the mega flood. Since we 
include flood-proneness and its interaction with the 2011 flood exposure in all of our 
regression analyses, the estimation results thus capture the within-group impacts of the 
mega flood on the outcome variables.  
In particular, households who were prone to flooding had limited access to irrigation, 
sowed a little bit earlier, and had a larger share of lowland in total farmland compared to 
those who were not. The average flood frequency for flood-prone households was about 
two to three events in the past five years, which was much higher than that of non-flood-
prone households. Only a small fraction of flood-prone and non-flood-prone households 
reported having prepared for the mega flood.  
                                                                                                                                                                            
cultivation, while rice income of households in Khon Kaen and Nakhon Ratchasima contributed to 
less than 40 percent of total income. On average, sampled households in the north-east were poorer 
than those in Suphan Buri and Phitsanulok. Sampled households in Phitsanulok were slightly more 
exposed to natural shocks, with an average of three events in the past 10 years, compared with two 
events for the three other provinces.  
  69 
We later asked the sampled households about what they would do in preparation for 
future flood events. In addition, the survey included a series of hypothetical questions 
with no financial incentive used to elicit risk, time, and social preferences; subjective 
expectations of future risk exposure; and safety net perceptions.31  
For risk preferences, we used a variant of Binswanger’s (1980) game by asking the 
respondent to choose among a variety of rice seed types, where each type gave different 
yield that was varied according to uncertain situations. Some types gave a low yield but 
were more resistant to natural hazards, while some gave a much higher yield in normal 
circumstances but would give a very low yield under natural hazards. The respondent’s 
seed choice thus reflects his or her degree of risk aversion. We then constructed a risk 
aversion parameter based on the payoff of the chosen rice variety as an ordinal index 
ranging from 1 (least averse) to 5 (most averse).  
For time preferences, each respondent was asked to choose whether to receive a certain 
amount of money the next day or to receive a larger amount of money in the next 15 days 
in eight circumstances. The amount of money given in the second choice increased as the 
experiment progressed from situations 1 to 8. We then observed the patterns of answers 
that the respondent gave to these situations, particularly when he or she first switched to 
accepting a payment in the next 15 days instead of receiving a certain amount of money 
the next day. This reflects the extent to which the respondent discounts the future over 
the present, and hence indicates his or her degree of impatience. We then constructed our 
                                                          
31 Appendix 3-A and Appendix 3-B provide a summary of hypothetical questions used for eliciting 
preference parameters and subjective expectations, respectively.    
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time reference parameter or impatience as an ordinal scale ranging from 0 (not impatient 
or most patient) to 8 (most impatient).32  
For social preferences, we used the dictator game to elicit how altruistic the respondent 
would be in two scenarios. This game measures how people care about others, although 
there is no gain in return. The game is played as we hypothetically gave the respondent  
a certain amount of money and asked him or her to give a part or even all of that money 
to another randomly matched farmer from the same village. The respondent was also  
told that the chosen beneficiary was anonymous and that his or her decision would be 
confidential. Next, we repeated this game but assumed that there was a severe flood in 
the preceding year in which every household in the village including the respondent’s 
was affected. This time, we hypothetically gave the respondent a certain amount of 
money as compensation and asked him or her to give that money to a random flood 
victim in the village. We then constructed altruism parameters from the proportion of 
money the respondent gave in each situation. These continuous variables thus range from 
0 (least altruistic) to 1 (most altruistic).  
For the elicitation of subjective expectations, the respondent was asked to assign  
a probability to the occurrence of three flood events in the next 10 years (no flood, mild 
floods, and severe floods). In the field, 10 one-baht coins were given to the respondent as 
visual aids for us to express the probabilistic concept since we were afraid that it might 
be too abstract to ask for probabilities directly. The chart in Appendix 3-B was presented 
to the respondent while we explained the questions and situations of three different flood 
                                                          
32 Note that our simple measure of time preference is subject to risk aversion, as preferring to accept 
lower instantaneous payment rather than waiting for higher future payment may reflect risk aversion 
to future payments as well as impatience. 
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events that could happen in the future. The respondent was asked to allocate 10 coins into 
the given intervals labelled by flood events. The number of coins allocated in each 
interval thus reflected the likelihood that each flood event would occur in the next 10 
years. We constructed subjective expectation variables of future mild floods and severe 
floods from the number of coins assigned to each event, ranging from 0 (no chance), 0.1 
(1 in 10 years), 0.2 (2 in 10 years), …, to 1 (10 in 10 years).  
For safety net perceptions, we asked what the respondent thought about the capability of 
his or her own household, social networks within the community, and the government to 
deal with future floods or to mitigate the potential impacts of floods. For the perceptions 
of safety nets provided by households and social networks, we used an ordinal scale of  
0 (not able), 0.5 (partially able), and 1 (totally able) for these measures. For safety nets 
provided by the government, we applied subjective probabilities of public assistance in 
terms of natural disaster relief, given the occurrence of future flood events, to reflect the 
dependability of the government. The response thus ranged from 0, 0.1, 0.2, ..., to 1, 
signifying the respondent’s strength of belief about the likelihood of getting government 
support during floods. 
Table 3.3 reports summary statistics of preference measures, subjective expectations, and 
behaviour by village- and household-level flood exposures. For risk preferences, the 
sampled households were more risk averse, with the mean risk aversion of 3.9-4.1 out of 
the maximum 5 in both groups. We also find that the mega flood was associated with 
significantly higher risk aversion among flooded villages but not among flooded 
households. For time preferences, households were slightly impatient, with the mean 
impatience of 4.7-5.1 on the scale from 0 to 8. Nevertheless, there was no significant 
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difference in impatience between flooded and non-flooded villages or households.  
For social preferences, the average share of grant money given to a randomly matched 
villager in a normal situation was 0.24-0.27, but reduced to 0.22-0.24 when households 
were asked to share the assistance money with another flood victim in the same village. 
The mean altruism parameters in both situations were not significantly different between 
flooded and non-flooded villages or households, signifying that exposure to the mega 
flood did not correlate with altruistic behaviour of flood victims.  
For subjective expectations, households expected mild floods to occur four to five times 
and severe floods to occur two to three times over the next 10 years. Being hit by the 
mega flood resulted in higher subjective probabilities of future mild and severe floods 
among flooded households as well as among households living in severely flooded 
villages. For safety net perceptions, households affected by the 2011 flood at the village 
or household level had lower expectations of their capability and that of the social 
networks to deal with future floods. In fact, flooded households are more likely to expect 
government provided disaster relief following the mega flood. 
Finally, this chapter examines the potential impacts of the mega flood on household 
behaviour in relation to the preparedness for flood events in the future and the strength  
of farm production that could help mitigate the severity and damage of future floods 
following the severe flood in 2011. Each household was asked the following questions: 
[1] whether the household had savings; [2] whether the household invested in flood 
prevention or adjusted farming practices by changing modes or methods of rice 
cultivation; [3] whether the household grew other crops; [4] whether the household had 
off-farm employment; [5] whether the household participated in or contributed to 
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building flood prevention systems with the community; [6] whether the household gave 
support to others, including by lending money; [7] whether the household demanded 
market crop insurance against future flood risks; and [8] whether the household invested 
in better seeds and organic fertilizer. Panel C of Table 3.3 shows that most behaviour was 
similar among households in flooded and non-flooded villages, except for investing in 
irrigation, adjusting farming practices, and demanding commercial crop insurance, which 
were significantly more prevalent among households in flooded villages and among 
flooded households. Compared with non-flooded households, flooded households were 
more likely to diversify to off-farm employment and provide assistance to others but 
were less likely to have savings.      
3.4 Empirical Strategy  
From our sampling strategy, we can construct three flood exposure variables to represent 
variations in severe flood experience across sampled villages and households. First, 
village-level flood exposure is a binary variable, indicating whether the household was 
located in a heavily flooded village. By comparing households living in severely flooded 
villages with those in not so severely flooded villages, we could identify the potential 
impacts of the mega flood on households living in more heavily flooded villages relative 
to those in other villages with largely similar characteristics. Second, household-level 
flood exposure is another binary variable, indicating whether the household’s rice fields 
were heavily flooded. By comparing heavily flooded households with not so heavily 
flooded households within the flood-prone (non-flood-prone) group, we could identify 
the potential impacts of the mega flood on households who were directly hit by the flood 
relative to others with similar characteristics. Finally, we used the percentage of rice 
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fields reported being completely submerged for longer than 15 days during the 2011 
flood to capture the intensity of the flood among flooded households. This household-
level flood intensity variable allows us to identify the heterogeneous effects of the extent 
to which the mega flood affected households.  
We estimate the impacts of the mega flood in 2011 by regressing preference, subjective 
expectation, and behavioural variables on flood exposure, controlling for household 
characteristics, geographical characteristics, and location fixed effects. Moreover, we 
hypothesise that the effects of the mega flood would be different among households who 
were well acquainted with floods and those who were not, because of some specific 
characteristics (i.e. farming practices, flood anticipation, and uneven experiences with 
floods). Flood-prone households also had a greater chance of being hit by the mega flood 
than non-flood-prone households. We therefore include a flood-prone variable and its 
interaction with flood exposure to capture the impacts of the mega flood on the outcome 
variables within the flood-prone and non-flood-prone groups:  
 ܻ ௜௩  ൌ ߚ ଴ ൅ ߚ ଵ ܨ݈݋݋݀     ௜௩  ൅ ߚ ଶ ܨ݈݋݋݀     ௜௩  כ ܨܲ  ௜௩  ൅ ߚ ଷ ܨܲ  ௜௩  ൅ ܆ ௜௩  ઺ ସ ൅ ߙ ௩ ൅ ߝ ௜௩  [3.1] 
where ௜ܻ௩ represents preference, subjective expectation, or behavioural variables. ܨ݈݋݋݀௜௩ 
is a variable that captures household exposure to the mega flood, for which we use three 
measures: [1] village-level flood exposure; [2] household-level flood exposure; and  
[3] the percentage of rice fields with total crop loss owing to their rice fields being 
completely submerged by floodwaters during the mega flood. ܨ ௜ܲ௩ is a binary variable 
indicating whether a household belongs to the flood-prone group. By regressing on ܨ ௜ܲ௩ 
and its interaction with each flood exposure variable, we can estimate flood-prone (non-
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flood-prone) specific impacts of the mega flood. The vector of control variables, ܆௜௩ , 
contains household demographics, wealth, and experiences with natural hazards in the 
past. The model includes ߙ௩ to control for unobserved heterogeneity at the village level, 
where ߝ௜௩  is a random error.33 We clustered all specifications at subdistrict level.  
There remains the question whether the variation of household-level flood exposure can  
be treated as exogenous. Our sampling strategy, which employs discontinuity across the 
GIS flood inundation maps in order to select heavily flooded and non-flooded samples 
from largely homogenous and neighbouring households within the flood-prone (non-
flood-prone) group, along with statistical tests in Table 3.2, helps ensure that exposure to 
the 2011 mega flood was largely exogenous to the outcome variables. We also argued 
that the main factors creating the variations in household flood experience were the 
correlations between the rice production cycle, the timing of the flood, and flood severity. 
Since the mega flood was unexpected by the time it arrived, the rice production cycle 
was unlikely to be endogenous to the flood. Even experienced farmers found it difficult, 
if not impossible, to adjust their growing periods in order to reduce this mega flood risk. 
In fact, the variation in rice production cycle could have come from rainfall patterns, 
which appeared to be exogenous factor. By asking the sampled households whether they 
had done anything in preparation for the 2011 flood, we found that the occurrence of the 
flood was beyond the expectation of most respondents. We also found that a significantly 
large number of sampled households who were flooded in 2011 reported that the mega 
flood was the most severe flood they have ever experienced, making its effects highly 
unanticipated. 
                                                          
33 For village-level flood exposure, we control for subdistrict instead.  
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 3.5 Estimation Results 
3.5.1 How did the 2011 flood affect preferences?  
Table 3.4 shows the estimation results of the mega flood on households’ attitudes 
towards risk for the full sample and for subgroups by level of wealth. Columns (1) to (3) 
report OLS estimates of the risk aversion parameter for the three measures of flood 
exposure. Column (1) shows no significant correlation between the mega flood and the 
risk aversion of households in severely flooded villages in all groups. Columns (2) and (3) 
show that being hit by the 2011 flood and increasing flood intensity were associated with 
higher risk aversion among flooded households that were not prone to flooding before 
2011. Nevertheless, the mega flood did not significantly affect the risk aversion of 
households living in flood-prone areas. These findings are robust when we performed 
ordered probit estimations in columns (4) to (6). The estimates in columns (5) and (6) 
provide us with more heterogeneous effects across different subgroups, in which 
increasing risk aversion can be observed among non-flood-prone households in the 
bottom and middle wealth groups but not in the top wealth group. In column (6), we  
also find significant evidence that flood-prone households in the bottom wealth group 
became less risk averse (more risk-loving) as the intensity of the mega flood increased. 
However, our results reveal that the degree to which households are prone to flooding did 
not significantly affect their risk preferences in general. 
An increase in risk aversion could also have implications for an individual’s investment 
decisions making them more conservative as well as on the demand for safety nets 
through either self-insurance mechanisms or market-based insurance. In other words, risk 
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aversion affects how people prepare themselves for future risk exposure. Our finding for 
the non-flood-prone group is consistent with other studies that examine the impacts of 
natural disasters on risk preferences. For example, Cassar et al. (2011) show that the 
2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami in Thailand made the affected individuals 
more risk averse. Cameron and Shah (2012) show that individuals who had recently 
suffered a flood or earthquake in Indonesia exhibited higher risk aversion than those 
living in similar but unaffected villages. Considering the 2011 flood in Cambodia, 
Chantarat et al. (2015) find that the mega flood led to higher risk aversion among rice-
farming households. On the contrary, Eckel et al. (2009) find that after being hit by 
Hurricane Katrina, some of the Hurricane evacuees became more risk-loving. Page et al. 
(2012) show that individuals directly affected by the 2011 flood in Brisbane, Australia, 
became more willing to adopt riskier options in their decision-making process. Ingwersen 
(2014) shows that individuals’ physical exposure to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami in 
Indonesia was associated with a temporary decrease in risk aversion, particularly for 
older adults and the poor, and that the impacts were independent of asset loss and 
increasing intensity.   
Table 3.5 summarises the estimation results for time preferences. Columns (1) to (3) 
show OLS estimates of the impatience index. We find that the 2011 mega flood did not 
significantly affect time preferences in general and that there was also no statistically 
significant correlation between impatience and flood-proneness. The estimations for 
population subgroups show that the flood significantly reduced the impatience of flooded 
households that were not prone to flooding in the bottom wealth group. This finding is 
also applicable to non-flood-prone households in severely flooded villages as well as to 
increasing flood intensity. But for non-flood-prone households in the top wealth group, 
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being flooded was associated with higher impatience. Ordered probit estimations in 
columns (5) and (6) show a significant positive effect of the flood on the impatience of 
flooded households in non-flood-prone areas. The estimates for wealth subgroups were 
consistent with the OLS estimates. In addition, there was significant evidence that being 
hit by the mega flood resulted in higher impatience among non-flood-prone households 
in the middle wealth group.  
In sum, we find no systematic pattern of the 2011 flood on the time preferences of 
flooded households across wealth subgroups. The flood made asset-poor households that 
were not prone to floods more patient. But for asset-rich households, the mega flood 
seemed to increase the impatience of non-flood-prone households. Time preferences 
reflect how people discount the future over the present, which affect their incentive to 
save. Our finding adds to the mixed results about natural disasters and time preferences. 
Cassar et al. (2011) find that following the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami in 
Thailand, individuals who had a family member injured or killed were likely to be more 
impatient. Callen (2015) shows that the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami increased 
the patience of wage workers in Sri Lanka. For Cambodia, Chantarat et al. (2015) find 
that the 2011 flood significantly reduced the impatience of flood-prone households that 
were hit by the flood.    
Table 3.6 summarises the estimation results for altruism. We pooled the two altruism 
measures together (the proportion of grant money given to a random villager in a normal 
situation and the proportion of money given to a random flood victim during a severe 
flood) and used a variable ‘Share when loss’ to indicate the results for the latter measure. 
For altruism towards a random villager under normal circumstances, the OLS estimates 
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in columns (1) to (3) show that there was no significant correlation between any of the 
three measures of flood exposure and altruistic behaviour. However, the significantly 
negative coefficient on the ‘Share when loss’ variable implied that, when compared to 
altruism in a normal situation, households became less altruistic when they were asked  
to share money with another villager during a severe flood event in which everyone in 
the village, including the households themselves, was affected. Nevertheless, it turns out 
that experiencing the mega flood made flooded households more altruistic towards flood 
victims as shown in column (2). Being prone to floods also corresponded with being 
more altruistic. The estimations for wealth subgroups show that asset-poor households 
that were not prone to flooding became more altruistic and that flood-prone households 
in the bottom and middle wealth groups exhibited less altruistic behaviour after being hit 
by the mega flood. We find significant evidence, but only in the top wealth group, that 
flooded households that were already prone to floods became less altruistic towards flood 
victims. It is likely that experiencing the mega flood made them realise the limitations of 
risk-sharing in the presence of aggregate shock.  
These results are robust when performing ordered probit estimations in columns (4) to (6). 
Overall, we find no significant evidence that the mega flood affected the altruistic 
behaviour of households in general. It is only the case for asset-poor households that 
experiencing the mega flood made non-flood-prone households more altruistic and flood-
prone households less altruistic. An increase in altruistic behaviour among flood victims 
could enhance social capital formation in the aftermath of a severe flood. Our finding 
corresponds with other studies on natural disasters and social preferences. For example, 
Castillo and Carter (2011) find that negative weather shocks from Hurricane Mitch in 
1998 increased the social interaction of small Honduran communities, but that this 
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relationship was not linear to the size of shock. Cassar et al. (2011) show that the 2014 
Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami in Thailand resulted in higher altruism. Chantarat 
et al. (2015) also find that the 2011 flood in Cambodia made flooded households in non-
flood-prone areas more altruistic.      
3.5.2 How did the 2011 flood affect subjective expectations of future floods and the 
dependability of safety net institutions? 
Table 3.7 summarises the regression results for subjective expectations of mild and 
severe floods in the future. We pooled the two flood events together and used a variable 
‘For mild flood’ to indicate the results for mild flood events. For the full sample, the OLS 
estimates in columns (1) to (3) show that the mega flood did not make households adjust 
their subjective expectations of future floods. However, by performing ordered probit 
estimations in columns (4) to (6), we find that the flood significantly increased the 
subjective probabilities of future severe floods among flooded households that were not 
prone to floods, while being in severely flooded villages did not affect their expectations 
of future floods. Compared with severe floods, the subjective expectations of mild floods 
appeared significantly larger, signifying that farming households were likely to anticipate 
the occurrence of frequent, but less severe floods in the next 10 years. Surprisingly, the 
degree to which households are prone to floods in normal years did not significantly 
affect their perceptions of future floods in any mean.  
The estimation results for population subgroups by ordered probit regressions show that 
the mega flood significantly increased subjective expectations of future severe floods 
among non-flood-prone households in the bottom wealth group. The incidence of the 
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2011 flood at the village level induced flood-prone households in this group to adjust 
upward their expectations of future severe floods. Moreover, we find that the mega flood 
also increased subjective expectations of future severe floods of non-flood-prone 
households in the middle wealth group, while there was no such evidence for households 
in the top wealth group. Our key finding is consistent with Chantarat et al. (2015) finding 
that the 2011 flood in Cambodia significantly increased subjective expectations of future 
floods, especially for severe floods.   
Table 3.8 summarises the estimation results on households’ perceptions of their own 
capability and that of social networks and the government as safety net institutions 
following the severe flood event. Using village- and household-level flood exposures, 
columns (1) to (6) report OLS estimates; columns (7) to (12) report ordered probit 
estimates. The results show that there was no significant difference in safety net 
perceptions between households living in flood-prone areas and households outside those 
areas. Experiencing the mega flood significantly reduced the perceived dependability  
of self-insurance and social insurance of both flooded households and households in 
severely flooded villages that were not prone to floods. It turns out that the reduction in 
self-reliance after the mega flood was significantly larger among flood-prone households 
in flooded villages. As for the provision of public insurance, we find that being hit by the 
mega flood significantly increased subjective expectations of government assistance 
among flooded households that were not prone to floods.  
The estimation results for wealth subgroups reveal that the decreasing dependability of 
self-insurance and social networks was relatively similar across different subgroups, 
except that the mega flood did not affect the perception of self-reliance of households in 
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the top wealth group. Strikingly, we find that households’ perceptions of public insurance 
varied according to wealth status. The mega flood only made flooded households in the 
middle wealth group that were not prone to floods adjust upward their subjective 
expectations of government assistance. While there was significant evidence that flood-
prone households in this group expected to receive government support, being hit by the 
mega flood reduced their subjective expectations of public safety nets. One explanation 
could be the reduced credibility of government implicit insurance in the presence of 
widespread natural disasters, probably due to a lack of resources or mismanagement at 
the time of such rare, severe, and nationwide event. The mega flood, therefore, induced 
households in the middle wealth group to rely more on public assistance after being hit 
by the flood. We did not see such evidence among households in other wealth groups as 
poorer households might have already benefited from government assistance during past 
flood events and, therefore, expected to receive the same treatment in the future, while 
wealthy households might be capable of dealing with floods and thus do not expect to 
receive assistance from the government insurance. 
3.5.3 How did the 2011 flood affect household behaviour?  
In the previous sections, we tried to understand how the mega flood affected households’ 
preferences and subjective expectations. These changes in preferences and expectations 
could also affect household behaviour, and some of these changes could in turn affect 
households’ long-term prosperity and resilience to future disaster risks. In this section, 
we further explore whether and how the mega flood affected household behaviour and 
how these behavioural changes were related to changes in household preferences and 
subjective expectations following the severe flood event.  
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Table 3.9 summarises the estimation results of probit regressions on eight behavioural 
variables using household-level flood exposure. We consider key behaviour that prevents 
the incidence of floods in the future or mitigates the severity and damage of future flood 
events. Each household was asked whether they engaged in or made decisions about the 
following options: [1] whether the household had savings; [2] whether the household 
invested in their own flood prevention or adjusted farming practices; [3] whether the 
household grew other crops; [4] whether the household had off-farm employment;  
[5] whether the household participated in or contributed to building flood prevention 
systems with the community; [6] whether the household gave support to others, including 
by lending money; [7] whether the household demanded market crop insurance against 
future flood risks; and [8] whether the household invested in better seeds and organic 
fertilizer. Behaviours [1] to [4] are types of self-insurance by building up buffer stocks. 
Behaviours [5] and [6] reflect social insurance. Behaviour [7] is market-based insurance, 
while behaviour [8] is important for future income generation.       
Column (1) shows that non-flood-prone households who were hit by the mega flood were 
less likely to have savings, especially those in the bottom and middle wealth groups.  
This result is in line with our earlier findings that the mega flood significantly increased 
the impatience of households that were not prone to flooding. Overall, we find that the 
more capable the households think they are, the lesser their intention to engage in self-
insurance strategies. The incentive to invest in flood protection and to adjust farming 
practices increased significantly with subjective expectations of future floods reported  
in column (5). With no significant effect of the mega flood, households may find it not 
worthwhile to invest in flood protection and to adjust farming practices while still living 
in the location that has been flooded regularly. Column (11) shows that the mega flood 
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significantly reduced crop diversification of non-flood-prone households in the middle 
wealth group, perhaps because of their higher subjective expectations of public insurance 
following the mega flood. Asset-rich households that were prone to floods were most 
likely to diversify their crop production shown in column (12). Column (15) shows that 
being hit by the mega flood induced off-farm diversification among flood-prone 
households in the middle wealth group. However, asset-poor households were less likely 
to engage in off-farm activities when hit by the flood, probably because of their limited 
earning options shown in column (14). 
As for social insurance, experiencing the mega flood did not induce flooded households 
to contribute to public goods or to help others, no matter whether they were living in 
flood-prone or non-flood-prone areas. This finding is consistent with what we found 
earlier that the mega flood reduced the perceived dependability of social networks among 
flooded households. Generally, households in risky environments were more likely to 
take out commercial insurance against future flood risks. Column (25) shows that the 
mega flood boosted demand for crop insurance among flooded households that were not 
prone to floods before 2011, especially those in the bottom and middle wealth groups.  
A significant increase in insurance demand is in line with our previous finding that the 
mega flood increased the risk aversion and subjective expectations of future floods of 
non-flood-prone households. Furthermore, we also find no crowding out effect of public 
insurance through the provision of natural disaster relief that might crowd out demand for 
market-based insurance. Column (29) shows that households with higher flood risks 
generally had less incentive to invest in better seeds and organic fertilizer. As a result of 
higher risk aversion, the mega flood significantly reduced the plot investment of asset-
poor households in non-flood-prone areas as reported in column (30).  
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3.6 Conclusions  
This study contributes to the existing literature on the potential impacts of natural 
disasters. Given its rarity and severity, the 2011 mega flood serves as an ideal natural 
experiment for a study of how affected households cope with largely unexpected natural 
disasters and how these disasters affect their behaviour. We examine the effects of the 
mega flood on preferences, subjective expectations, and behaviour of rice-farming 
households by utilising the discontinuity generated by the flood to construct a variation 
in severe flood experience across sampled villages and households. Data come from  
a field survey conducted in 2014 in Thailand’s key rice-growing areas severely affected 
by the mega flood, particularly in the central-lower north and in the north-east of the 
country. There are 426 sampled households in total from four provinces: Suphan Buri, 
Phitsanulok, Khon Kaen, and Nakhon Ratchasima.  
Our empirical analyses show that experiencing the mega flood significantly changed  
the preferences, subjective expectations of future floods, and safety net perceptions of 
households that were not prone to flooding. These significant changes can be observed 
especially among asset-poor households. However, the mega flood did not have any 
statistically significant effect on households in the high risk group whose farms had been 
flooded regularly. For preferences, non-flood-prone households became more risk averse, 
more impatient, and more altruistic after being hit by the mega flood. An increase in risk 
aversion was found to be associated with higher demand for insurance, while reducing 
productive investment. Increasing impatience also reduced the flooded households’ 
incentive to save. We did not see any evidence that being more altruistic induces social 
capital formation among flooded households.  
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For subjective expectations, the mega flood made households that were not prone to 
floods adjust upward their subjective expectations of future severe floods. We find that 
even though these low-risk households expected a higher chance of floods in the next  
10 years, they were less likely to adopt self-insurance strategies that could help them 
manage and cope with future floods. After being hit by the mega flood, non-flood-prone 
households felt less confident about their ability to deal with future flood events. 
Moreover, the flood also reduced their perceived dependability of social networks, 
probably because they started to realise the limitations of risk-sharing networks in the 
presence of aggregate or covariate shocks. Finally, the mega flood significantly increased 
subjective expectations of government assistance of non-flood-prone households in the 
middle wealth group. We also find that the adoption of self-insurance strategies was 
negatively correlated with the expectations of public insurance among households in this 
group. This finding highlights one of the crucial problems arising from the government’s 
implicit insurance that crowds out private effort through self-insurance during the severe 
flood event. On the contrary, there was no crowding out effect of public insurance on 
household demand for market-based insurance.  
The incidence of the mega flood in 2011 brought some changes in the behaviour of 
households that were not prone to floods. These behavioural changes could be mediated 
through the flood-induced changes in preferences and subjective expectations. We find 
that the flooded households tended not to have savings and have less productive 
investment in better seeds and organic fertilizer, especially among asset-poor households. 
This finding has important implications for long-term economic prosperity and the 
potential welfare impacts of catastrophic disasters. Experiencing the mega flood also 
reduced the incentive of flooded households to insure themselves against future flood 
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risks through on-farm and off-farm diversification strategies. Flooded households had 
higher demand for market-based insurance than non-flooded households. 
The 2011 flood is an exceptional case given its scale and magnitude. With the influence 
of climate change, we expect to see more frequent disasters of this kind and more severe 
damage in the years ahead. It is important to discuss some of the policy implications of 
our empirical findings. During the mega flood, the Thai government had a reputation for 
poor crisis management as well as for inconsistency and imprecision in communication. 
The government should first regain its reputation and give the Thai people confidence in 
public safety nets. In this regard, the Yingluck’s government proposed a comprehensive 
plan of water management for the country after the mega flood, and a similar plan was 
declared as a national agenda and committed to by the National Council for Peace and 
Order (NCPO) following the 2014 coup d’état. If implemented, this plan may help to 
ensure that the government plays a leading role in preventing future flood events or 
mitigating their consequences.  
Second, a reduction of savings and productive investment among flooded households in 
the less wealthy groups signifies the significance of unexpected and severe disasters that 
could make affected households fall into the poverty trap. It is therefore important for the 
design of safety nets and development programs that help facilitate natural disaster risk-
management and risk-coping strategies of agricultural households in the rural economy. 
The government’s policy should aim to promote farm investment and the competiveness 
of agricultural households in the aftermath of severe disaster events − for example, the 
provision of investment loans at a low interest rate.      
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Third, the government should be more careful in providing assistance or compensation  
to flood victims through the official loss and damage assessment so that the provision of 
public insurance will not crowd out any private effort through self-insurance. Our finding 
suggests that households were less likely to insure themselves by engaging in on-farm 
and off-farm diversification strategies following the mega flood. The government should 
therefore encourage these households by giving technical assistance with their farming 
practices and flood prevention infrastructure. The government could also facilitate the 
access to non-agricultural occupation so that farming households can diversify their 
income away from such uncertain activities.  
Finally, we find that flooded households may have realised the limitations of risk-sharing 
among families and social networks within the community in the presence of aggregate 
shocks, and that they are more likely to take out commercial insurance. Under such 
circumstances, the government and financial institutions should develop their insurance 
products so that farmers can benefit from the protection at a reasonable price. In addition, 
the government, in cooperation with the private sector, should also take part in building 
community resilience to future large-scale floods. Such programs should aim to improve 
coordination and collaboration among households in order to help strengthen risk-sharing 
arrangements between flooded and non-flooded households so that they can rely on each 
other, even in the absence of public or private assistance.  
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Table 3.3: Summary statistics of preferences, subjective expectations,  
and behaviour by the 2011 flood exposures  
 
 Village flood (=1) Household flood (=1) 
Not 
flooded Flooded Difference 
Not 
flooded Flooded Difference 
A. Preferences       
Risk aversion (1,2,..,5) 3.931 4.133 0.202* 3.941 4.123 0.182 
 (1.193) (1.065) (0.119) (1.154) (1.124) (0.120) 
Impatience (0,1,2,..,8) 4.880 4.804 -0.076 4.689 5.074 0.385 
 (2.778) (2.538) (0.262) (2.765) (2.528) (0.263) 
Altruism − % grant money given to randomly  
matched villager during normal time (0-1)  
0.274 0.239 -0.035 0.264 0.251 -0.013 
(0.242) (0.243) (0.024) (0.241) (0.246) (0.024) 
Altruism − % assistance money shared to 
randomly matched flood victim in the village (0-1)                
0.241 0.217 -0.024 0.232 0.229 -0.003 
(0.241) (0.228) (0.023) (0.235) (0.236) (0.023) 
B. Subjective expectations       
Probability of mild flood (0,0.1,0.2,…,1) 0.427 0.477 0.050* 0.423 0.486 0.063** 
 (0.281) (0.244) (0.026) (0.272) (0.255) (0.026) 
Probability of severe flood (0,0.1,0.2,…,1) 0.204 0.285 0.081*** 0.192 0.306 0.114*** 
 (0.191) (0.225) (0.020) (0.175) (0.237) (0.020) 
Can rely on themselves during flood (0,0.5,1) 0.430 0.264 -0.166*** 0.450 0.226 -0.224*** 
 (0.406) (0.358) (0.038) (0.406) (0.338) (0.037) 
Can rely on social networks during flood (0,0.5,1) 0.498 0.323 -0.175*** 0.500 0.311 -0.189*** 
 (0.363) (0.322) (0.034) (0.371) (0.301) (0.034) 
Can rely on government during flood (0,0.1,0.2,…,1) 0.374 0.377 0.003 0.333 0.435 0.102*** 
 (0.339) (0.339) (0.033) (0.318) (0.358) (0.033) 
C. Behaviour        
Have savings (=1) 0.719 0.690 -0.029 0.753 0.640 -0.113** 
 (0.450) (0.464) (0.045) (0.432) (0.481) (0.045) 
Build flood protection/adjust farming practices (=1) 0.314 0.408 0.094** 0.299 0.434 0.135*** 
 (0.465) (0.493) (0.047) (0.459) (0.497) (0.047) 
Diversify on farm (=1) 0.085 0.054 -0.031 0.086 0.051 -0.035 
 (0.255) (0.187) (0.022) (0.248) (0.196) (0.023) 
Diversify off farm (=1) 0.099 0.109 0.010 0.080 0.137 0.057* 
 (0.300) (0.312) (0.030) (0.271) (0.345) (0.030) 
Contribute to building community flood  
protection (=1) 
0.347 0.315 -0.032 0.319 0.354 0.035 
(0.477) (0.466) (0.046) (0.467) (0.480) (0.047) 
Lend to or help others (=1) 0.145 0.152 0.007 0.108 0.206 0.098*** 
 (0.352) (0.360) (0.035) (0.310) (0.405) (0.035) 
Demand market-based insurance (=1) 0.566 0.755 0.189*** 0.502 0.857 0.355*** 
 (0.497) (0.431) (0.046) (0.501) (0.351) (0.044) 
Investment in better seeds and organic fertilizer (=1) 0.764 0.739 -0.025 0.741 0.771 0.030 
  (0.425) (0.440) (0.042) (0.439) (0.421) (0.043) 
Notes: The table reports the mean and standard deviation by village- and household-level flood exposures. Standard deviations 
are in parentheses. * indicates difference is statistically significant at 10%, ** at 5%, and *** at 1%.  
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Table 3.4: The 2011 flood and risk preferences  
 
OLS with FE Ordered Probit 
 
Village  
flood 
(=1) 
Household 
flood 
(=1) 
% Paddy 
field 
flooded 
Village  
flood 
(=1) 
Household 
flood 
(=1) 
% Paddy 
field 
flooded 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Full sample (N = 374)       
Flood 0.069 0.338** 0.262* 0.205 0.327** 0.310** 
(0.116) (0.153) (0.144) (0.128) (0.132) (0.150) 
Flood*Flood prone -0.005 -0.277 -0.257 0.001 -0.270 -0.295 
(0.231) (0.195) (0.224) (0.250) (0.190) (0.237) 
Flood prone 0.001 0.087 0.072 0.034 0.143 0.141 
(0.142) (0.177) (0.181) (0.148) (0.170) (0.170) 
F - Joint signt. of all flood variables  0.30 2.93 2.15 3.88 6.48 4.56 
Bottom third (N = 123)       
Flood 0.179 0.772 0.763* 0.270 0.478*** 0.556*** 
(0.198) (0.442) (0.426) (0.226) (0.164) (0.196) 
Flood*Flood prone 0.195 -0.463 -0.725 0.108 -0.298 -0.607* 
(0.569) (0.508) (0.487) (0.565) (0.265) (0.344) 
Flood prone -0.381 -0.178 -0.059 -0.076 0.092 0.211 
  (0.407) (0.235) (0.231) (0.405) (0.211) (0.196) 
F - Joint signt. of all flood variables 0.80 1.64 1.81 3.76 8.52 8.94 
Middle third (N = 123)       
Flood -0.118 0.247 0.095 0.027 0.529** 0.545** 
(0.366) (0.237) (0.198) (0.309) (0.207) (0.243) 
Flood*Flood prone 0.104 -0.027 0.090 0.234 -0.325 -0.372 
(0.367) (0.297) (0.294) (0.402) (0.250) (0.281) 
Flood prone -0.051 -0.138 -0.147 -0.241 -0.068 -0.079 
  (0.341) (0.226) (0.286) (0.267) (0.210) (0.219) 
F - Joint signt. of all flood variables 0.05 0.54 0.27 0.99 6.78 5.05 
Upper third (N = 128)       
Flood 0.088 0.114 -0.018 0.380 0.147 0.008 
(0.211) (0.229) (0.319) (0.256) (0.252) (0.261) 
Flood*Flood prone -0.241 -0.157 0.119 -0.368 -0.395 -0.183 
(0.340) (0.363) (0.360) (0.353) (0.274) (0.283) 
Flood prone 0.324 0.373 0.257 0.432** 0.482* 0.365 
  (0.198) (0.248) (0.225) (0.213) (0.258) (0.234) 
F - Joint signt. of all flood variables 0.27 0.14 0.06 2.23 2.60 0.59 
Other controls yes yes yes yes yes yes 
FE subdistrict village village - - - 
Notes: Dependent variable is the risk aversion parameter. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at subdistrict level. *, **, 
*** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Other control variables included (but omitted from this table) 
are female, age, education-primary, education-secondary, household size, ln asset per capita, land per capita, number of shocks in 
the past 10 years, and constant.   
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Table 3.5: The 2011 flood and time preferences 
 
OLS with FE Ordered Probit 
 
Village  
flood 
(=1) 
Household 
flood 
(=1) 
% Paddy 
field 
flooded 
Village  
flood 
(=1) 
Household 
flood 
(=1) 
% Paddy 
field 
flooded 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Full sample (N = 426)       
Flood -0.238 0.336 0.504 -0.075 0.170* 0.165* 
(0.307) (0.348) (0.372) (0.086) (0.097) (0.103) 
Flood*Flood prone 0.142 0.053 -0.020 0.111 -0.054 -0.021 
(0.424) (0.418) (0.381) (0.139) (0.134) (0.126) 
Flood prone 0.001 -0.165 -0.144 -0.032 0.015 0.002 
(0.319) (0.420) (0.371) (0.112) (0.154) (0.139) 
F - Joint signt. of all flood variables  0.36 0.56 1.16 0.89 3.11 3.08 
Bottom third (N = 142)       
Flood -1.304* -1.919** -1.731* -0.402** -0.326 -0.350* 
(0.734) (0.897) (0.973) (0.197) (0.201) (0.212) 
Flood*Flood prone 1.852** 1.234 1.520 0.701** 0.616* 0.865** 
(0.838) (1.312) (1.176) (0.304) (0.368) (0.357) 
Flood prone -1.050 -0.604 -0.777 -0.439 -0.372 -0.423* 
  (0.947) (0.683) (0.724) (0.294) (0.231) (0.235) 
F - Joint signt. of all flood variables 2.80 3.52 1.66 6.57 3.19 5.87 
Middle third (N = 142)       
Flood 0.204 0.486 0.861 0.127 0.462** 0.607*** 
(0.388) (0.546) (0.844) (0.131) (0.187) (0.215) 
Flood*Flood prone -0.338 0.068 0.110 -0.094 -0.581** -0.681*** 
(0.749) (0.826) (0.840) (0.334) (0.286) (0.236) 
Flood prone 0.843 0.554 0.425 0.253 0.416 0.391 
  (0.508) (0.621) (0.546) (0.260) (0.280) (0.245) 
F - Joint signt. of all flood variables 0.14 0.57 1.69 1.03 6.77 10.41 
Upper third (N = 142)       
Flood 0.086 1.256* 1.559** 0.027 0.231 0.225 
(0.427) (0.644) (0.731) (0.218) (0.213) (0.195) 
Flood*Flood prone -1.209 0.544 0.020 -0.251 0.091 -0.105 
(0.739) (0.722) (0.914) (0.308) (0.299) (0.340) 
Flood prone 0.558 -0.617 -0.365 0.034 -0.160 -0.063 
  (0.686) (0.507) (0.572) (0.285) (0.212) (0.230) 
F - Joint signt. of all flood variables 1.84 3.44 3.58 1.21 2.35 1.84 
Other controls yes yes yes yes yes yes 
FE subdistrict village village - - - 
Notes: Dependent variable is the impatience index. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at subdistrict level. *, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Other control variables included (but omitted from this table) are 
female, age, education-primary, education-secondary, household size, ln asset per capita, land per capita, number of shocks in the 
past 10 years, and constant.   
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Table 3.6: The 2011 flood and social preferences 
 
OLS with FE Ordered Probit 
 
Village  
flood 
(=1) 
Household 
flood 
(=1) 
% Paddy 
field 
flooded 
Village  
flood 
(=1) 
Household 
flood 
(=1) 
% Paddy 
field 
flooded 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Full sample (N = 852)       
Flood -0.011 0.029 0.054 -0.055 0.015 0.112 
(0.035) (0.039) (0.044) (0.169) (0.171) (0.202) 
Flood*Flood prone -0.066 -0.038 -0.034 -0.281 -0.267 -0.248 
 (0.039) (0.046) (0.054) (0.194) (0.246) (0.270) 
Flood*Share when loss -0.017 0.038* 0.022 -0.083 0.210** 0.140 
 (0.025) (0.020) (0.024) (0.125) (0.096) (0.110) 
Flood*Flood prone*Share when loss 0.059 -0.067 -0.067 0.314 -0.340 -0.348 
 (0.068) (0.048) (0.048) (0.342) (0.238) (0.231) 
Share when loss -0.027 -0.046** -0.039** -0.101 -0.205** -0.172** 
 (0.019) (0.017) (0.015) (0.091) (0.084) (0.078) 
Flood prone 0.050** 0.048* 0.040 0.234*** 0.216 0.172 
(0.019) (0.026) (0.023) (0.080) (0.133) (0.111) 
Flood prone*Share when loss -0.017 0.039 0.036 -0.105 0.181 0.168 
(0.023) (0.027) (0.023) (0.113) (0.126) (0.106) 
F - Joint signt. of all flood variables  1.68 3.17 3.20 4.87 15.33 9.11 
Bottom third (N = 284)       
Flood -0.051 0.144** 0.142** -0.255 0.140 0.117 
(0.054) (0.067) (0.066) (0.263) (0.197) (0.191) 
Flood*Flood prone -0.057 -0.264*** -0.252** -0.155 -0.852*** -0.761*** 
(0.081) (0.072) (0.087) (0.414) (0.246) (0.293) 
Flood*Share when loss -0.006 0.033 0.032 -0.116 0.240 0.241 
 (0.054) (0.038) (0.040) (0.285) (0.184) (0.193) 
Flood*Flood prone*Share when loss -0.029 -0.017 -0.015 -0.031 -0.091 -0.072 
 (0.127) (0.100) (0.075) (0.650) (0.477) (0.350) 
Share when loss -0.045 -0.058** -0.058** -0.153 -0.269** -0.266** 
 (0.031) (0.024) (0.023) (0.145) (0.110) (0.109) 
Flood prone -0.029 0.072 0.046 -0.223 0.049 -0.071 
 (0.039) (0.053) (0.055) (0.160) (0.192) (0.178) 
Flood prone*Share when loss 0.083 0.067 0.068 0.352 0.310 0.316 
(0.063) (0.063) (0.048) (0.327) (0.311) (0.229) 
F - Joint signt. of all flood variables  3.52 4.30 2.69 9.79 25.68 8.84 
Other controls yes yes yes yes yes yes 
FE subdistrict village village - - - 
Notes: Dependent variable is the altruism variable measured by the proportion of grant money given to randomly matched villager 
during normal time or assistance money shared to randomly matched flood victim in the village in the situation when respondent also 
experiencing loss from flood. ‘Share when loss’ is a binary variable = 0 if altruism is measured by the former and = 1 if altruism is 
measured by the latter when respondent also experiencing loss. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at subdistrict level.  
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Other control variables included (but omitted from this 
table) are female, age, education-primary, education-secondary, household size, ln asset per capita, land per capita, number of shocks 
in the past 10 years, and constant.   
  99 
Table 3.6: The 2011 flood and social preferences (continued) 
 
OLS with FE Ordered Probit 
 
Village  
flood 
(=1) 
Household 
flood 
(=1) 
% Paddy 
field 
flooded 
Village  
flood 
(=1) 
Household 
flood 
(=1) 
% Paddy 
field 
flooded 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Middle third (N = 284)       
Flood 0.075 0.002 0.023 0.185    0.068   0.153    
(0.072) (0.039) (0.074) (0.346)   (0.260)  (0.435)   
Flood*Flood prone -0.182* -0.135* -0.147* -0.763   -0.697   -0.784   
 (0.092) (0.068) (0.081) (0.492)   (0.478)  (0.556)   
Flood*Share when loss -0.073 0.001 0.029 -0.317   0.006   0.173    
 (0.043) (0.036) (0.035) (0.208)   (0.182)  (0.199)   
Flood*Flood prone*Share when loss 0.066 0.027 -0.020 0.322    0.173   -0.091   
 (0.067) (0.066) (0.058) (0.363)   (0.344)  (0.313)   
Share when loss 0.010 -0.017 -0.023 0.068    -0.057   -0.091   
 (0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.133)   (0.125)  (0.138)   
Flood prone 0.129** 0.156*** 0.147*** 0.670***  0.605**  0.599***  
(0.046) (0.041) (0.033) (0.230)   (0.248)  (0.216)   
Flood prone*Share when loss -0.070 -0.059* -0.044 -0.370   -0.312*  -0.237   
(0.047) (0.033) (0.035) (0.238)   (0.174)  (0.188)   
F - Joint signt. of all flood variables  2.78 1.71 2.67 8.97 3.48 7.31 
Upper third (N = 284)       
Flood -0.042 0.003 0.074 -0.222    -0.165   0.095 
(0.055) (0.064) (0.093) (0.281) (0.300)   (0.364) 
Flood*Flood prone 0.017 0.040 0.036 0.117 0.519    0.594 
(0.052) (0.066) (0.102) (0.284) (0.380)   (0.513) 
Flood*Share when loss 0.031 0.081* 0.014 0.197 0.410*   0.059 
 (0.056) (0.042) (0.060) (0.278) (0.214)   (0.318) 
Flood*Flood prone*Share when loss 0.119 -0.216** -0.177 0.570 -1.108**  -0.932 
 (0.084) (0.085) (0.125) (0.412) (0.432)   (0.640) 
Share when loss -0.048 -0.069** -0.040 -0.245 -0.335**  -0.183 
 (0.037) (0.030) (0.031) (0.195) (0.162)   (0.169) 
Flood prone 0.052** 0.069* 0.067* 0.285* 0.073    0.073 
 (0.022) (0.036) (0.033) (0.165) (0.208)   (0.222) 
Flood prone*Share when loss -0.045 0.120** 0.090 -0.228 0.583**   0.433 
(0.050) (0.051) (0.060) (0.249) (0.259)   (0.303) 
F - Joint signt. of all flood variables  2.27 7.17 2.15 8.18 13.62 4.14 
Other controls yes yes yes yes yes yes 
FE subdistrict village village - - - 
Notes: Dependent variable is the altruism variable measured by the proportion of grant money given to randomly matched villager 
during normal time or assistance money shared to randomly matched flood victim in the village in the situation when respondent also 
experiencing loss from flood. ‘Share when loss’ is a binary variable = 0 if altruism is measured by the former and = 1 if altruism is 
measured by the latter when respondent also experiencing loss. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at subdistrict level.  
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Other control variables included (but omitted from this 
table) are female, age, education-primary, education-secondary, household size, ln asset per capita, land per capita, number of shocks 
in the past 10 years, and constant.   
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Table 3.7: The 2011 flood and subjective expectations of future floods 
  
OLS with FE Ordered Probit 
 
Village  
flood 
(=1) 
Household 
flood 
(=1) 
% Paddy 
field 
flooded 
Village  
flood 
(=1) 
Household 
flood 
(=1) 
% Paddy 
field 
flooded 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Full sample (N = 852)       
Flood 0.048    0.056    0.045    0.048    0.500***   0.442*    
(0.044)   (0.044)   (0.059)   (0.044)   (0.189)   (0.242)   
Flood*Flood prone 0.022    -0.001   0.031    0.022    0.040    0.198    
 (0.025)   (0.026)   (0.039)   (0.025)   (0.133)   (0.184)   
Flood*For mild flood -0.031   -0.071   -0.036   -0.031   -0.369    -0.245    
 (0.056)   (0.067)   (0.093)   (0.056)   (0.268)   (0.377)   
Flood*Flood prone*For mild flood -0.006   0.039    -0.020   -0.006   0.145    -0.091    
 (0.054)   (0.038)   (0.055)   (0.054)   (0.166)   (0.235)   
For mild flood 0.217***  0.229***  0.215***  0.217***  1.007***   0.946***   
 (0.042)   (0.036)   (0.033)   (0.042)   (0.165)   (0.147)   
Flood prone 0.009    0.005    -0.005   0.009    0.032    -0.010    
(0.017)   (0.018)   (0.020)   (0.017)   (0.116)   (0.131)   
Flood prone*For mild flood 0.018    0.002    0.023    0.018    -0.001    0.085    
  (0.051)   (0.052)   (0.044)   (0.051)   (0.212)   (0.176)   
F - Joint signt. of all flood variables  2.22 1.14 1.84 12.51 25.87 33.30 
Bottom third (N = 284)       
Flood 0.046   0.133**   0.144*   0.307 0.780*** 0.801*** 
(0.067)  (0.061)   (0.073)   (0.245) (0.207) (0.241) 
Flood*Flood prone 0.055   -0.045   0.002    0.473*** 0.108 0.278 
(0.049)  (0.051)   (0.060)   (0.144) (0.167) (0.221) 
Flood*For mild flood -0.032   -0.217   -0.234   -0.114 -0.976** -1.045** 
 (0.098)  (0.142)   (0.150)   (0.367) (0.478) (0.518) 
Flood*Flood prone*For mild flood -0.042   0.072    -0.010   -0.277 0.359 0.025 
 (0.096)  (0.145)   (0.143)   (0.366) (0.508) (0.507) 
For mild flood 0.194**  0.254***  0.256***  0.774** 1.072*** 1.080*** 
 (0.086)  (0.050)   (0.048)   (0.355) (0.171) (0.168) 
Flood prone 0.017   0.045    0.036    -0.079 0.057 0.087 
 (0.023)  (0.033)   (0.034)   (0.096) (0.143) (0.136) 
Flood prone*For mild flood -0.002   -0.029   -0.010   -0.018 -0.209 -0.136 
  (0.086)  (0.095)   (0.086)   (0.320) (0.335) (0.302) 
F - Joint signt. of all flood variables  0.76 1.20 1.23 28.48 27.44 16.05 
Other controls yes yes yes yes yes yes 
FE subdistrict village village - - - 
Notes: Dependent variables are subjective probabilities of future mild and severe flood. ‘For mild flood’ is a binary variable =1 if it 
is for mild flood and = 0 if it is for severe flood. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at subdistrict level. *, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Other control variables included (but omitted from this table) are 
female, age, education-primary, education-secondary, household size, ln asset per capita, land per capita, number of shocks in the 
past 10 years, and constant.   
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Table 3.7: The 2011 flood and subjective expectations of future floods (continued) 
 
OLS with FE Ordered Probit 
 
Village  
flood 
(=1) 
Household 
flood 
(=1) 
% Paddy 
field 
flooded 
Village  
flood 
(=1) 
Household 
flood 
(=1) 
% Paddy 
field 
flooded 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Middle third (N = 284)       
Flood 0.045    0.015    -0.024   0.525**   0.462***  0.392***  
(0.054)   (0.046)   (0.036)   (0.257)   (0.171)   (0.146)   
Flood*Flood prone 0.028    0.071    0.127**   -0.204   0.233    0.359    
 (0.044)   (0.065)   (0.054)   (0.253)   (0.234)   (0.273)   
Flood*For mild flood -0.034   -0.048   0.024    -0.237   -0.216   0.061    
 (0.069)   (0.081)   (0.084)   (0.286)   (0.339)   (0.338)   
Flood*Flood prone*For mild flood 0.063    0.034    -0.041   0.295    0.013    -0.303   
 (0.090)   (0.067)   (0.076)   (0.360)   (0.304)   (0.322)   
For mild flood 0.198***  0.200***  0.181***  0.962***  0.941***  0.863***  
 (0.044)   (0.049)   (0.046)   (0.220)   (0.246)   (0.225)   
Flood prone 0.006    -0.033   -0.045   0.099    -0.125   -0.173   
(0.032)   (0.047)   (0.042)   (0.175)   (0.201)   (0.207)   
Flood prone*For mild flood 0.026    0.045    0.065    0.086    0.241    0.329    
  (0.066)   (0.079)   (0.073)   (0.299)   (0.348)   (0.324)   
F - Joint signt. of all flood variables  5.29 0.93 1.71 9.77 26.46 35.97 
Upper third (N = 284)       
Flood 0.064    0.002    -0.042   0.311    0.248 0.005 
(0.061)   (0.050)   (0.051)   (0.235)   (0.289) (0.330) 
Flood*Flood prone -0.062   -0.022   0.033    -0.224   -0.186 0.139 
(0.060)   (0.067)   (0.073)   (0.309)   (0.348) (0.425) 
Flood*For mild flood -0.034   0.025    0.127    -0.177   0.057 0.512 
 (0.060)   (0.081)   (0.095)   (0.260)   (0.360) (0.458) 
Flood*Flood prone*For mild flood -0.007   0.038    -0.043   0.030    0.176 -0.186 
 (0.083)   (0.119)   (0.149)   (0.343)   (0.551) (0.718) 
For mild flood 0.263***  0.238***  0.208***  1.169***  1.078*** 0.942*** 
 (0.042)   (0.032)   (0.037)   (0.213)   (0.180) (0.180) 
Flood prone 0.045    -0.002   -0.023   0.146    0.132 0.001 
 (0.041)   (0.034)   (0.044)   (0.205)   (0.217) (0.256) 
Flood prone*For mild flood 0.016    -0.014   0.014    0.064    -0.037 0.090 
  (0.069)   (0.050)   (0.062)   (0.288)   (0.242) (0.297) 
F - Joint signt. of all flood variables  0.41 0.22 0.65 2.27 2.68 8.50 
Other controls yes yes yes yes yes yes 
FE subdistrict village village - - - 
Notes: Dependent variables are subjective probabilities of future mild and severe flood. ‘For mild flood’ is a binary variable =1 if it 
is for mild flood and = 0 if it is for severe flood. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at subdistrict level. *, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Other control variables included (but omitted from this table) are 
female, age, education-primary, education-secondary, household size, ln asset per capita, land per capita, number of shocks in the 
past 10 years, and constant. 
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Appendix 3-A: Experimental Games and Preference Measures   
 
3.A.1 Risk preferences  
 
Suppose there were seven varieties of rice seeds. Each variety would give a different 
yield, which was also varied according to the situation. Some varieties gave a low yield, 
but were resistant to diseases, pests, and natural disasters. Some varieties gave a higher 
yield, but were not resistant to diseases, pests, and natural disasters, and would give  
a very low yield when diseases, pests, or natural disasters took place. If you did not know 
for sure whether such disasters would happen next year, but you knew that the chances 
that the disasters would happen and would not happen were equal, which variety of rice 
seed would you choose to grow next year? 
 
Rice variety 
Yield (kg per rai) in the year  
that diseases, pests, or natural 
disasters happened 
Yield (kg per rai) in the year  
that diseases, pests, or natural 
disasters did not happen 
1 700 700 
2 630 1,330 
3 560 1,680 
4 420 2,100 
5 280 2,240 
6 140 2,660 
7 0 2,800 
 
By allowing the respondent to choose among different rice varieties, the respondent’s 
seed choice hence reflected his or her degree of risk aversion. A risk aversion parameter 
was constructed based on the payoff of the chosen rice variety as an ordinal index 
ranging from 1 (least averse) to 5 (most averse):  
 
Rice 
variety 
Low payoff 
(Pr = 0.5) 
High payoff 
(Pr = 0.5) 
Expected 
payoff 
Risk class 
Risk aversion 
parameter 
1 700 700 700 extreme 5 
2 630 1,330 980 severe 4 
3 560 1,680 1,120 intermediate 3 
4 420 2,100 1,260 moderate 2 
5 280 2,240 1,260 inconsistent − 
6 140 2,660 1,400 slightly-to-neutral 1 
7 0 2,800 1,400 inconsistent − 
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3.A.2 Time preferences 
 
Suppose you had to choose between two choices (A or B) in eight situations. If you 
chose choice A, you would receive 1,000 baht tomorrow. On the other hand, if you chose 
choice B, you would receive more than 1,000 baht in the next 15 days. Which choice 
would you pick in each situation, when the amount of money in choice B increased as the 
experiment progressed from situations 1 to 8? An impatience index ranging from 0 to 7 
was defined on the basis of when the respondent first switched from choice A to choice B. 
If the respondent did not switch by choosing choice A in all situations, an impatience 
index would be 8, representing the highest impatience level (least patience):   
 
Situation Choice A Choice B 
Impatience index  
if first switch to B 
1 Get 1,000 baht tomorrow Get 1,000 baht in 15 days 0 (not impatient) 
2 Get 1,000 baht tomorrow Get 1,010 baht in 15 days 1 
3 Get 1,000 baht tomorrow Get 1,020 baht in 15 days 2 
4 Get 1,000 baht tomorrow Get 1,050 baht in 15 days 3 
5 Get 1,000 baht tomorrow Get 1,100 baht in 15 days 4 
6 Get 1,000 baht tomorrow Get 1,400 baht in 15 days 5 
7 Get 1,000 baht tomorrow Get 1,700 baht in 15 days 6 
8 Get 1,000 baht tomorrow Get 2,000 baht in 15 days 7 
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3.A.3 Social preferences 
 
[1] Suppose we gave you 1,000 baht in cash today and matched you with another farmer 
from your village, but you did not know who the other farmer was and the other farmer 
did not know who you were. If we gave you a chance to give that person a part or all of 
the 1,000 baht, while keeping your decision confidential, would you give that farmer any 
money? If so, how much?  
 
[2] Suppose there was a severe flood in which everyone in your village, including you, 
was affected and your loss was approximately 50,000 baht. Now suppose that we gave 
you 20,000 baht as compensation and paired you with one of the flood victims from your 
village, but you did not know who the other farmer was and the other farmer did not 
know who you were. If we gave you the opportunity to give that person a part or all of 
the 20,000 baht, while keeping your decision confidential, would you give that flood-
affected farmer any money? If so, how much?  
 
Altruism parameters were constructed from the proportion of money that the respondent 
gave in each of the above situations. These continuous parameters thus ranged from 0 
(least altruistic) to 1 (most altruistic).  
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Appendix 3-B: Elicitation of Subjective Expectations  
 
I would like to ask you a series of questions regarding the likelihood that some events 
will occur. I will give you 10 one-baht coins, and you will be asked to allocate them into 
given intervals to reflect the strength of your belief that each event will happen − each 
coin represents one chance out of 10 or 10 percent. The situation with greater number of 
coins assigned thus reflects the situation that you feel most likely to happen. Subjective 
expectation variables were constructed directly from the number of coins the respondent 
assigned to each situation as the percentage out of 10. 
 
Question 1 
The likelihood that the following flood events will occur in the next 10 years 
No flood 
 
Mild flood (normal or seasonal flood) 
 
Severe flood (similar to the 2011 flood) 
 
(coins) (coins) (coins) 
 
Question 2 Question 3 
The likelihood that the occurrence  
of mild flood will affect rice production 
The likelihood that the occurrence  
of severe flood will affect rice production 
No damage 
Partial 
damage 
Total 
damage 
No damage 
Partial 
damage 
Total 
damage 
(coins) (coins) (coins) (coins) (coins) (coins) 
 
Question 4 
 
Question 5 
The likelihood that  
farmer will receive relief 
when mild flood occurs 
The likelihood that  
farmer will receive relief  
when severe flood occurs 
Yes No Yes No 
(coins) (coins) (coins) (coins) 
 111 
CHAPTER 4 
Shocks, Economic Consequences, and Coping Responses: 
Evidence from Thai Households 
4.1 Introduction 
In Thailand, despite increased economic growth and poverty reduction, many households 
continue to live in risky environments facing both natural and economic threats to their 
livelihoods. Tropical storms, droughts, and crop pests are common threats to farmers in 
many parts of Thailand, while floods are known to affect both rural and urban areas.34 
Household income may also be exposed to idiosyncratic shocks such as ill health or 
covariate macroeconomic events. When financial resources and access to formal safety 
nets are limited, such shocks potentially induce poverty traps. Informal risk-coping 
strategies can help provide some degree of protection for income and consumption, but 
these mechanisms typically come at some cost in the short run or long run, for example 
through incurring debt or depleting productive assets. An understanding of risk patterns, 
their economic consequences, and household informal responses is important for 
developing and improving safety net programs to vulnerable households.  
                                                          
34 This information is taken from the official statistics of natural events of Thailand’s Department of 
Agricultural Extension and Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation.  
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The links between shocks, household vulnerabilities, and risk-coping mechanisms have 
been explored in the literature in different contexts. Most of these studies take a partial 
approach by considering a particular type of shock or a set of similar shocks. Natural 
disasters and health shocks have attracted much attention in the literature since both are 
the most prevalent shocks affecting households in developing economies. The evidence 
on the effects of ill health on household consumption is mixed as shown in Dercon and 
Krishnan (2000) and Asfaw and Braun (2004) for Ethiopia; Gertler and Gruber (2002), 
Gertler et al. (2009), and Sparrow et al. (2014) for Indonesia; Skoufias and Quisumbing 
(2005) and Islam and Maitra (2012) for Bangladesh; De Weerdt and Dercon (2006) for 
Tanzania; and Wagstaff (2007) for Vietnam. Natural shocks (mostly rainfall related) can 
lead to income fluctuation, especially in farm earnings. Income shocks can also translate 
into consumption fluctuation, depending mostly on household’s economic status. Recent 
studies that examine the economic impacts of natural shocks include Asiimwe and 
Mpuga (2007) for Uganda; Thomas et al. (2010) for Vietnam; Skoufias et al. (2011) for 
Indonesia; Porter (2012) for Ethiopia; and Kurosaki (2013) for Pakistan. 
The empirical literature has shown evidence of consumption smoothing to some extent 
and this sheds light on the role of self-insurance as a risk-coping mechanism. Coping 
responses to natural shocks can vary. For example, households often use livestock as 
buffer stocks to insulate consumption from drought-induced income shocks as shown in 
Fafchamps et al. (1998) for West Africa; Kazianga and Udry (2006) for Burkina Faso; 
and Hoddinott (2006) for Zimbabwe. The role of savings has been observed by Paxson 
(1992) for Thailand; Udry (1994) for Nigeria; and Ersado et al. (2003) for Zimbabwe. 
Other sources of income from non-farm transactions could also be a compensation for 
negative income shocks as shown in Porter (2012).  
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A number of recent studies have considered multiple types of shocks. These studies help 
deliver a better understanding of the impacts of shocks on household well-being and 
responses in which households can be affected by multiple shocks at the same time and 
have limited resources to deal with those shocks. Dercon et al. (2005) find that droughts 
and illnesses had negative impacts on household consumption in Ethiopia and that poorer 
households were more affected by droughts, while richer households were more 
vulnerable to health shocks. Rashid et al. (2006) show that asset-rich households in 
Bangladesh were more likely to divest assets and to obtain secured loans, rather than 
relying on unsecured loans. For Mozambique, Kuchler et al. (2012) find that although 
experiencing illness was associated with a significant increase in non-food expenditure, 
households were able to smooth their consumption through credit and labour markets. 
Using data from Ethiopia, Yilma et al. (2014) find that covariate shocks such as natural 
and economic shocks triggered dissaving and also a reduction of consumption, while 
households affected by idiosyncratic health shocks instead resorted to borrowing. 
Heltberg and Lund (2009) and Wagstaff and Lindelow (2014) observe that in Pakistan 
and Laos, respectively, health shocks were more common than other shocks, more 
concentrated among the poor, and more costly.  
But despite the growing evidence from multi-shock analyses, the empirical evidence for 
Thailand remains limited. Using panel data of rural households in three north-eastern 
provinces, Tongruksawattana et al. (2010) find that economic and demographic variables 
such as wealth status, education, and reliance on agriculture played a decisive role in 
determining the choice of coping strategy. Using the same dataset, Amare and Waibel 
(2014) show that income diversification strategies were a common response to dealing 
with climate variability, but not to idiosyncratic shocks. Poorer households were less able 
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to exploit non-farm employment opportunities in order to mitigate climate variability, 
most likely due to the lack of human and physical capital.  
Motivated by multi-shock comparative studies, this study examines the prevalence of 
shocks to household livelihoods in Thailand, the ability of households to protect their 
consumption levels from these shocks, and the coping strategies used to achieve this.  
The study adds to the existing literature on the multidimensional aspects of shocks and 
household welfare, as comprehensive evidence for Thailand is still lacking. This chapter 
first examines the distribution of shocks by demographic composition of households, 
economic status, and location. Next, the impacts of shocks on household consumption 
expenditure and financial status are estimated. This provides some insight into the 
channels through which shocks affect households and their ability to smooth 
consumption. Finally, this chapter investigates which shocks trigger which coping 
strategies and what determines the choice of coping strategy.  
The empirical analysis is based on a panel survey of Thai rural and urban households 
from 2010 and 2012. The data shows that natural shocks dominate in frequency among 
farming households, while health shocks are the most common shocks for non-farming 
households. Experiencing shocks is not only conditional on demographic composition 
but also on economic status and location. Natural and health shocks significantly increase 
household spending, especially through medical services and additional costs of living. 
Economic shocks, however, may have negative effects on household consumption, for 
example due to unemployment or loss of earnings. Cutting consumption expenditure 
seems to be the first line of defence for households in response to economic shocks. 
Dissaving and borrowing are the most common strategies households adopt when facing 
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natural shocks and serious injuries or deaths of family members. Depleting assets is 
another significant strategy to cope with economic shocks and serious injuries or deaths. 
The sale of farm stocks is especially prevalent in dealing with natural shocks. The effects 
of shocks and coping response also vary by wealth level. Asset-rich households are more 
likely to rely on their own savings or deplete assets when affected by shocks, while  
asset-poor and resource-constrained households tend to resort to cutting consumption 
expenditure or relying on external credit and assistance from relatives.  
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 describes the household 
socio-economic panel survey and provides a descriptive analysis of the incidence of 
shocks, their economic consequences, and household responses. Section 4.3 outlines the 
empirical framework. Section 4.4 shows the estimation results. Section 4.5 summarises 
and concludes the paper.  
4.2 Data 
4.2.1 Survey data  
This study relies on data from the socio-economic panel surveys from 2010 and 2012 
collected by the National Statistical Office of Thailand (NSO). In 2005, the NSO started 
tracking households over time in order to create a panel dataset. However, the first three 
rounds of this panel survey did not contain explicit information on the incidence of 
shocks, their consequences, and household responses. Such information was later 
included in the 2010 and 2012 rounds. The survey contains information on demographic 
characteristics, educational attainment, health conditions, household’s experience with 
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various shocks, employment, income, expenditure, financial status of borrowing and 
saving, assets, and housing characteristics. 
Using a stratified two-stage random sampling method, the survey covers all 76 provinces 
of Thailand by first selecting the number of sampled villages from both municipal and 
non-municipal areas of each province, and then randomly selecting 10 households from 
each village. 35  The sampled households, therefore, include farming and non-farming 
households living in rural and urban areas across Thailand.36 The 2010 survey round 
covered 6,111 households. The 2012 survey round included 5,961 households, of which 
5,313 households can be traced to the 2010 sample and 648 households were newly 
sampled. This implies a sample attrition in 2012 with respect to 2010 of 798 households, 
or 13 percent. Tests for attrition bias show that the omission from the 2012 sample does 
not significantly explain most of the outcome variables of interest including the incidence 
and consequences of shocks and household responses to shocks.37  
4.2.2 Descriptive analysis  
Table 4.1 presents the mean and standard deviation of the key variables used in the 
estimation. As for the incidence of shocks, natural shocks and illnesses were the most 
common shocks, reportedly affecting 16 to 23 percent of the sampled households each 
                                                          
35 Thailand has three levels of municipalities which are city, town, and subdistrict. This panel survey 
uses the same definition for municipal and non-municipal areas. However, there is no clear definition 
for urban and rural areas. Using the classification based on population density, economic growth, and 
average income level, households in municipal areas can be considered as living in urban areas, while 
those in non-municipal areas can be treated as living in rural areas.    
36 According to NSO’s statistics, north-eastern Thailand has the largest share of households with 
consumption expenditure below the poverty line of 21 percent on average between 2010 and 2012 as 
compared with other regions, while the national average is 14 percent.   
37 The estimation results from the test of attrition bias are presented in Appendix 4-A.  
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year. There was a rare occurrence of economic shocks and serious injuries or deaths of 
family members, with less than 2 percent of households affected. The table shows 
summary statistics for various measures of per capita consumption expenditure, in which 
food consumption accounted for nearly 40 percent of total expenditure, followed by 
general spending on housing, goods, and services. Households were also asked whether 
they borrowed money from commercial banks, government banks, savings banks, or 
informal private lenders during the last 12 months at the time of the survey, but only  
5 percent of the sample borrowed in 2010 and only 3 percent in 2012 − mostly used for 
investment, education, and general spending. In addition, 70 percent of households had 
savings, mostly in terms of savings accounts in commercial banks, cooperatives, or other 
financial institutions. The primary objective of the savings was to be used in case of 
emergency, followed by general usage and financial security. The average household had 
a male head aged just over 50 years and had completed at least primary education.  
The average household size was three to four members, with an equal number of males 
and females, and about one-fourth of working-age adults worked in agriculture.    
This household panel survey has a unique advantage over the existing national surveys in 
Thailand in its extensive shock modules as it covers multiple types of shocks, their 
economic consequences, and also a range of risk-coping strategies. Table 4.2 shows  
the incidence of shocks between the groups of farming and non-farming households. 
Farming households are defined as those having at least one member working in 
agriculture and earning some money from doing so. By this definition, 44 percent of the 
sample size is classified as farming households, of which about half are located in north-
eastern Thailand and 82 percent in non-municipal areas. Generally, farming households 
can be considered as representative sample of the country’s rural poor.  
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The survey asked the sampled households whether they experienced any of 12 different 
types of shocks during the year prior to the survey. These shocks can also be grouped 
into four main categories: natural shocks, market shocks, economic shocks, and health 
shocks. Farming households were more susceptible to the occurrence of shocks, with 
56.9 percent reporting experiencing at least one shock, compared to 34.5 percent among 
non-farming households.  
Illness of family members that required hospital admission was the most common shock, 
reported by 32.8 percent of households in 2010 and 25.7 percent in 2012. Droughts or 
insufficient rainfall in 2010 were the most acute among natural shocks as the rainy 
season in 2009 ended earlier than usual, resulting in a relatively high incidence of crop 
pests and livestock diseases in 2010. With the impacts of the mega flood in late 2011, the 
majority of farming households in 2012 were affected by floods, storms, and landslides. 
Since the mega flood affected residential areas as well as agricultural areas, the non-
farming households also reported a high incidence of floods, storms, and landslides. 
Among market shocks, high prices of consumption goods were reported slightly more 
often by both farming and non-farming households, than the incidence of low output 
prices or weak demand and high input prices. Only few households indicated the 
presence of economic shocks and serious injuries or deaths of family members.    
Approximately 45 percent of the sampled households reported one or more shocks in the 
past 12 months, while the average number of shocks conditional on experiencing shocks 
was 1.3. This is much lower than what had been observed for Pakistan (65 percent) and 
Ethiopia (73 percent) (Heltberg and Lund, 2009, and Yilma et al., 2014, respectively). 
The most common types of shocks among households in Thailand were natural shocks 
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(45.8 percent) and idiosyncratic health shocks (46.5 percent). Natural shocks were more 
common for farming households compared to health shocks, and vice versa for the non-
farming households. The occurrence of market shocks (34.3 percent) and economic 
shocks (2.7 percent) was far less frequent. The relatively high incidence of natural and 
health shocks in Thailand was also found in other developing countries. Health shocks 
dominated in frequency in Pakistan (Heltberg and Lund, 2009), Bangladesh (Rashid et al., 
2006; Khan et al., 2015), and Laos (Wagstaff and Lindelow, 2014). Natural shocks, 
droughts in particular, were the most common shocks affecting rural households in 
Ethiopia (Dercon et al., 2005; Yilma et al., 2014) as well as in north-eastern Thailand 
(Tongruksawattana et al., 2010).  
Table 4.3 shows the distribution of the four main types of shocks among households, 
classified by their livelihood, urban and rural residence, geographical region, and wealth 
status. Farming households were relatively more affected by natural and market shocks, 
while economic and health shocks were more common among the non-farming 
households. A similar pattern was observed for households in urban and rural areas. 
Rural households, which accounted for about 40 percent of the sample, reported a higher 
incidence of natural and market shocks, while urban households were slightly more 
affected by economic and health shocks. The farming households in the north-east were 
the group mostly affected by natural shocks in 2010, likely due to droughts which  
are common problems in the area. The mega flood in 2011 affected households in central 
and northern Thailand more than those in other regions. Shocks were not uniformly 
distributed across asset quartiles. Natural shocks in 2010 affected households in the 
middle quartiles more than those in the top and in the bottom quartiles. But for natural 
shocks in 2012, with the impacts of the mega flood, households in upper quartiles were 
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slightly more affected. Households in the upper quartiles reported a higher incidence of 
market shocks, while economic shocks were more concentrated among households in the 
bottom quartile. The least wealthy and the wealthiest households were more likely than 
those in the middle quartiles to suffer health shocks.  
Table 4.4 shows the total costs of shocks, self-reported by households conditional on 
having reported a shock. The table shows the percentage of households reporting asset 
lost, income lost, and expenses incurred, as well as the average (non-zero) costs in baht. 
Natural shocks had a great impact on household assets and income. Among several kinds 
of natural shocks, pests and diseases were relatively more costly, especially in 2010, with 
a significant number of households reporting not only asset and income loss but also 
additional expenses (mostly for pesticide and medicine). Following the mega flood in 
2011, flood-related shocks in 2012 reportedly caused higher asset and income loss than 
such shocks in 2010. A significantly large number of households reported that they had 
to spend more when affected by market shocks from higher prices of production inputs 
and consumption goods. Farming households reported that reduced output prices or 
demand resulted in income loss. Economic shocks affected households by reducing their 
income, especially for the non-farming group. Facing health shocks not only prevented 
households from earning, but they also incurred extra medical expenses. Comparing the 
two types of health shocks, serious injuries or deaths of family members resulted in  
a greater income loss (for example, the death of key earning person), while illnesses 
rather increased household spending. 
Following the questions on shocks and consequences, respondents were asked about their 
responses to those shocks. Table 4.5 tabulates the percentage of households that reported 
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a specific coping strategy in response to a particular shock. These coping responses are 
conditional on reporting a shock and are not mutually exclusive. According to Heltberg 
and Lund (2009), these coping options can be grouped into behavioural-based strategies 
(reduce food consumption; reduce education expenses including school dropout; spend 
less on recreation, gambling, or unnecessary items), asset-based strategies (reduce 
savings; borrow from external sources; sell or pawn land and assets including livestock 
and stocks of agricultural products), and assistance-based strategies (borrow or receive 
support of any kind from relatives at no cost). 
The table shows that reducing consumption expenditure was the most salient option for 
the affected households to do in response to shocks in general in which they were more 
likely to spend less on unnecessary items, rather than reducing food consumption or 
education expenditure. The incidence of economic shocks mostly triggered a reduction of 
consumption expenditure as shocks reduced household income. Resorting to savings and 
borrowing from external sources were also prevalent among households. The sale of 
assets was much less common than dissaving and borrowing. When comparing different 
types of shocks, selling assets was relatively more common in response to economic and 
health shocks, serious injuries or deaths of family members in particular. This could be 
the case when extra money is needed urgently in an unexpected situation. Internal 
assistance from relatives can be considered as a source of emergency income support 
among households in Thailand. Households affected by economic and health shocks 
reported the receipt of support of any kind from their relatives more frequently than those 
affected by natural and market shocks. Receiving assistance from others thus seemed to 
be more effective in coping with idiosyncratic shocks. As for the incidence of health 
shocks, though the number of households reporting the experience of illnesses was much 
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higher than that of serious injuries or deaths, 80 percent of the affected households were 
able to cover the treatment costs.   
 4.3 Empirical Strategy  
The empirical analysis starts with investigating the household characteristics that are 
related to the probability of experiencing a specific type of shock. Although the survey 
contains information on the incidence of 12 different events, the analysis aggregates 
these to four broader categories: natural shocks, market shocks, economic shocks, and 
health shocks (see Table 4.2 for a breakdown by category). A probit model is estimated 
that specifies the probability of a household experiencing at least one shock of each 
category as a function of household characteristics and location:  
                             ܲݎ݋ܾ    ሺݏ ݄ ݋ܿ݇   ௜௧ ௡ ൌ ͳ ሻ ൌ  ܆ ௜௧ ᇱ ઺ ൅ ݎ݁݃   ௜ כ ߛ ௧ ൅ ߝ ௜௧   [4.1] 
where ݏ݄݋ܿ݇௜௧௡  = 1 represents the incidence of shock type n facing household i in year t 
and ܆௜௧  is a vector of time-varying household characteristics including demographic 
composition (age and gender of the household head, household size, share of males, and 
share of age groups); human capital (highest education level of the household head); and 
economic status (share of household members working in agriculture as an indicator for 
livelihood and wealth quartiles, based on the value of housing assets and durable assets). 
The model includes region dummies, ݎ݁ ௜݃, and time fixed effects, ߛ௧, along with their 
interaction terms to capture covariate trends in the occurrence of shocks across locations 
and over time. The random error, ߝ௜௧, is assumed to follow a standard normal distribution. 
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The coefficient ઺ indicates which household is likely to report which type of shock as  
a percentage point change in the likelihood that each shock is reported.  
To improve an understanding of the channels through which shocks affect household 
welfare and the ability to smooth consumption, the impacts of shocks are estimated for 
household consumption expenditure, borrowings, and savings. However, these outcome 
variables usually do not follow a normal distribution. The application of linear regression 
such as ordinary least squares (OLS) is therefore not appropriate. Instead, as a number of 
studies have argued, a fixed effects Poisson model (FEP) is better placed to fit such 
skewed outcome variables.38 Although the Poisson model is typically used for count data, 
it does not require the variables of interest to follow a Poisson distribution. The only 
requirement for the FEP estimate to be consistent is that the conditional mean is correctly 
specified (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006; Wooldridge, 2002). For the outcome variables in 
this study, the following specification is imposed:  
                ܧ ሺܻ ௜௧  ȁ܁ ௜௧  ǡ ܆ ௜௧  ǡ ݎ݁݃   ௜ ǡ ߛ ௧ ǡ ߜ ௜ ሻ ൌ ݁ݔ݌   ሺ܁ ௜௧ ᇱ ી ൅ ܆ ௜௧ ᇱ ઺ ൅ ݎ݁݃   ௜ כ ߛ ௧ ൅ ߜ ௜ ሻ      [4.2] 
where ௜ܻ௧ represents various measures of per capita household consumption expenditure, 
total amount of borrowings during the last 12 months prior to the survey, and current 
savings of household i in year t. The vector of shock variables, ܁௜௧, contains indicators for 
the incidence of natural shocks, economic shocks, serious injuries or deaths of family 
members, and illnesses that require hospital admission self-reported by household i in 
                                                          
38 For example, Manning and Mullahy (2001), Buntin and Zaslavsky (2004), Mihaylova et al. (2011), 
Sparrow et al. (2014), and Khan et al. (2015). 
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year t.39 Apart from controlling for observed household characteristics, locations, and 
time fixed effects, the model also includes household fixed effects, ߜ௜, to control for any 
unobserved time-invariant characteristics of household i that could have an influence on 
the relationship between the outcome variables and self-reported incidence of shocks, for 
example tastes, preferences, and health endowments. The inclusion of household fixed 
effects helps minimise any reporting bias arising from the reliance upon self-reported 
evidence of shocks where the sampled households might have a tendency to report  
(or not to report) some information. The coefficient ી indicates a percentage change in 
the outcome variables due to the incidence of shocks.40   
But while this fixed effects approach eliminates any bias from unobserved heterogeneity, 
it is susceptible to potential reverse causality and state dependence. Reverse causality can 
be due to the feedback effects from household consumption to morbidity and mortality 
(Khan et al., 2015). However, one can argue that such feedback is likely to be a long-run 
effect, which is unlikely to be observed over short time periods; therefore it is unlikely to 
bias the panel regression results. State dependence refers to a causal relationship between 
changes in household health condition and consumption preferences (Gertler and Gruber, 
2002). This could induce a potential confounding channel through which health shocks 
affect household consumption, which can be misinterpreted as imperfect consumption 
                                                          
39 From this point onwards, the analysis will not include the events of market shocks since it is most 
likely that the sampled households had a fairly limited view of the markets, thus making their 
responses on market shocks slightly more subjective than other types of shocks. Households observed 
adverse natural events directly from the actual occurrence and had a good view of their physical 
condition and economic status. It is, therefore, difficult to compare the consequences of market shocks 
among the affected households as well as to examine their coping responses. 
40  For the interpretation of ી , considering a FEP model with two shock variables specified as 
ܧሺ ௜ܻ௧ȁ܁௜௧ǡ ܆࢏࢚ሻ ൌ ሺߠଵ ଵܵ௜௧ ൅ ߠଶܵଶ௜௧ ൅ ܆௜௧ᇱ ઺ሻ, the marginal effect of the shock variable ଵܵ௜௧ on the 
expected value of ௜ܻ௧ , while keeping the other variables constant, is ߲ܧሺ ௜ܻ௧ȁ܁௜௧ǡ ܆࢏࢚ሻ ߲ ଵܵ௜௧Τ ൌ
ߠଵሺߠଵ ଵܵ௜௧ ൅ ߠଶܵଶ௜௧ ൅ ܆௜௧ᇱ ઺ሻ. The FEP coefficient ߠଵcan then be interpreted as a semi-elasticity: ߠଵ ൌ ߲ܧሺ ௜ܻ௧ȁ܁௜௧ǡ ܆࢏࢚ሻ ܧሺ ௜ܻ௧ȁ܁௜௧ǡ ܆࢏࢚ሻ߲ ଵܵ௜௧Τ . In other words, ߠଵ ൈ ͳͲͲ reflects the percentage change 
in ܧሺ ௜ܻ௧ሻ due to a discrete change in ଵܵ௜௧ from zero to one. 
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smoothing. However, previous studies on the impacts of health shocks have found no 
evidence of state dependence (see, for example Gertler and Gruber, 2002; Gertler et al., 
2009; Sparrow et al., 2014). This study provides an implicit test for state dependence by 
following Gertler and Gruber (2002), based on the notion that in the presence of state 
dependence, shocks would affect household consumption irrespective of their ability to 
self-insure. Assuming that the ability to smooth consumption depends on wealth status 
and budget constraint, the effects of state dependence should differ between wealthier 
and poorer households. The differential effects of shock on consumption by wealth status 
cannot, therefore, be due to state dependence.  
This chapter further explores a relationship between shocks and household responses in 
order to examine which shocks trigger which coping responses. The 12 self-reported 
coping options shown in Table 4.4 can be grouped into seven main strategies: [1] reduce 
consumption expenditure on food items, education, or miscellaneous expenses; [2] rely 
on or reduce savings; [3] borrow from external sources, including commercial banks, 
government banks, savings banks, or informal private lenders; [4] sell or pawn assets, 
including land and livestock; [5] sell stocks of agricultural products; [6] receive internal 
assistance from relatives in terms of interest-free borrowings or remittances; and  
[7] do not resort to any option. A multivariate regression approach is applied to identify 
the links between a coping strategy and a particular shock type. Since households can be 
affected by not only one, but several shocks simultaneously, it is therefore important to 
control for the incidence of other shocks, as well as household characteristics, and region 
and time fixed effects:    
                 ܲݎ݋ܾ    ሺܿ݋݌݅݊݃      ௜௧ ௠ ൌ ͳ ሻ ൌ  ܁ ௜௧ ᇱ ૎ ൅ ܆ ௜௧ ᇱ ઺ ൅ ݎ݁݃   ௜ כ ߛ ௧ ൅ ߜ ௜ ൅ ݒ ௜௧   [4.3] 
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where ܿ݋݌݅݊݃௜௧௠ = 1 represents the adoption of a coping strategy m when household i is 
affected by at least one of the four main types of shocks in year t. ݒ௜௧ is an error term. 
The coefficient ૎ shows which type of shock is more likely to trigger the adoption of 
which coping strategy, interpreted as a percentage point change in the likelihood that 
each coping option is adopted in response to a specific shock type.   
Finally, this chapter investigates what determines the choice of risk-coping strategy when 
households are affected by shocks (irrespective of shock types) and have several options 
of coping strategies. The adoption of a particular coping option is likely to be a function 
of the affected household’s demographic composition, human capital, and economic 
status. This approach is similar to the analysis of the distribution of shocks, presented in 
Equation [4.1], but using household responses as a dependent variable instead and 
assuming that the choices for coping strategies are not necessarily independent of each 
other. A system of linear equations of the main coping responses is therefore estimated 
on a vector of covariates, while allowing the error terms to be correlated across different 
options. The coefficient of interest indicates which type of household is likely to adopt 
which coping strategy as a percentage point change in the likelihood that each coping 
option is adopted when hit by shocks in general.    
4.4 Estimation Results  
4.4.1 Experiencing shocks 
Table 4.6 shows the marginal effects from probit regressions for experiencing each of the 
four main types of shocks. As for demographic composition, household size is positively 
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correlated with the incidence of shocks in general, suggesting that larger families are 
more likely to be exposed to shocks. The estimation results show that the more 
households engage in agriculture, the greater the chance to report the incidence of natural 
and market shocks. Nevertheless, the incidence of economic shocks is negatively 
correlated with the number of household members working in agriculture. Working in 
agriculture does not affect self-reported health shocks. Household age composition also 
has a statistically significant effect on the probability of experiencing shocks. Increasing 
the share of adult members aged between 15 and 65 years reduces the likelihood of 
facing natural, market, and health shocks, but increases the probability of reporting 
economic shocks. The share of household members aged over 65 years is associated with 
an increased incidence of reporting health shocks, presumably because health condition 
of the elderly is, on average, not as good as compared to the younger age groups. 
However, the gender composition of household members does not have a bearing on the 
probability of experiencing shocks. Male-headed households seem to be less likely to 
experience natural and economic shocks.  
For the measures of human capital, there is a negative relationship between education 
level and the probability of reporting shocks. Households with heads completing at least 
secondary education are less likely to report shocks compared to those with less than 
primary education. However, this is not the case for natural shocks, which are considered 
to be the most covariate shocks.  
When considering household responses by asset-based wealth quartiles, the results show 
that shocks are not uniformly distributed across quartiles. Households in the wealthier 
quartiles are more likely to report natural and health shocks compared to those in the 
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least wealthy quartile. But while there is also a positive wealth gradient for market 
shocks, the effect is only statistically significant for households in the third quartile. It is 
likely that wealthier households have a bigger farm size and more commercial farming 
practices than the poorest households, which increases direct exposure to natural and 
market shocks. On the other hand, economic shocks are more predominant among poorer 
households whose members tend to have lower educational attainment and also limited 
employment opportunity than those of wealthy households. 
The incidence of natural shocks is statistically significantly higher in 2012 compared to 
2010, which is most likely the result of the mega flood in late 2011 that affected 
households in 66 out of 77 provinces in all regions of Thailand. Households in other 
regions seem to report having experienced natural shocks more frequently than those in 
the central region. The explanation for this could be the fact that farming households 
make up only 20 percent of total households in the central region, which is much lower 
than in the other regions where at least 50 percent are farming households.   
4.4.2 Self-reported shocks and consumption smoothing  
Table 4.7 presents the estimated effects of various shocks on household consumption 
expenditure, borrowings, and savings. 41  The results for the full sample suggest that 
economic and health shocks reduce per capita food consumption expenditure by 1.3 to 
3.6 percent. Meanwhile, natural shocks increase food spending by 1.5 percent. A slight 
increase in food expenditure can be explained by the fact that the occurrence of natural 
                                                          
41 This table shows the estimation results obtained from the FEP model which show qualitatively 
similar results as the OLS estimates (not presented here). 
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shocks could result in higher prices of food supplies as a result of a supply shortage. 
There is a marked increase in health care expenditure of 68 percent and 91 percent in 
response to serious injuries or deaths, and illnesses of family members, respectively, 
which is consistent with the findings of Sparrow et al. (2014) and Khan et al. (2015). 
Education expenditure is greatly reduced by 37 percent when households are affected by 
economic shocks, and by 18 percent in the case of natural shocks. Health shocks also 
lead to a slight decline of education expenses by less than 10 percent. While experiencing 
natural and health shocks is associated with an increase in general household spending on 
housing, goods, and services, households who experience economic shocks resort to 
cutting such expenditure by 17 percent instead. One possible explanation for this is that 
economic shocks have direct effects on a loss of earnings which force the affected 
households to cut their consumption expenditure, while natural and health shocks 
increase their living expenses. When affected by shocks, households are generally more 
likely to cut their miscellaneous expenses on entertainment, recreation, social occasions, 
or religious activities by 5 to 8 percent. Nevertheless, there is a 48 percent increase in 
miscellaneous spending in relation to the report of serious injuries or deaths of family 
members, which could be due to the costs of funerals. 
Overall, the incidence of economic shocks results in a significant reduction of total 
consumption expenditure that is net of medical spending by 9.5 percent. When income 
declines, cutting consumption expenditure seems to be a typical response by households, 
while experiencing serious injuries or deaths is associated with additional expenses 
incurred of 15 percent, mostly from an increase in general spending and miscellaneous 
expenses. Natural shocks and illnesses do not seem to have much effect on household 
consumption with less than 2 percentage change in total expenditure. 
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As for households’ financial status, the results show that health shocks significantly 
increase the amount of debt that households borrowed in the last 12 months by 12 to 54 
percent. This finding corresponds with the substantial increase in health care expenditure 
due to health shocks. In contrast, households affected by natural shocks are less likely to 
rely on external credit, due to the limited opportunities to borrow in the presence of 
common shocks. Instead, the incidence of economic shocks leads to a 16 percent 
decrease in the amount of current savings. There is also a slight decline in savings of  
7 percent when households report having experienced illnesses. However, a reduction of 
savings is not the case for households experiencing serious injuries or deaths as dissaving 
might not provide them with enough cash to meet extra medical costs and other expenses 
compared to borrowing.  
Table 4.8 presents the estimation results for the poorest and wealthiest 50 percent of the 
sample, based on asset holdings in the baseline year (2010). It shows clear patterns of 
wealth-differentiated effects of shocks on household consumption. When hit by shocks, 
households in the poorest half are likely to reduce their consumption expenditure by 
several means, especially on general household spending and miscellaneous expenses. 
An increase in food spending suggests that poorer households need to maintain their 
consumption level as it might be low already. Natural shocks and illnesses significantly 
reduce household consumption of the least wealthy group by 2 to 3 percent, but not in the 
other group. The negative effects of economic shocks show that households in both 
groups are not able to protect their consumption from adverse changes to economic status 
in relation to employment and earnings. The incidence of economic shocks reduces total 
consumption expenditure by 15 percent among households in the wealthiest half and by  
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5 percent for the poorest half. Serious injuries or deaths of family members increase total 
consumption expenditure among households in both groups by 13 to 20 percent.  
Household responses to shocks also vary by wealth level. The wealthiest households 
borrow in case of economic shocks and serious injuries or deaths, while the less wealthy 
households seem not to incur more debt in such situations. On the other hand, the poorest 
half, which contains a significant proportion of farming households, tends to borrow 
when experiencing natural shocks and illnesses. Dissaving is slightly more common 
among the least wealthy households, mostly in response to the incidence of natural 
shocks, with a 20 percent reduction in savings.  
4.4.3 Self-reported shocks and coping responses  
Among the 45 percent of sampled households who experienced at least one shock in the 
past year, about 56 percent undertook coping actions in response to those shocks. 
Households that refrained from coping with shocks were mostly those who experienced 
illnesses. The data shows that reducing consumption expenditure, dissaving, and relying 
on internal assistance from relatives were the most prevalent options reported by 14 to 22 
percent of the affected households. Borrowing and selling assets were less commonly 
adopted options reported by 7 to 9 percent of the affected households. Previous studies 
have also confirmed the key role of savings as self-insurance such as Wagstaff and 
Lindelow (2014) for Laos and Yilma et al. (2014) for Ethiopia. In other countries, 
borrowing turns out to be the most common option as shown in Heltberg and Lund (2009) 
for Pakistan; Tongruksawattana et al. (2010) for north-eastern Thailand; and Khan et al. 
(2015) for Bangladesh. Increasing labour market participation is found to be another 
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important strategy for households in Bangladesh and Mozambique as shown in Rashid et 
al. (2006) and Kuchler et al. (2012), respectively. 
To explore the patterns of which shocks trigger which coping actions, Table 4.9 shows 
the relationship between the types of shocks and the self-reported choice of coping 
strategy. Economic shocks are the predominant events to trigger a reduction in household 
consumption. Dissaving is one of the most common strategies households adopt when 
experiencing shocks, in particular natural shocks and serious injuries or deaths. It turns 
out that only households who are affected by natural shocks and serious injuries or deaths 
are likely to borrow. Economic shocks are more likely to trigger asset sales compared to 
other shocks, while selling stocks of agricultural products is slightly more common in 
response to natural shocks. Coping with shocks by relying on internal assistance from 
relatives is also prevalent among Thai households, especially when they are affected by 
idiosyncratic shocks such as economic and health shocks. Equally, the probability of 
getting support is lower in the presence of natural shocks which are likely to affect other 
households in the community and region. Experiencing illnesses that require hospital 
admission is strongly correlated with taking no action, suggesting that the affected 
households perceive the costs of required medical treatment as affordable given their 
disposable income. A possible explanation is that the Thai government’s Universal 
Health Coverage Program successfully gives people confidence that they can get access 
to health care services at affordable prices.  
Table 4.10 shows the estimation results for the choice of coping strategy separately for 
farming and non-farming households. Among the different types of natural shocks, 
farming households are most likely to resort to reducing their own savings in response to 
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floods and droughts. Such events often require additional investments to restore farm 
lands and production means, possibly financed through dissaving, but to a lesser extent 
also reducing consumption expenditure, borrowing, relying on assistance from relatives, 
or selling stocks of agricultural products. The farming households not only use their own 
savings but also rely on external credit to cope with crop pests and diseases. Besides, 
they are more likely to borrow when facing economic shocks while the non-farming 
households are likely to borrow when affected by serious injuries or deaths. Overall, 
borrowing is slightly more prevalent among the farming households compared to non-
farming households. This can be explained by the public provision of agricultural 
financing services in Thailand known as the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural 
Cooperatives (BAAC). BAAC provides financial assistance to farmers, mostly in terms 
of credit at a lower interest rate, which can be used for agricultural and non-agricultural 
related activities. There is no significant evidence for the role of general assets in coping 
with shocks among the farming households.  
By considering the sampled households by their wealth status, Table 4.11 shows similar 
results as in the previous analyses. Households in the least wealthy half are more likely to 
report reducing consumption expenditure when hit by shocks, compared to those in the 
wealthiest half. This finding corresponds with the results in Table 4.8, which show the 
negative effects of shocks on total consumption expenditure among households in the 
poorest group. The wealthier households tend to rely more on their own savings, while 
households in the least wealthy group are more likely to rely on external credit and 
assistance from relatives. Asset-poor households tend not to sell their physical assets in 
the way that asset-rich households do, possibly because their assets are less abundant or 
because the long term income effects from losing productive assets could be deemed too 
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costly. The positive wealth gradient on dissaving and depleting assets is also confirmed 
by Rashid et al. (2006) for Bangladesh and Tongruksawattana et al. (2010) for Thailand, 
but this is in contrast to Khan et al. (2015) who find that poorer households in 
Bangladesh are more likely to deplete their savings and assets. The fact that wealth has 
negative correlation with the reliance on external credit of the affected households is 
consistent with the conclusions drawn by Tongruksawattana et al. (2010) for Thailand 
and Khan et al. (2015) for Bangladesh. The sale of stocks of agricultural products is more 
prevalent among households in the least wealthy group − as expected as it contains  
a larger share of farming households. 
Table 4.12 shows the results relating the self-reported choice of risk-coping strategy  
(as opposed to no specific action) to a number of household characteristics, conditional 
on facing any shock. This provides additional information on what determines the 
household’s eventual choice of coping strategy when hit by shocks (irrespective of shock 
type). The results show that household size is positively correlated with borrowing and 
depleting assets. In contrast, household size has a negative correlation with receiving 
internal assistance, suggesting that relatively larger households are less likely to receive 
support from relatives. Farming households with a larger number of members working in 
agriculture show more variations in the choice of coping strategy, but mostly report 
relying on selling assets and borrowing from external sources. The results for age and 
gender composition do not show a clear pattern on the adoption of coping options.  
The level of education shows a negative and statistically significant relationship with the 
likelihood of reporting dissaving and receiving support.  
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The results further suggest that economic status has a substantial influence on the type of 
coping strategy that households report having relied on. The upper wealth quartiles report 
that they are less likely to reduce their consumption expenditure in response to shocks 
compared to those in the bottom wealth quartile. When hit by shocks, asset-abundant 
households would rather use savings to finance their consumption expenditure against 
income shortage. This is consistent with the findings that the negative effects of shocks 
on total consumption expenditure are more pronounced for asset-poor households. 
Households in the highest wealth quartile are less inclined to incur additional debt or to 
rely on internal assistance from relatives, compared to those in the least wealthy quartile. 
There is no significant correlation between experiencing shocks and depleting assets of 
households in different wealth groups.   
4.5 Conclusions 
This chapter provides a comprehensive analysis of shocks in Thailand by examining the 
distribution of shocks, their economic consequences, and coping responses of urban and 
rural households. The study relies on socio-economic panel surveys from 2010 and 2012. 
It adds to the existing literature on multidimensional aspects of shocks and household 
welfare which is still scarce for Thailand.  
The data show that about half of the sampled households reported having experienced at 
least one shock during the 12 months prior to the survey. In Thailand, similar to other 
developing countries, natural and health shocks were the most common shocks affecting 
20 percent of the sampled households each year. Economic shocks were relatively rare 
affecting only 1.2 percent of the sample. Although there was high incidence of droughts 
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in 2010, health shocks still dominated in frequency, mostly related to illnesses (36 
percent of reported shocks). Under the strong influence of the mega flood in late 2011, 
natural shocks were predominant in 2012 (40 percent), while health shocks were less 
frequent (27 percent). A probit estimation of the probability of experiencing each type of 
shock shows that shocks are not evenly distributed across households. Generally, larger 
households along with households where the head has a low level of education are more 
likely to report having experienced a shock. Natural shocks are more likely to have been 
experienced in the north-eastern part of Thailand and among households in the wealthier 
quartiles, while economic shocks are less prevalent among wealthy households. Health 
shocks are more common among households with a larger share of aged members and 
households in the richest quartile.     
The causal effects of shocks on household consumption show that natural shocks are 
associated with a slight increase in food spending, perhaps due to higher prices of food 
supplies as a result of a supply shortage. However, there are negative effects of economic 
and health shocks on food consumption expenditure, suggesting that there is no complete 
consumption insurance in the case of food consumption which is contrary to some other 
studies where consumption smoothing cannot be rejected. There is also a significant 
reduction of education and miscellaneous expenses in response to shocks in general, 
except that experiencing serious injuries or deaths of family members has a bearing on 
miscellaneous spending, most probably due to the costs of funerals. Clearly, health 
shocks sharply increase health care expenditure as well as general household spending on 
goods and services. Households are not able to insure their consumption against income 
loss from economic shocks to their livelihood. Moreover, this study observes wealth-
differentiated effects of shocks on household consumption. Experiencing shocks is 
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associated with a reduction of total consumption expenditure among households in the 
poorest half, especially on general spending and miscellaneous expenses. On the other 
hand, shocks cause overspending among households in the wealthiest half as shocks 
increase the costs of living. 
As for household responses to shocks, reducing consumption expenditure and relying on 
savings as well as assistance from relatives were the most prevalent options, while 
borrowing and selling assets were slightly less common. Economic shocks are most 
likely to trigger a reduction of household consumption and asset sales. When facing 
unexpected income loss, the affected households would rather consume less or resort to 
selling their assets for the urgent need for cash. Dissaving is the most likely response for 
coping with not only natural shocks but also serious injuries or deaths of family members. 
This finding is consistent with the covariate nature of natural shocks, where borrowing is 
relatively less likely. Coping with idiosyncratic shocks such as serious injuries or deaths 
can be achieved by reducing savings, selling assets, and relying on credit. These options 
can provide extra cash to help meet the cost of medical treatment. However, households 
affected by illness tend to rely on their own savings and support from relatives. Internal 
assistance appears to be a prominent option in response to idiosyncratic shocks, but 
limited in the presence of natural shocks, which are common among households in the 
community and area.  
The adoption of risk-coping strategies not only differs by shock type but also varies 
according to household livelihood. More importantly, borrowing from external lenders is 
slightly more common among the farming households, mostly in response to natural and 
economic shocks. This can be explained by the public provision of agricultural financing 
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services in Thailand that help provide financial assistance to farmers at cheaper prices. 
Finally, the affected households’ choice of coping strategy also differs by wealth status, 
as asset-rich households are more likely to rely on their own savings or deplete assets.  
On the other hand, given limited resources, asset-poor households are more likely to 
reduce their consumption expenditure as well as to rely on external credit and assistance 
from relatives. 
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Table 4.6: Probability of experiencing a particular shock 
 
 Prob(shockn = 1) 
 Natural 
shocks 
Market 
shocks 
Economic 
shocks 
Health 
shocks 
Demographic composition:     
Age of household head 0.0007** 0.0001 0.0000 0.0004 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003) 
Male head  -0.0134* 0.0027 -0.0068*** -0.0110 
 (0.0079) (0.0076) (0.0022) (0.0084) 
Number of household members 0.0118*** 0.0062*** 0.0034*** 0.0361*** 
 (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0006) (0.0024) 
Share of members working in agriculture 0.3308*** 0.1332*** -0.0203*** -0.0095 
 (0.0110) (0.0112) (0.0050) (0.0130) 
Share of male members 0.0022 0.0029 0.0062 0.0263 
 (0.0163) (0.0151) (0.0043) (0.0168) 
Share of members aged 15-65 years  -0.1601*** -0.0593*** 0.0294*** -0.0941*** 
 (0.0205) (0.0197) (0.0065) (0.0215) 
Share of members aged > 65 years  -0.1765*** -0.0863*** 0.0161** 0.0624** 
 (0.0264) (0.0253) (0.0079) (0.0269) 
Human capital:      
Primary education  -0.0106 -0.0044 -0.0022 -0.0052 
 (0.0096) (0.0090) (0.0025) (0.0100) 
Secondary education  -0.0130 -0.0084 -0.0039 -0.0347*** 
 (0.0124) (0.0115) (0.0034) (0.0128) 
Vocational education or training  0.0106 -0.0495*** -0.0182** -0.0242 
 (0.0175) (0.0174) (0.0074) (0.0183) 
Higher education -0.0240 -0.0669*** -0.0108** -0.0504*** 
 (0.0160) (0.0159) (0.0051) (0.0167) 
Wealth status:     
Asset quartile 2 0.0174* 0.0093 -0.0054* -0.0052 
 (0.0105) (0.0099) (0.0029) (0.0110) 
Asset quartile 3 0.0389*** 0.0230** -0.0049* -0.0002 
 (0.0104) (0.0098) (0.0027) (0.0109) 
Asset quartile 4 0.0283** 0.0100 -0.0112*** 0.0315*** 
 (0.0111) (0.0104) (0.0032) (0.0113) 
Geographical region:     
Northern region   0.0882*** 0.0221* 0.0054 0.0137 
 (0.0139) (0.0123) (0.0033) (0.0134) 
North-eastern region  0.1046*** -0.0204* 0.0091*** 0.0011 
 (0.0129) (0.0119) (0.0032) (0.0125) 
Southern region  0.0358** 0.0371*** 0.0028 -0.0079 
 (0.0176) (0.0141) (0.0038) (0.0160) 
Time fixed effect (2012 = 1) 0.2281*** -0.0143 -0.0102*** -0.0943*** 
 (0.0116) (0.0108) (0.0033) (0.0119) 
     
Observations 12,072 12,072 12,072 12,072 
Notes: The table shows marginal effects from probit regressions for the incidence of a particular shock type. The reference 
group for the measure of human capital is the head of the household having below primary education; the reference category 
for wealth status using asset quartiles is the poorest quartile; the reference group for geographical region dummies is the 
central region. Region-time interaction terms are omitted from the table. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% 
and 1%, respectively; robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
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Table 4.12: Probability of relying on a particular coping option 
 
 Prob(coping responsem = 1) 
 
Reduce 
consumption 
Use 
savings 
Borrow 
Sell assets 
or stocks 
Receive 
support 
Demographic composition:      
Age of household head -0.0011** 0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0004 0.0005 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005) 
Male head -0.0026 -0.0269* 0.0090 -0.0257** -0.0268** 
 (0.0116) (0.0144) (0.0082) (0.0102) (0.0118) 
Number of household members 0.0013 -0.0045 0.0063*** 0.0069** -0.0075** 
 (0.0035) (0.0039) (0.0024) (0.0028) (0.0036) 
Share of members working in agriculture 0.0651*** 0.1071*** 0.1239*** 0.1342*** 0.0056 
 (0.0189) (0.0214) (0.0133) (0.0152) (0.0182) 
Share of male members 0.0137 0.0113 0.0044 0.0235 0.0206 
 (0.0270) (0.0321) (0.0167) (0.0221) (0.0282) 
Share of members aged 15-65 years  -0.0007 -0.0501 -0.0614*** 0.0088 -0.0845** 
 (0.0327) (0.0379) (0.0213) (0.0263) (0.0333) 
Share of members aged > 65 years  -0.0303 -0.1130** -0.0621** -0.0193 0.0086 
 (0.0389) (0.0466) (0.0264) (0.0323) (0.0436) 
Human capital:       
Primary education  -0.0086 -0.0378** -0.0081 -0.0029 -0.0415*** 
 (0.0144) (0.0170) (0.0107) (0.0121) (0.0154) 
Secondary education 0.0005 -0.0344 -0.0098 -0.0097 -0.0549*** 
 (0.0198) (0.0230) (0.0136) (0.0153) (0.0198) 
Vocational education or training  -0.0673** -0.0732** -0.0153 -0.0370** -0.0772*** 
 (0.0270) (0.0349) (0.0174) (0.0181) (0.0268) 
Higher education -0.0316 -0.0617* -0.0188 -0.0127 -0.0944*** 
 (0.0271) (0.0340) (0.0140) (0.0197) (0.0256) 
Wealth status:      
Asset quartile 2 -0.0263* 0.0292* 0.0041 0.0203 -0.0018 
 (0.0144) (0.0159) (0.0101) (0.0124) (0.0147) 
Asset quartile 3 -0.0326** 0.0835*** 0.0067 0.0048 -0.0117 
 (0.0149) (0.0174) (0.0103) (0.0122) (0.0150) 
Asset quartile 4 -0.0443*** 0.1180*** -0.0177* -0.0081 -0.0383** 
 (0.0165) (0.0201) (0.0103) (0.0127) (0.0161) 
      
Observations 4,466 4,466 4,466 4,466 4,466 
Notes: The table shows estimates from linear regressions with household fixed effects for the probability of engaging in  
a particular coping strategy when the sampled households are hit by shocks, irrespective of shock types. The estimation allows the 
error terms to be correlated across equations or different options since household’s decision over the range of coping strategies is 
not independent. The reference group for the measure of human capital is the head of the household having below primary 
education; the reference category for wealth status using asset quartiles is the poorest quartile. Region dummies, time fixed effects, 
and region-time interaction terms are omitted from the table. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively; robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Appendix 4-A: Test for Attrition Bias  
 
As discussed in section 4.2.1, the household panel data is subject to attrition between 
survey waves, which can lead to attrition bias (Wooldridge, 2002). In order to test for 
possible attrition bias, a selection indicator (si,t=2010) is constructed and defined as  
a binary variable which takes the value equal to 1 if a household observed in 2010 was 
excluded from the sample size in 2012 (798 in 6,111 households), and equal to 0 if that 
particular household was observed again in 2012 (5,313 households). The test is based on 
linear regressions for the key variables of interest on the selection indicator, while also 
controlling for household characteristics and location fixed effects:   
 
ܼ௜ǡ௧ୀଶ଴ଵ଴ ൌ ߙݏ௜ǡ௧ୀଶ଴ଵ଴ ൅ ܆௜ǡ௧ୀଶ଴ଵ଴ᇱ ઺ ൅ ݎ݁݃௜ ൅ ݒ௜ǡ௧ୀଶ଴ଵ଴ 
 
where Zi,t=2010 represents the variable of interest: [1] the incidence of the four main types 
of shocks; [2] various measures of per capita consumption expenditure, borrowings, and 
savings; and [3] the self-reported choices of coping strategies when faced with a shocks. 
Xi,t=2010 is a vector of time-varying household characteristics including demographic 
composition and human capital variables; regi is a set of region dummies; and vi,t=2010 is 
an error term. The coefficient α indicates differences in the outcome variables between 
households that dropped out from the sample size in 2012 and those who remain in the 
balanced panel that cannot be explained by the other covariates.  
 
The estimation results for the key variables are shown in Appendix Table 4.1. The results 
show a statistically insignificant estimate of the selection indicator for 16 out of 19 
variables in total. There is no evidence of attrition bias for the incidence of any of the 
self-reported shocks or the reported coping strategies. The point estimates are relatively 
small and not statistically significant. There is also no suggestion of attrition bias for total 
consumption, food consumption, or most of non-food consumption items. However, the 
selection regressions do show statistically significant differences for education expenses, 
borrowings, and savings. Nevertheless, the overall results suggest that there is little scope 
for attrition bias in the regression analyses presented in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Conclusions 
This thesis investigates the potential impacts of natural shocks on household welfare and 
behavioural responses in Thailand. The three empirical studies in Chapters 2 to 4 provide 
insights into how shocks affect household income and consumption; how affected 
households manage or cope with shocks; and how experiencing shocks can change 
household preferences, subjective expectations of future risk exposure, perceptions of 
safety net institutions, and behaviour.  
Using measures of extreme excessive and deficit rainfall events, the study in Chapter 2 
finds that there is imperfect income smoothing, in that crop income falls sharply in 
response to the incidence of excessive and deficit rainfall. The results show evidence of 
income smoothing through asset transactions and off-farm employment against the 
incidence of excessive rainfall but not against that of deficit rainfall. This finding 
suggests that deficit rainfall events are more difficult to handle as shocks not only reduce 
crop income but also limit households’ opportunities to smooth income. A second key 
finding is that households are able to smooth their consumption when affected by 
excessive rainfall shocks but not fully when faced with deficit rainfall shocks, in which 
there is a significant reduction of miscellaneous expenses against the incidence of deficit 
rainfall events. Third, landless households are more vulnerable to rainfall shocks than 
landholding households due to their limited ability to smooth income and consumption. 
Landless households also fail to maintain their food consumption and need to reduce 
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necessary spending (education and health care) and miscellaneous spending (recreation, 
luxury goods, and special occasions) when hit by deficit rainfall shocks. Next, dissaving 
and asset sales are prevalent options in response to extreme rainfall events, while affected 
households are less likely to borrow in such events. Finally, this study has implications 
for weather-based index insurance that is more accurate and independent of on-farm 
inspection and loss assessment, especially for managing drought risk. 
The second study in Chapter 3 examines the consequences of the mega flood in 2011. 
This study first shows that the mega flood did not have any significant effect on the 
preferences or subjective expectations of rice-farming households in the high-risk group, 
which were flooded regularly. However, getting hit by the mega flood made households 
living in non-flood-prone areas more risk averse, more impatient, and more altruistic. 
Asset-poor households were generally more likely to be affected by the flood than better-
off households. Second, after experiencing the mega flood, these low-risk households 
also adjusted upward their subjective expectations of future severe floods. Third, only 
households in the middle wealth group had higher expectations of public insurance 
following the severe flood event, when the Thai government played a leading role in 
providing disaster relief and other assistance to flood victims. Next, safety nets through 
social networks within the community became less dependable after the flood, signifying 
the limitations of risk-sharing in the presence of aggregate shocks. Finally, the mega 
flood also influenced households’ behaviour, potentially through the changed preferences 
and subjective expectations. Households directly hit by the flood were less likely to have 
savings and to engage in self-insurance mechanisms, as well as to make productive 
investments, but more likely to take out commercial crop insurance, especially those in 
the bottom and middle wealth groups.  
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The third study in Chapter 4 examines multidimensional aspects of shocks by taking into 
account multiple types of shocks. First, it shows that natural and health shocks are the 
most common shocks in Thailand. Second, shocks are not uniformly distributed across 
households but vary according to demographic composition, livelihoods, and economic 
status. Bigger households are more likely to report having experienced shocks in general. 
Natural shocks are more concentrated among farming households in the north-east of the 
country and more pronounced among wealthy households. Economic shocks are less 
common among households with higher education level and among richer households. 
Health shocks are prevalent among households with aged members and in the wealthiest 
group. Third, there is evidence of imperfect consumption smoothing, which opposes the 
findings in Chapter 2. Economic shocks and illnesses have negative impacts on total 
household consumption, especially through a reduction of food consumption, education, 
and miscellaneous expenses. In contrast, serious injuries or deaths of family members 
increase household spending, most probably due to the costs of medical treatment and 
funerals. A slight increase in total consumption expenditure due to natural shocks can be 
explained by higher prices of food supplies and other consumption goods as a result of  
a supply shortage. Next, this study provides supporting evidence of wealth-differentiated 
effects of shocks, in which shocks reduce consumption expenditure among poorer 
households but lead to overspending among richer households. Finally, asset-rich 
households are more likely to resort to their own savings or to deplete assets, while asset-
poor households prefer to reduce their consumption expenditure and to rely on external 
credit and assistance from relatives.  
